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LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

CONDUCTED BY

JAS. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

J. A. SINGMASTER, D.D.

FREDERICK G. GOTWALD, D.D.

WITH THE SPECIAL CO-OPERATION OF

PROF. S. A. ORT, D.D., LL.D.

PROF. F. D. ALTMAN, D.D.

PROF. ALFRED HILLER, D.D.

PROF. F. P. MANHART, D.D.

PROF. J. L. NEVE, D.D.

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THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

JANUARY, 1908.

ARTICLE I.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY. ✓

BY PROFESSOR C. F. SANDERS, A.M., B.D.

We hear much nowadays about the "new". In every department of thought the "new" is being spoken of with a significant emphasis. We are even offered books of the comprehensive bird's-eye-view type on "Our New Knowledge." It is not strange therefore that we should have a "new" Psychology. The fact however that the air is surcharged with the notion of the "new" is not new. Ever since the beginning of reflective thought each succeeding age has, just as a mother would speak of her child caressingly, characterised its own contributions with the term which expresses curious interest and a degree of self-conscious satisfaction,—*the new*. The appellation is commonplace, but it has frequently made the impression of a novelty to be suspected, to the great confusion of unreflective minds. As a term applied to the thought world it comprehends the results of the efforts toward progress. Its significance is vitality. Nothing more. The character of the "new" may be either beneficial, pernicious, or a thing indifferent, but the quality which gives character and produces results must not be confused with its newness. Thoughts and things are to be resisted or fostered in proportion as they are beneficial or pernicious. Newness *per se* does not furnish the basis for a value-judgment.

In undertaking to write of The New Psychology our main purpose is neither apologetic nor critical. We purpose rather

to set forth what is comprehended under the qualifying term "new" as applied to psychology. Even this is no small matter. We may have occasion to clear away misunderstandings and per consequence appear apologetic at times; on the other hand we may have to pass judgments which will appear critical; but apology and criticism are not our purpose. We shall indulge them only so far as clear presentation may require—never to approve or condemn the new *per se*. ..

The quantity of discussion devoted to a given subject only registers the attention which for the time being is given it by the thought world. Attention however rests upon two anterior facts, namely, personal interest and the force with which the subject presses its claim. Personal interest in questions pertaining to the soul is older than philosophy. It rises and falls with the promise of answer to the questions which the persistent curiosity of the mind ever and anon propounds concerning the essence behind the mysterious phenomena of mind. The force with which the new psychology has been pressing its claim is due, largely at least if not wholly, to the revolution which has taken place in this branch of investigation during the past thirty or forty years. The apparent getting hold of psychical facts which have forever been eluding the scientific mind has seemed to promise solutions of problems formerly enshrouded in profoundest mystery. As a matter of fact the real advance has been only the getting hold of functions in scientific fashion, the essence behind them is as mysterious as ever. But to have reduced the study of the functions of the mind to a scientific basis is perhaps the most colossal achievement of human genius in all time.

As Kepler (1) and Galileo transformed the science of Astronomy, so Fechner and Wundt are transforming the science of psychology. Had these psychologists performed their labors under like conditions they would no doubt have met a similar fate. The native restlessness of the human mind impels it ever to persist in its attempt to comprehend the universe. This accounts for its incessant activity, its ingeniousness, its daring, and its undaunted perseverance in spite of seeming impossibilities. The

(1) Kepler published his *Nova Astronomia* in 1609, the same year in which Galileo made his first telescope. The mathematical formulas and the observational instrument made the new science secure.

fact that what previous generations have regarded impossible has been achieved, has given stimulus to the support of a boundless hope. Bright hope, by the very force of its allurements, arrayed against seeming insuperable difficulties, is maddening. Its force frequently inspires attempts to leap the barriers and capture the prize which is apparently so near. Suppression of this natural rage is subserved by the correlative mental element known as conservatism. This function, sometimes regarded as dogged foginess, has recently been dignified by the appellation, "the governor of the engine of progress." The impulse insures the progress, the governor guarantees the safety. Man were in a bad state without either. Neither can say to the other "I have no need of thee." What has sometimes been forgotten, however, is the fact that the thought world is a sphere all its own. Error can be refuted only by truth, and *truth is essentially thought*. The only measures which can avail against thought, scientific, philosophic, or religious, are facts and inferences which are better authenticated and more carefully guarded. The invocation of any other power is a remnant of savagery, which substitutes blows when argument fails. The rack and the stake missed the mark. The Fuggers could not by purchase stay the march of the new learning, so neither is the thought tendency of to-day a purchasable commodity. We are confronted by the stern fact, that thought can be met only by thought,—error demands refutation.

From Socrates until now certain classes of men have made it a practice to condemn theories by the simple assertion that they are in conflict with the idea of God. The practice has wrought much harm. Belief in God is practically universal. Hence a judgment, cast in generalities, that a given theory is erroneous because it conflicts with the idea of God has the effect of prejudicing the public mind against the theory. This seriously hampers calm, unbiased investigation, as well as the balance which would be afforded by intelligent judgment from all sides. But the catastrophe comes, as has so frequently been the case, when the condemned theory is vindicated by undeniable facts. Disillusioned by the force of persistent facts the mind reverses its judgment and concludes, God has been used to prejudice facts.

The outcome is a mind prejudiced against God. It is thus that what was intended is lost by an indolent *petitio principii*.

It is serious business, this living and thinking. Save a few insignificant pessimists, men believe themselves engaged in bringing to pass the Golden Age of Humanity's Ideal. Whatever God may contribute towards the consummation is not our first concern. It is ours to follow with scrupulous consistency the thread of law which pervades God's universe. (2) The law is as unchangeable as its Author. Upon him who would substitute the *use* of God for strenuous investigation there must eventually come shameful defeat. If this seeming digression requires apology, it is given in the fact that to me the most deplorable practice of man has been the attempt to suppress by force on the one hand and to foster by purchase on the other. Andrew Carnegie's endowment for the support of superannuated educators of institutions which are anchored to no religious theory is a subtle bid for the purchase of a conviction attested by 2000 years of history.

This, I submit, is the condition under which human beings perform their allotted task; namely, the world-theory must take account of the sum-total of the problems submitted by science, philosophy, and religion, and these must be worked into a consistent unity according to the laws of mind.

A new thing is always conspicuous. This makes it attractive and opens it at once to the serious student and the flippant shallow brain. The former finds in it stimulus to quicken his thinking powers, the latter a mark for his shafts of cheap irony. When it so happens that one reads only the satire or cheap wit of the shallow, he may be relieved of much hard thinking, but he has a poor chance of getting any correct knowledge.

(2) I like the words of Abraham Davenport before the Connecticut legislature in 1780, when it became so dark that men moved to adjourn because they believed the day of judgment at hand:

"This well may be
The day of judgment which the world awaits;
But be it so or not, I only know
My present duty and my Lord's command
To occupy till He come.

So at the post where He hath set me in His Providence
I choose for one to meet Him face to face.
Let God do His work. We will see to ours."

The following clipping from a recent periodical is typical of the length to which some people can go in their smart judgment on matters which are occupying the minds of the world's foremost thinkers:

"RECEIPT FOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

To one grain of disputed truth, add two pounds of theories and one quart of sheer nonsense. Borrow a little real fact from the natural sciences, sprinkling thoroughly with absurd imaginative powers. This addition will seemingly increase the grain of disputed truth. Mix together with an intelligible mass of tommyrot, and an unintelligible mass of ideas. Add a pretty picture or two, publish in book form, and sell for \$2.00 per. Moral: Where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise,—unless you can make money on it."

Another which Prof. James quotes in his Talks to Teachers attempts its satire on the terminology which a profounder investigation has created (3)

"Such an advertisement," says Prof. James, "is, in sober earnest, a disgrace to all concerned." (4)

I have indulged the above quotations in order to show the capabilities of such as are "too wise" to examine into the merits of the progress of science, and, to them, that's the end on't. We shall now endeavor to indicate the specific features of the *New Psychology*.

(3) "What is Apperception? For an explanation of Apperception see Blank's *PSYCHOLOGY*, Vol. — of the Education series, just published.

The difference between Perception and Apperception is explained for the teacher in the preface to Blank's *Psychology*.

Many teachers are inquiring, "What is the meaning of Apperception in educational psychology?" Just the book for them is Blank's *PSYCHOLOGY* in which the idea was first expounded.

The most important idea in educational psychology is Apperception. The teacher may find this expounded in Blank's *PSYCHOLOGY*. The idea of Apperception is making a revolution in educational methods in Germany. It is explained in Blank's *PSYCHOLOGY*, Vol. — of the Education series, just published.

Blank's *PSYCHOLOGY* will be mailed to any address on receipt of \$1.00."

(4) Talks, p. 155.

I. ITS ORIGIN.

Even the most casual student of philosophy knows how Cartesian Dualism severed mind from the possibility of interaction with the physical world by its definitions. Between the *substantia finita cogitans sive mens*, and the *substantia extensa sive corpus* there is an unbridged chasm. (5) Occasionalism offered but a poor method of reconciling the dilemma which so completely rent the universe asunder. The French materialists took Descartes' conclusion of the impossible interaction between mind and matter at its face value. It refused to accept, however, a denial of their concomitant action. Hence all that was left was the conclusion that the mind must be accounted for as a material phenomenon. Soul, however, was not to be ruled out of the thinking of mankind by forced theory which rested upon divisive definitions grounded in speculative philosophy. This served to turn the current of philosophy from metaphysics to epistemology—from, what is? to how do we know? This was done by Locke. Berkeley and Hume carried Locke's theory of sensation into a theory whose outcome is scepticism. Just as Socrates came to the rescue of philosophy when it had fallen into disrepute through sophistry, so Kant undertook to find a solid foundation in the ruins of Hume's scepticism. His method was that of criticism. The path to certainty is through criticism of the given. The Kantian result is transcendentalism. Then followed Herbart with the principle, *the real is the given*. In order to prevent knowledge escaping us he raised the demand: *Psychology must be reduced to an exact science*. (6) His method was to reduce all mental forms to the simple element of presentation. The mental processes were conceived in terms of a sort of calculus expressing the manner in which ideas, presentations, were apperceived. His method was foredoomed to failure because of the impossibility of defining the values of his presentations. (7) His demand for a scientific psychology how-

(5) Falckenberg; Hist. Mod. Phil. p. 95. See also Kuno Fischer, Descartes. 381. Weber; Hist. Phil. 319; Calkins Persistent Problems of Philosophy. 54f. Prof. Calkins says: "But even Descartes' defective arguments have at least the merit of stating clearly inevitable problems." 55.

(6) Herbart's Psychology as Science appeared 1825.

(7) Überweg's History of Philosophy gives a pretty good account of his method. Vol. II, p. 276. Also, Ribot, German Psychology of To-day, 24-67.

ever was the prophecy of a new science. His failure had defined the course which must be taken. A method of determination of psychical facts must be worked out. *The first demand of science is a standard of exact measurement.*

The supply of (scientific) facts presently became possible through the labors of men in widely different fields of research. Lazarus and Steinthal strike out into Ethnic Psychology and bring together the facts of the psychical development of the peoples. As touching the validity of their facts, their method is similar to that of history. From a wide range of careful observation they seek to secure the real psychic elements by a process of abstraction. (8) Ernst Heinrich Weber, a specialist in physiology, discovered a standard for the measurement of sensation. (9) Weber's most noted disciple was Gustav Theodore Fechner who developed Weber's law into a universal law of psychophysics. (10) Almost contemporary with Fechner was Lotze who, as specialist in medicine and philosophy, made valuable research into problems specifically psychological. His *Medizinische Psychologie* (11) "is intended to be a physiology of the spiritual life as distinguished from the physiology of the bodily life." Stratton says of Lotze: "The main current of the experimental stream came less directly through him than through Weber and Fechner; but he was a man incomparably larger than either of them, and must certainly be acknowledged as one of the great forces in developing the work." (12) Such was the line of preparation upon which Wilhelm Wundt followed. He founded his laboratory at Leipzig in 1879, which marks the birth of Experimental Psychology. "To-day there certainly are more than thirty psychological laboratories in the United States

(8) Lazarus published his first edition of *The Life of the Soul*, in Monographs concerning its Phenomena and Laws in 1857.

(9) Weber, *On Sense of Touch and Organic Feeling*. 1849.

(10) Fechner, *Elemente der Psychophysik*...1860. Villa says: "Fechner may truly be called the founder of scientific psychology." *Contem. Psyc.* 35, see also p. 137 f. This judgment commits its author to Fechner's psychophysical parallelism according to which the psychical and physical are not different in substance, but only in aspect. We prefer to regard Fechner as the last step in the forecourt of scientific psychology. See Calkins. *Intro. to Psyc.* p. 443. Jerusalem says: "Fechner and Wundt are to be named together as the founders of modern psychology." *Einleit. in d. Phil.* 21.

(11) Appeared 1852. See Erdmann *Hist. Phil.* III. 307.

(12) *Exper. Psyc.* 15.

alone." (13) We have dwelt upon the line of the development of Experimental Psychology because of its distinctive importance. We have to-day, Ethnic Psychology, with the methods of the science of history; Comparative Psychology, with the methods of observation of the natural sciences; and Experimental Psychology, with the methods of the Laboratory. And, inasmuch as the results of observation are all brought to the test of the results of the laboratory, the following is justified: "What is, however, generally regarded as the characteristic and distinctive feature of the new psychology is the use of experimental methods analogous to those of physics and physiology." (14)

Before the method of experiment all empirical psychology had to depend on introspection. With the introduction of experiment there has come a controversy between the introspectionists and the experimentalists. Introspection is essentially speculative in its presuppositions and is a true child of the period when psychology was regarded a department of metaphysics. Villa observes: "if we examine the results achieved in recent times through the exclusive application of that method, we find that scarcely anything has been added to the psychology of the time of Wolff." (15) "By their fruits ye shall know them."

However, even though introspection alone is incompetent, it is the indispensable correlate of experiment. It is by the co-ordination of the two methods that positive results are obtained. They are supplemental and reciprocally corrective. It is in their mutual recognition that the path of progress is found. (16) Ladd, for example, says: "Experiment has become in these modern times a most valuable and even indispensable means for constituting and improving the science of psychology. — Experiment belongs to truly psychological method only so far as it is constantly accompanied by introspective examination of the phenomena of consciousness." (17) It may indeed be said, the

(13) Calkins; *Intro.* 445. See also Scripture: *New Psychology.* 463ff. The labors of Helmholtz were also directly tributary.

(14) Baldwin; *Dict. Phil. and Psych.* II 387.

(15) *Contem. Psych.* 130.

(16) Jerusalem *Einl. in d. Phil.* 2 Aufl. 29 gives a nice statement of the controversy.

(17) *Descriptive Psych.* 22f.

experiment without the introspective record is but half of one whole. There is profound truth in Jodl's remark that consciousness is a veritable transubstantiation. (18) In an article on the Dangers from Experimental Psychology (19) Prof. Munsterberg "maintains that the psychologist who discovers a measureable sensation or feeling stands on the same level with the physicist who discovers a metal which is not in space and time and subject to the law of causality." The restriction here implies the demand of a careful combination of introspection with experiment. Where this occurs Munsterberg's (20) warning is nullified.

The problem underlying the justification of the *new* psychology is the matter of its differentiation from philosophy. Wundt will have it a strictly natural science. The controversy turns on what is to be regarded as the subject matter of psychology,—whether it shall be confined to the finding of the facts and laws of psychical functions or whether it shall include definitions of psychical essence, and furthermore what attitude it shall take to preconceptions concerning soul. Wundt is emphatic for the restriction of the discipline to psychic phenomena and their laws, and indeed, throwing preconceptions aside psychophysical phenomena and laws. He says: 'Psychology not only has no use for the concept (soul-substance), but, in so far as it has been real science, it has never been used by it, and metaphysics has as little place in psychology as for example in biology or history.' (21) Similarly Titchener: "The question; Is there anything behind the mental process, any permanent mind?—is a question which has often been asked, and which it is well worth while to try to answer. But it is not a question which can be raised by psychology. Scientific psychology has freed itself entirely from the

(18) *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*. 57. For a splendid statement of the combination of introspection and experiment see Judd; *Psychology* (1907) pp. 5-11, also "Experiment never supplants but only supplements and strengthens introspection." Calkins, Intro. to *Psyc.* 11. Villa, *Contem. Psyc.* 137-172.

(19) *Atlantic Monthly*. Feb. 1898.

(20) Prof. Munsterberg has gained considerable notoriety by an article in the October number '07, of McClure's Magazine in which he proposes the psychological experiment as a 'third degree' method for the detection of criminals. He is by no means anti-experimentalist, nor has he become an experiment fanatic.

(21) *Grundzuege d. Physiologische*, 5 Aufl. III, 773 n. 1.

influence of philosophy (epistemology and metaphysics.)" (22) On the other hand Prof. James says: "When we talk of psychology as a natural science, we must not assume that that means a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid ground. It means just the reverse; it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint. —The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when they come, as come they some day surely will. —When they do come however, the necessities of the case will make them metaphysical." (23) It is because the phenomena of mind lie on the borderland between the sensible and the supersensible world that this peculiar situation obtains. We may analyse *things* as far as we will without having the problem of essence or ultimate reality arise. But not so with *mind*. Wundt presumes against the necessities in the case. The ultimate analysis of mind forever raises the question of the nature of ultimate reality, and the last psychologic problem can never be solved until its metaphysics is determined. This, however, does not preclude scientific methods all the way to the limits of scientific possibility. It does however mean that psychology differs from other sciences in its necessarily raising ultimate questions which the other sciences do not.

The purpose of the scientific psychologists thus appears to be to rid the subject of the hindrances of preconception and prejudice which follow inevitably upon metaphysical theory. Wundt and Titchener assume the riddance attained. James scouts it and sees a master metaphysician as the supreme demand. However James, even as Wundt and his school, would restrict the investigation to scientific fact and exclude any and every metaphysical preconception; neither would Wundt and Titchener be regarded as psychologically settling any metaphysical question by saying that psychology has nothing to do with metaphysics or soul-ontology. Wundt is at pains to clear himself of any such charge. He uses his theory of parallelism with masterful skill to this end. With Fechner psychophysical parallelism was a metaphysical principle. That is, the psychic and physical phenomena which we experience are parallel modes of the manifes-

(22) *Outlines of Psych.* 12 & 28.

(23) *Psychology* (briefer course) 467 f.

tation of one and the same fact or process. With Wundt, however, parallelism is postulated as heuristic principle only. As such its use is wholly free from metaphysical implication. As heuristic principle he would use it in explaining all the phenomena which involve mind and body. "The principle of psychophysical parallelism in the sense here established is heuristic not only because it confines itself exclusively to the facts, for which it is immediately required, but especially also in so far as it refers fundamentally to the immediate reality of phenomena, not to the metaphysical essence of things." (24) Wundt may hold metaphysical views which others will refuse to accept, but he would clear his psychology from any prejudice which might result from the rejection of his metaphysics. Here I have nothing to say on Wundt's metaphysics. The whole purpose at present is to set forth that the new psychology is characterised by the determined effort to investigate on the basis of empirical fact,—fact scientifically measured and systematized—free from all metaphysical implications. Whether it has succeeded or can succeed, in such attempt is another problem entirely. The new psychology intends to be unmetaphysical. In this intention it is doing no more than all other particular sciences did at some time in their history. And this it does without either positing or negating anything, even as the other sciences.

II. CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS.

The following sentence, from the review of a book on psychology which recently came from the press, fell under our eye: "When you buy a geometry or a chemistry you know what you are going to get, but when you buy a psychology you may get anything from ghosts to logarithms." The observation is suggestive. It brings together the wide range of psychological appliances into a single sentence. The phenomena of dreams, hallucination, telepathy, hypnotism and the wide range of pathological evidences which bear on psychic life are being searched through in order to learn what they may reveal as to the nature of mind. From these onward the phenomena of normal mental life in their varied stages of development, both racial

(24) *Grundzuege* III, 773.

and individual, have been approached with careful observational methods and the respective facts turned over to the principles of higher mathematics even as in physics and chemistry..

Investigation into the phenomena of abnormal mind has produced a prodigious literature. There is no doubt much chaff. But modern psychology regards the genius, the eccentric, and the freak (whether insane or otherwise) as presenting a problem of mental differentiation by the processes of nature which show, by emphasis, the nature of certain mental facts. The genius and the degenerate are psychological extremes which under normal conditions are none the less existent even though subordinate to a different control. The investigations conducted by the societies of psychical research must proceed along the laborious path of collecting descriptive material, sift it, classify and evaluate and classify again in the hope of finding what is trustworthy in what is known as thought transference, visions, spiritualism, &c. In the investigation of pathological cases, degeneracy, &c., the problem resolves itself into biographic sketches in the place of the introspective records, and measurements of the various nervous structures of the body in order to find to what parts the divergence from the normal is due. Heredity, environment, brain size, quality of blood, nutrition, and general physical condition are all asked what light they can shed on the problem of mind. The only point which can raise an issue here is as to whether such facts can be legitimately regarded as bases for psychical deductions. The modern psychologist is certain that these physiological "ends" of psychophysical phenomena are real signs of psychical facts which manifest themselves through them.

We are perhaps less concerned about the genius and the eccentric because we have little interest in protecting society against them and no one seems to regard the attempt to grow a race of geniuses as profitable. Hence these are studied only for what they may reveal as to the possibilities of mind and the conditioning grounds. Society, however, has an immediate concern with the insane, the idiotic and the criminal. The question of responsibility must be settled on psychological grounds. Upon the degree of responsible capacity rests the relation of the individual to society. Here we are at the boundary of an almost

limitless field. It is through mind that the individual is a member of the organism of society and exerts the functions of his membership. Whatever may affect mind for the weal or woe of society is matter of immediate concern, and the psychologist regards it his duty to get all the facts and make his people wise. The results of past investigations have assured him that he is on safe ground for a large part of his problem at least in the realm of physiological psychology. He refuses to be prejudiced in his investigations by speculative preconceptions.

The psychology of religion has in a large measure become a distinct field of investigation. The importance here is of inestimable value to the Church and church workers. The material is forthcoming for a new philosophy of religion, a philosophy which promises things grand and beautiful in the real sublimity of man which the study of religion reveals. The genetic method discovers the vital periods in psychical development and enables us both to know the times and the means for religious development as well as their real value for the highest development of the person.

However, the most important distinction of the new psychology clusters around experiment. Among the experimentalists Wundt is easily chief. He it is that has created the method. Starting out on the clue given by Weber, he founded his laboratory in 1879. The subjects needed for experimentation responded to the adventurer and the project soon became a fact. For thirty years results have been flowing from that laboratory which have been the admiration of the world. It gave the impulse for the founding of laboratories in all parts of the world. (See Scripture as cited above.) With such results crowning his labors there is little wonder that the ingenious founder should place a high estimate on his method. Through all his writings he rings the changes on experiment. In his lectures he ends the discussion of every controversial point by citing his opponent to the bar of experiment. One gets the impression that he feels that all that is required to bring other psychologists up to his point of view is experiment. His enthusiasm for experiment almost parallels Bacon's enthusiasm for the empirical methods as against the rational methods of the scholastic philosophy. Of Bacon Rudolph Eucken is moved to

say: "Blind respect for the past changes suddenly into blind rejection, and appreciation of the present only." (25)

The contention for experiment rests upon the demand which science makes that we must observe the behavior of elements under investigation when under control in order that different investigators may test the results and form conclusions based on a comparison of as wide a range of observation as possible. But what do we mean by experiment. "When we merely note and record the phenomena which occur around us in the ordinary course of nature we are said to *observe*. When we change the course of nature by the intervention of our muscular powers, and thus produce unusual combinations and conditions of phenomena we are said to *experiment*. Herschel justly remarks that we might properly call these two modes of experience *passive and active* observation." "Accidental observation long ago impressed upon men's minds the phenomena of lightning, and the attractive powers of amber. Experiment only could have shown that phenomena so diverse in magnitude and character were manifestations of the same agent. To observe with accuracy and convenience we must have agents under our control, so as to raise or lower their intensity, to stop or set them in action at will." "We are said to *experiment* when we bring substances together under various conditions of temperature, pressure, electric disturbance, chemical action, &c., and then record the changes observed." (26) "What Bacon indicated as the purpose of experiment in natural science, namely, that it does not permit nature its freedom, but that it applies directive force, to the end that it answers the questions which the investigator propounds to her,—precisely this is what the psychological experiment is to accomplish for the individual consciousness: it shall not permit it its freedom, but subject it to determined and exactly regulated conditions, and the psychologist must observe, and wherever possible quantitatively define, the phenomena which appear under the conditions arbitrarily introduced by himself." (27)

(25) *Lebensanschauungen grosser Denker*... 316.

(26) Jevon's *Principles of Science*, 400, 401, 416.

(27) Wundt; *Logik*. 2 Aufl. III. 174. Wundt's explanation of the importance of experiment is now accessible to English readers in the first volume of his *Physiological Psychology* which has recently appeared in Eng. Trans. pages (in the original) 3 to 6.

Experiment, therefore, as applied to psychology, implies self-observation under controlled objective conditions. Of the "so-called pure self-observation," Wundt says, "it can lay no claim whatever to *exactness*." (28) The introspectionist contends that the experiment can reach only physiological conditions and results and not the psychical fact. The experimentalist on the other hand replies, if that be true, then psychical facts must remain forever beyond our reach. For says he: The introspectionist can never get hold of them. The moment the introspectionist begins his introspection every psychical fact, save consciously active introspection, has fled. To say that the process may be observed as it is recalled in memory is already a partial surrender. In the first place it confesses to being actively engaged in observing a thing which by its own acknowledgment no longer exists. The refuge of memory is not a very safe one in the realm where pretensions to scientific accuracy are made. At the very best it is but a fading copy which the introspectionist can get under observation. But where is this copy? It is the remaining vestige of a past feeling and as such a feeling also. Now we cannot here enter upon the question of the substrate in which this feeling persists,—whether, psychical in pure, physical or psychophysical. However, whatever theory is held, it will scarce be denied that the original psychical process is attended by physiological processes (whether causative, resultant or parallel does not matter at present). Now if these physiological processes can be controlled, measured and tabulated in a way which will in any sense be determinative, then we will have experimental facts which express the immediate physiological processes attending the psychical processes. These records will have the advantage of permanence, and as copies they are immediate. The conditions under which they were produced can be repeated ad libitum and by any number of subjects, thus making comparison on a definite basis possible. The contention between the introspectionist and experimentalist will then be reduced to the determination of the comparative trustworthiness of the respective records. No one contends that the experimental record is a feeling. It is, however, a definite and

(28) *Grundzuege*, 1, 4. (I do not have the Eng. Trans. at hand so my references are to the original, 5 Aufl.

unfading record of physiological process corresponding to a psychical process. It is universally conceded that a feeling is not identical with a physiological process. (Here is the importance of Wundt's heuristic principle of psychophysical parallelism. According to it there is but a single fact; a psychophysical stimulus producing a psychophysical reaction of which the record is the immediate copy.) The experimentalist assumes that feeling and physiological processes respond to each other with the precision of natural law. Hence if the introspectionist would controvert the experimentalist's contention he must show that such law does not exist.

Let us then see the method by which experimental records are secured in the psychological laboratory. Prof. Ebbinghaus' experiment in memory will illustrate one phase better than we can otherwise describe it. The variability of memory has been matter of common knowledge but its description before Ebbinghaus, was always expressed in indefinite terminology. His method was to take phenomena which could be expressed in numbers. After carefully guarding against possible modification due to associations with previous experiences, he devoted himself diligently to memorising a definite quantity, and entering the quantity and the time required in his record. (29) He then noted how much he remembered after a definite time—hours, days, weeks, months. He would then get data from which to conclude to the law of forgetting. He varied the conditions,—always so he could define the variation definitely,—and carried the experiment through almost three years of the most pains-taking daily experiment. His work, "Über das Gedächtniss" consequently, treats of memory on a basis of definite facts, and its importance for the understanding of the doctrine of the association of ideas is at once apparent.

Ever since astronomical instruments have been developed for taking accurate observations it has been matter of common knowledge that observers differed. This increment of difference is known to astronomers as personal equation. The psychologist places the observer where he can watch a rotating drum through a small telescope. On the drum there is marked a star.

(29) In this work he uses nonsense syllables. See his *Grundzüge d. Psych.* 633-707.

The observer is instructed to release an electric key the moment the star is on the cross-line of his telescope. The drum (Kymograph) is connected with a chronoscope in such a way that the chronoscope is released just at the moment the star is on the line. The precision is that of the finest mechanical accuracy and the timepiece registers down to the thousandths of a second. The observer's release of the key stops the chronoscope. The time the chronoscope registers is the interval by which the reaction of the observer is late of the true time of the star's passage over the line. This reaction time is the astronomer's personal equation in definite units. It is the time it takes for motor activity to follow a definite stimulus. It is measurement of the readiness of psychical response.

The blush of shame, the bloodless countenance of intense fear, the veinous tension in hot anger, have likewise been matter of common observation, but before the use of the plethysmograph, sphygmograph and similar instruments these important functions were necessarily expressed but vaguely. With these the variation in volume (of the body), character of respiration, and blood circulation, are recorded on the Kymograph with a precision conditioned only by the degree of the accuracy of the mechanism of the instrument.

Attention, voluntary processes, &c., are each in turn brought under control by the ingenuous experimenter. It is from these results that the new psychologist offers the world a scientific psychology. The higher mental processes elude his methods of reduction as yet, and perhaps some of them ever will, but he feels that his achievements have given a firmer basis from which to describe even those higher processes.

At the very door of the psychological laboratory there lies one chief difficulty, namely, the training of the subject. In the physical and chemical laboratories the subjects are things immutable, but not so in the psychological. Hence the first attempts are always in danger of being vague on account of the subject's lack of self-control or the power to distinguish clearly in the complex of his conscious processes the ones desired. It is not however an insuperable difficulty. It does however require that whoever would be an investigator here must put himself under rigid self-discipline.

I advert briefly to the possibilities and adaptability of laboratory psychology in our under-graduate schools. The limited time generally given the subject precludes the subject's self-discipline which we have noted as a fundamental prerequisite to investigation. But colleges are not institutes of investigation, but rather schools which prepare for investigation. Inasmuch therefore as present day psychology rests wholly upon the results of the laboratory investigator, both for the understanding of the results, and for the preparation of those who will become investigators, the under-graduate schools need an equipment of demonstration apparatus at the very least. Correspondence with the department in a number of our leading colleges brings almost universal testimony to this effect. (30)

(Prof. Titchener puts the distinction of the psychology of to-day and that of fifty years ago so tersely that I cannot forbear quoting him: "Fifty years ago facile reference to 'experience' was permissible. Nowadays, we have to deal, not with 'experience' in the large, but with a number of special facts, which take on a different colouring and a different relative importance according to the general theory in which they find a setting.—The lesson to be learned is that if one talks of 'experience' one must have a very clear and very detailed notion of what experience means. It is no more scientific to explain a given phenomenon by referring it to an indefinite 'experience', than it is to explain it by reference to an unconditioned and indeterminable faculty of will.")

III. RESULTS.

To tell how the new psychological method has affected psychological doctrine throughout the entire field would require a treatise. That is, of course, not expected. The general effect of the new methodology is all that can here come under consideration.

The new psychology has reduced theory to fact; speculation to exact observation. This however restricts its field as compared with philosophical psychology. It confines it wholly to

(30) Previous experience in laboratory methods is a condition of admission to Wundt's laboratory.

the facts of psychical phenomena as they appear in our world. Says Prof. James: "I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own laws obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) *thoughts and feelings*, (2) and a *physical world* in time and space with which they co-exist and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book.— All attempts to *explain* our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities (whether the latter be named soul, transcendental Ego, ideas, or elementary units of consciousness) are metaphysical." (31)

By the introduction of experiment, not as supplanting introspection, but as a means of control whereby introspection may be strengthened, it seeks to analyze and classify psychical experiences without reference to ultimate reality. What is thus gained is precision in the observation made, and a possibility of tabulation which permits of a wide range of comparison. These are the elements in every scientific investigation which condition the correctness of generalization. And, inasmuch as science asks first, what happened? and then, working back to the cause, asks in the second place, why did it happen? we arrive at a system of psychical causation on a basis of actual occurrence. For example, I have before me the finished work of the young man with whom I was associated in the Leipzig Laboratory for two semesters, which contains some thirty thousand observations under control. His conclusions are the conclusions warranted by the facts revealed in those figures. The transsubstantiation of the nervous innervation produced by the stimulus into mentality is never considered. But the facts for the law of cause and effect within the phenomenal world are given without that transcendent speculation. From the conclusion we *know* what will happen psychically under given conditions. Once we have defined the cause of experiences we are in position to control the causes intelligently and direct them more positively towards

a fixed goal. This is the crowning promise of the new psychology. I say, promise, for the science is but in its infancy. The data are just being gathered. True the beginning has already been made in applying the results to scientific pedagogy, ethics, and sociology.

Let us note just a few examples. "Schuyten's dynamometer tests for 54,200 children, mostly between twelve and sixteen years of age, stimulated by rivalry showed an ascending curve from October to January, a sharper rise in February, and a fall in March. Psychic and physical development increased from October to January, and fell from January to March. The curves then separate and take opposite directions. While attention diminishes during the summer months, muscular power increases in a remarkable way to June or July. This is very suggestive for the order of work through the school year and for vacations."

The facts here noted you will observe were mechanically measured. The deduction made is direct and on the basis of fact.

In moral development, suggestion plays an important part. Baldwin places it on an equality with pleasure and pain as a motive force. Its power is investigated to the best advantage, perhaps in its extreme form of hypnotism. The revelations of the systematic use of hypnotism are nothing short of amazing. On the one hand Delboeuf, Forel, Voisin and others have by its means reformed vicious youths and cured melancholiacs in large numbers. Their practice reveals the remarkable fact that stability of character resists the hypnotist—e. g. "Honest men resist the hypnotist's command to pocket a silver spoon for quite awhile, but finally they yield." Prof. Barth says: "Suggestion has restored confidence in the power of education." (32) The bearing on criminology will be evident at once. The danger of irresponsible strangers being permitted to parade this power on the stage is not quite so evident. It breaks down individuality and weakens normal characters, so much so that Forel holds that its use should be controlled by legal restrictions such as applied to the use of the most deadly poisons. (33)

Prof. Stout is quite justified in saying: "the most important advantage of the new psychology lies in the convergence of mani-

(32) *Erziehungslehre*. 27.

(33) *Hypnotismus*. 243.

fold different lines of inquiry, capable of yielding each other help, guidance and verification." (34) The problem has not been simplified. The rather has it grown in its complexity because of its finding real causal relations where the older methods did not even look for any. However it is optimistic. Indeed sublimely optimistic. The craft feel that at last they are getting on a solid footing and that results henceforth will be positive. It is this that has inspired such enthusiasm in the subject.

But, I am asked, is there not the danger that this scientific method, over which the specialists are so enthusiastic, will destroy the conception of human freedom or lose the psychical in the physical? This of course looks forward to the metaphysical implications. Those who see freedom endangered quite frequently commit the fallacy of demanding for their concept of freedom an absolute caprice which is wholly beyond the reach of psychical motive. Even God could not move such a being. Wundt says: "Man is determined physiologically; psychologically free." James, scientific psychology postulates determinism in the interest of method, but scientific ethics postulates freedom and "I am convinced," says he, "that ethics has the better of the argument." Ladd regards the facts of psychology as in nowise precluding freedom. We cannot here take space to discuss the problem, but the above citations are not very indicative of danger to the concept of freedom from psychology.

With reference to the latter observation noted above, namely, losing the psychical in the physical, I take space for a brief paragraph. The older psychologies began with a definition of the soul; the new ones, if they attempt a definition at all, reserve it for the last chapter. They regard such definition as much beyond their province as chemists would the exposition of the essence of the elements with which they have to do. However, materialist attempts to account for psychic phenomena are wholly foreign to the new Psychology. Wundt's actual-soul theory is vitalistic. Some of his disciples see in Wundt's theory a necessity for the doctrine of the resurrection of the body which is lacking in spiritualistic theories. James regards the concept of a distinct soul-essence as meeting all requirements best. Pfaender says: "If there is a substantial soul it is of a nature

altogether different from what we generally understand by substance." Jodl: "The soul does not have states, or faculties, as thoughts, ideas, feelings, hate, &c., but these states in their totality are the soul." (This however stops fatally short of a persistent entity.) Muensterberg: "This actual soul is persistent since it identifies itself in every act. It is self-conscious. It is immortal because its actual reality in temporal efficiency cannot be affected by biologico-psychological objective phenomena in time." No, scientific psychology has not lost the psychical in the physical. (35)

The important problem which divides the new psychologists is that of parallelism and interaction. The former is necessarily monistic, the latter dualistic. Wundt, Hoeffding and Jodl, are parallelists (monists). Muensterberg and Ziehen regard parallelism as a tentative postulate. James, Kuelpe, Jerusalem, Stumpf, Ladd, and Busse are interactionists. I make these references in order to show the main contention of the new psychology,—that metaphysical problems lie beyond its province. All of these men are in the front rank of scientific psychologists. (Jodl perhaps more philosophical.) Their divers metaphysical theories do not affect their attitude to psychological method.

The new psychology is here to stay. It is ever enlisting enthusiastic recruits. The exceeding ingenuity and pains-taking detail with which the investigators prosecute their work are among its most hopeful signs. Whoever would appreciate present day thought on psychologic topics must acquaint himself with its methods. For those alarmists who scent danger in every new thing, there is but little danger here,—there isn't much room for danger because of its insistence upon relegating all problems of essence to metaphysics. The errors of science find their corrective in the subject-matter. God is author of the laws which the scientist seeks to trace out "after Him." Furthermore whoever would refute the metaphysical errors which will grow out of the findings of the new psychology must know the sources of such errors.

(35) The discussion of this very interesting problem lies beyond the purpose of the present paper. We hope at some other time to present Wundt's actual-soul theory, when we will have room to show its consequences and inconsistencies.

ARTICLE II.

THE NEW ETHICS.

BY PROFESSOR LUTHER A. FOX, D.D.

Ethics is the science of the ideals of character. Its scope includes the whole of rational conduct. Every act of man, so far as it may fall under the control of will, is moral. Even reflex acts if subject to voluntary regulation are ethical. The science, therefore, is very closely related to physiology, psychology, sociology and religion. It involves an investigation of the well-being of man, of the origin and law of obligation, of all possible human relations, of the nature of conscience and the problem of free will. Such a comprehensive field has given rise to a great many questions admitting of a great variety of answers. A multitude of ethical theories determined by the different conceptions of man and of the universe was inevitable. These may be gathered into two great classes known as the Intuitive and the Hedonistic schools. The Intuitive school regards reason as the great controlling element of life, duty the supreme end, and the idea of right the supreme law. It emphasizes the dignity and worth of personality. The Hedonist regards feeling as the chief factor in man, happiness the supreme end and the idea of the good as the supreme law. The happiest man realizes best the purposes of his existence, just because he is happy, and is the ideal man. Hedonism has two distinct forms and is broken up into two subordinate schools. The one is called Egoistic Hedonism. The other is called Universalistic Hedonism, or more recently Utilitarianism. The former name for all Hedonism has become specialized. In a still earlier period and for many centuries it was known as Epicureanism. Intuitivism has had different phases but not so distinctly marked as to constitute different schools. To these two great historic classes there has been added another known sometimes as Perfectionism and sometimes Eudemonism.

That special type of ethical theory which may be called the New Ethics is a form of Hedonism. It claims to be eminently

scientific. It has its psychological basis in the New Psychology and its philosophical basis in the doctrine of Evolution. It is sometimes materialistic and sometimes pantheistic. It seeks a place among the natural sciences. It has three types: the Biological represented by Herbert Spencer, the Sociological represented by Leslie Stephen, and the Rational Universalistic represented by H. Sidgwick. To understand it fully it is necessary to trace it from its beginning among the Greeks.

Heraclitus, about 500 B. C., and Democritus, about 400 B. C., were both physical philosophers but have left some traces of their ethical reflections. Heraclitus commands men to obey reason and the divine law, the ground of human law. He was an Intuitionist. Democritus, the laughing philosopher, was a Hedonist. He was a materialist in metaphysics, carrying out the theory of atoms as taught by his master Leucippus. These atoms are the eternal grounds of all things. The soul consists of the finest of the atoms. Sensation is the only cause of knowledge. There is only one supreme law and that is necessity. There is no personal life after death. Pleasure is the ultimate good, and this he identified with an equanimity of mind. By some unknown standard he pronounced the delights of the soul as better than the pleasures of the body. The first period of Greek philosophy was closed by the Sophists, philosophic sceptics and ethical Hedonists. Protagoras made the individual the measure of truth. Georgias ran philosophy into Nihilism. They taught ethics, as they did rhetoric, merely for the money that was in it. They were Egoistic Hedonists of a very superficial order, cultivating the art of the most pleasant possible life under the existing conditions. They made a reaction necessary.

Socrates was pre-eminently a moral philosopher. He arrested the sceptical tendencies of the age by appealing to deep ineradicable moral convictions. Whatever uncertainty there may be about the origin of the world it is certain that some things are right and other things are wrong. Great ethical principles are unquestionable. In this way he made a reconstruction of philosophy possible. He forced men to a clearer conception of ethical ideas and a more precise definition of ethical terms. His work was more destructive of popular errors than constructive of an ethical system. He taught the identity of knowledge and vir-

tue and of the inseparable relation of virtue and happiness. But he left a great many questions unanswered. The great thoughts he threw out were not gathered into a complete science nor their consequences fully elaborated. He had not defined the relation of knowledge to being nor the exact nature of the supreme end whether it is virtue or happiness.

Out of the circle of his immediate disciples there sprang up immediately after his death four different schools: the Megaric under Euclid, the Cynic under Antisthenes, the Academy under Plato, and the Cyrenaic under Aristippus. The Cyreniaks were Egoistic Hedonists. The psychological basis was the sensationalism of Protagoras, that we can know nothing of the world except through impressions upon our senses. The only good is pleasure which all living beings seek. The good is transient and must be seized in the present moment without anxious regard for the future. Bodily pleasures are the most intense but are not always to be preferred to pure mental pleasures. Wisdom consists in selecting pleasures undisturbed by prejudices and superstition.

Plato's ethics are profound. There are hedonistic and ascetic elements combined with idealistic principles and mythical tendencies. A complete analysis can not be undertaken in this sketch. His philosophy was realistic Idealism. In psychology he was a trichotomist, regarding the psychic and the nous as distinct entities linked together by the feelings. He lays down four kinds of excellence corresponding to the tripartite division of the mind. Virtue consists in the harmony of the elements of the soul under the government of reason. With Socrates he maintained the unity of virtue and the knowledge of the good, but he admitted a sort of virtue possible for men who are not philosophers. He believed with his master that there is a very close relation between happiness and virtue, both uniting in the good, but he came at last to hold that pleasure is subordinate to wisdom, the feelings to reason, happiness to duty. Between Plato and Aristotle there was a decided difference in mental habits, literary tastes and philosophic methods. Plato's trend was towards idealism, Aristotle's towards empiricism. They approached ethical questions from different stand-points. Aristotle sharply criticised Plato. But after all they were essentially

agreed in their general results. The ultimate end of man is well-being but perfect well-being consists in the exercise of speculative reason. Aristotle's ethical aim is rather practical than philosophic. He does not propose to give an ultimate theory of human good. He thinks moral truths are to be obtained by observation and the comparison of moral opinions. His great law of the golden mean has become famous.

Aristotle had not laid aside his pen until there arose two young men destined to become immortal in the history of ethics. Zeno the Stoic planted himself on the ethical principles of the Cynics stripped of their exaggeration. He announced more clearly than had ever been done before that virtue must be sought for its own sake. The aphorism has come down to us, virtue for virtue's sake. In philosophy the school was eclectic. It was more of a religion than a philosophy. It attached great importance to the law of nature. It depreciated pleasure. It was doubtful about a future life. Virtue alone is the supreme end. It produced many fine characters and some ethical books well worth reading at the present time.

Epicurus, with whom we are more immediately concerned in this study, was an Egoistic Hedonist. He borrowed his metaphysics from Democritus and his ethical stand-point from the Cyrenaics. He believed in the existence of the gods but did not admit their influence over the world. He denied the immortality of both gods and men. He knew no law but necessity. The highest good is the pleasure of the individual. Happiness is the health of the body and freedom from disquietudes. The only virtue is prudence. But pleasure is not a passing enjoyment but a permanent state. The pleasures of the mind are to be preferred to the pleasures of the body because they endure. Epicurus is slandered when he is called a voluptuary. Virtue is a tact, not itself the highest good, but the means of realizing it. Both Stoicism and Epicureanism reached down several centuries into the Christian era. While Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius were interpreting the principles of the Stoics Luccretius was putting those of Epicurus into Roman verse and Horace was making them popular by his matchless odes and satires. Cicero, the eclectic, preferring the doctrine of the sceptical Academies, was reviewing the ethical doctrines of the Stoics.

Plotinus, a few centuries later, carried the New Academy into mysticism.

For centuries Christianity gave the world its moral ideas. It came as a direct revelation from God, and thus obviated the necessity of scientific investigation. The authority was found in the will of God, the obligation in the relation of man to God, and the rule in the law as contained in the Scriptures. Obedience is enforced by the divine sanctions. The Church administered the divine government. The treatment of ethics was juridical rather than scientific. The duty of the Christian is to interpret the revealed code, not to investigate its rational grounds. The divine law is perfect and nothing more is to be known about man's duty than God had been pleased to put into the inspired Bible. This divine law has supreme authority, not because reason approved it, but because God has commanded it. If these early Christians speculated at all their doctrinal conceptions moulded those that were more directly scientific. God is Creator and Ruler and all authority is vested in Him. His will is the ultimate ground for obligation. Christ is the Saviour of all men, and this is the reason for the universal brotherhood of mankind. All men are depraved and need not only regeneration but also constant divine grace in living a right life. There was not much room left for scientific ethics. Augustine gave some attention to ethical study but he was influenced far more by theology than by philosophy. When Scholasticism arose and theologians like Anselm began to seek a rational ground for their faith men began to look also for a rational ground for duty. Abelard was the most distinguished of these moralists, and wrote an ethical treatise called *Nosce te ipsum*. He held that all of God's acts are necessary. The tendency to evil is not a sin but the necessary condition of virtue. Sin lies in the intention. He was feared and condemned because of his great influence over young men. The greatest ethical philosopher of the Middle Ages was Thomas Aquinas. His aim was to reproduce Aristotle's philosophy and his ethics are in the main only those of his Greek master interpreted by his Christian faith. God is the highest good. The end of all true life is God, and when it is attained there is perfect happiness. There are four kinds of law: eternal law, natural law, human law, and the di-

vine law revealed in the Bible. A knowledge of natural law has been implanted in the human mind by the Creator but this law is not sufficient and needs to be supplemented by the revealed law.

From the time of Abelard there was a steady growth of free inquiry. The sceptical spirit became more self-assertive. Scholasticism lost its hold upon the minds of scholars. Humanism and the Reformation emancipated thought. In the seventeenth century ethical science was revived along with philosophy and the more scientific study of nature.

Gassendi and Hobbes, contemporaries, revived Epicurean Egoistic Hedonism. Gassendi was a close follower of Epicurus and a decided opponent of the intellectualism of Descartes. Hobbes was a more independent thinker. In philosophy he was a materialist, in psychology a sensationalist. Knowledge is the addition of sensations, and sensation is a movement in the sensible body. Soul is brain action. There is no free will; men like brutes are governed by irresistible appetites. Reason without passion has no influence over the will. Pleasure is the only good. Interest is the supreme judge in morals as in all other things. Obligation originates in civil law; the highest authority is the arbitrary will of the magistrate. The State is necessary to the pleasure of the individual. But this theory did not meet the facts of our moral nature. The individual life is wider than the civil law, and the law is subject to the criticism of conscience.

Locke was decidedly influenced by the criticisms of Cumberland and More of the theory of Hobbes. He combined Intuitive and Hedonistic principles in his own theory. In regard to the ultimate end he was a Hedonist. Moral good and evil are only a voluntary conformity to law that will bring pleasure and pain. He denies that reason alone furnishes a sufficient moral motive. But he holds that ethical rules can be demonstrated on intuitive principles. He says that the idea of a Supreme Being upon whom we depend and the idea of ourselves as rational beings are sufficient grounds for such demonstration. Because men are related to God and each other everyone is bound to preserve his own life and the lives of others.

Locke's *Human Understanding* introduced a more thorough study of the human mind, and Shaftesbury began a more care-

ful analysis of human motives. He called the moral faculty moral sense. He distinguishes three classes of impulses: natural affections, self affections, and unnatural affections. Not only the outward beings that offer themselves to the senses are objects of affection but the very actions of beings when brought before the mind are also objects of affection. After Shaftesbury less prominence is given to abstract rational principles and much more attention to the empirical study of ethical facts. Butler admits that the reasoning of Clark from the moral principles as rational intuitions is valid, but he does not follow it. He makes conscience the ruling element in man but he gives no explanation of it. Price adopts the general view of Clark but modifies it by noting the emotional element as accompanying the moral intuition. Reid says that the moral faculty is innate only in germ.

In the time of Butler the psychological method was dominant. He seeks to ascertain duty by reflection upon the dictates of conscience. He notes in his last ethical treatise the apposition between the intuitional and utilitarian method. On account of one sentence that he let incidentally escape his pen he is claimed by Hedonists. By the prominence he gave benevolence he prepared the way for the utilitarianism of Hume and Bentham. Hutchinson opened that way still wider by the scholastic distinction between material and formal goodness. In treating of material good he anticipates the celebrated formula of Bentham, the greatest good for the greatest number. He does not define the relation between the individual and the general good. But certainly he was no Egoistic Hedonist for he proves by the crucial fact of the deeper interest in the future of his friends as a man approaches death the disinterestedness of real affection.

Hume was a Utilitarian. He agrees with Hutchinson as to the disinterestedness of virtue. Our sense of obligation is founded on the perception of utility. Acts are right because they tend to produce happiness. Reason is the servant of the passions. Conscience is general custom. But general utility is not the sole ground of moral feelings. Whatever tends to promote the happiness of the individual has merit that calls forth admiration. The hint thrown out by Hume in regard to the importance of sympathy was taken up by his friend Adam

Smith and developed into a theory which for a time attracted wide-spread attention. Smith asserted that there is ground for holding that there is a moral faculty and that all moral judgments can be derived from sympathy. He was a Utilitarian making the useful and pleasant not only the end but also the rule of all rational action. The theories of Hume and Smith as to the origin of moral sentiments have been more carefully defined and carried forward by the later Utilitarians.

Hartley, their contemporary, made important contributions to empirical ethics. He took Locke's theory of the association of ideas and applied it more rigorously than it had been done before to the explanation of complex moral emotions. He tried to show that the moral sense may be derived from the elementary pleasures and pains of the physical sense, through the imagination, ambition, self interest, sympathy and what he called theopathy. Feelings not only cohere but are transformed by combinations into entirely new elements, as oxygen and hydrogen are transformed into water. In this way he accounted for the disinterestedness of virtue. As the miser beginning with the love of money for its uses learns to love it for its own sake, so beginning with the love of virtue for the sake of happiness we learn to love and seek it for itself. He introduces physiology for the first time into ethical study. His method is as much physiological as psychological. He is not an Egoistic Hedonist. He denies that self interest is the primary object of pursuit. Our ideal aim should be to carry the annihilation of self into the pure love of God. Benevolence is the primary law, and we ought to direct every action towards the greatest happiness and least misery in our power. As it is difficult to apply this general rule we must have others which are less general.

After Hume, Smith and Hartley there was a decided reaction against the psychological method. The Intuitionists like Price and Ried confined themselves more closely to the generally accepted principles of morality, giving prominence to Common Sense, while Utilitarians worked out more thoroughly the principle of happiness both as the great end of life and the rule of duty. The fundamental difference between them as to the nature of obligation became more manifest.

Paley, a Christian philosopher, finds moral obligation in the

divine command learned from Scripture and the light of nature. He defines virtue as doing good to mankind according to the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness. He had a purely quantitative estimate of pleasure. His rational criterion of duty was general happiness. His great motive was personal pleasure. He tried to bring the Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism into harmony by means of the will of God. This compound of science and religion was not acceptable to scientific men and after him God and the Bible were pushed more into the background.

Bentham, an eminent jurist, was a more systematic Hedonist. Actions are to be judged solely with respect to their tendency to produce pleasure and pain. We are to determine from experience only what promotes happiness, and that alone is good. He specifies certain standards of judgments of pleasure: intensity, duration and certainty. We are to take account of the consequences of a pleasure and also the interest of others as well as the immediate enjoyment. He measures pleasures solely by their quantity. The quantity being equal pushpin is as good as poetry. Pleasure is the law of ethics. The motive is derived from the sanctions of the law as they appeal to the individual's interest. The great end of action is the greatest good of the greatest number, but the only interest which a man at all times is sure to find as an adequate motive is his own. Bentham knew that there was no place in his theory for obligation and he said that the word ought should be erased from the dictionary.

J. S. Mill adopted Utilitarianism to which he was led by his education, associations and mental tendency, but he criticised Bentham. He said that what each man desires for himself is pleasure for himself, and that the general happiness is the good of the aggregate of persons. Therefore one should seek the happiness of all. My happiness is a good to me and therefore the happiness of all is good to all. Left to itself there is the logical fallacy of division. He tried to find the link between the individual and the community in the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures. But that does not take him out of the grasp of Egoistic Hedonism. He admits that one may sometimes best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of

himself yet he thinks the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of reaching such happiness as is attainable. Self-sacrifice, then, is after all only a means of securing personal happiness. His method is psychological, not ethical. That every man seeks his own happiness may be a fact, but that does not make it an obligation. He differs from Bentham in regarding pleasure as qualitative as well as quantitative. The worth of pleasure is to be decided by the quality rather than the intensity. The pleasure of knowledge is better than that of appetite. But how pleasure can furnish its own standard of worth he has not satisfactorily explained. He seems to us to surrender a fundamental principle of Hedonism. He holds delicately the scale between the two but he points out nothing that will bring the interest of the individual and that of the community into harmony. The feeling of unity with our fellow creatures which makes their happiness a natural personal want leaves the preponderance on the side of the individual. We serve others only that we may thereby the better serve ourselves. He is aware of the problem he left unsolved and makes this great concession to Intuitivism: "The mind is not in a state of conformity to utility unless one loves virtue as a thing desirable in itself." While he was carrying out Hartley's psychological theory of complex moral emotion through the association of ideas his father, James Mill, was working out the physiological side of that theory and tried to account for the seemingly innate moral ideas by the law of heredity. Every idea had its own cerebral activity. The physiological side of these ideas may be transmitted by natural generation and thus the mental side appears at a very early period in the child's life. It has its analogy in the case of brutes. The pointer dog inherits in its nervous system the results of the early training and experiences of its sires and pointing birds appears as an innate instinct. The objection to Hartley's theory seemed to be removed.

A broad foundation, clearly defined by conflict, was laid by the centuries from Democritus to J. S. Mill for the New Ethics. Ethical science was ready for the revolutionary movement started by Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The doctrine of evolution was not new but the age was ripe for a new departure in sci-

tific work, and the effect of Darwin's books was magical. The New Ethics is known as evolutionary ethics or scientific ethics. It attempts to apply the principle of evolution to the moral as it had been applied to the physical life. Morality has been evolved and is the highest achievement of evolution. The task of ethical science is to trace the process and reduce the complex phenomena to perfect unity, and thus make ethics one of the natural sciences. It is Hedonistic but by substituting biological conceptions for those of pleasure and giving much more prominence to ideas of life than of happiness it has now developed into a new type. It carries forward the psychological theory of the association of ideas but tries to deduce moral rules from biological and social laws.

Herbert Spencer, the first and down to the present time, the greatest of the philosophers of evolution, makes the preservation and expansion of life the supreme end of actions. Life is to be estimated in its quantity both by its breadth and length. Conduct tending to preserve life is good. It has a surplus of the agreeable. When it has painful consequences it is wrong. The greatest quantity of life and the greatest quantity of happiness are coincident. Life without ultimate happiness is not worth living. Pleasure, then, is the end of moral action. Spencer applies the word conduct to every activity of life and he speaks of the conduct of molluscs as well as of men. Conduct is the effort of an organism to adjust itself to its environment. Ethical conduct is nothing more than entomological conduct carried up into a more complex environment. Good conduct on any plane produces pleasure. The ideal goal to natural evolution is the ideal standard of conduct ethically considered. The essential trait of the moral consciousness is the control of the simpler feelings by the more complex and more ideal. The general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct, human and subhuman, is that for the better preservation of life, the simpler, primitive, presentative feelings must be controlled by the later evolved, compound and representative feelings. There are different kinds of control. The truly moral control evolved out of the lower kinds is formed by a representation of the necessary natural results of an action. In this way the feeling of moral obligation is generated. It is an abstract sentiment formed

in a manner similar to abstract ideas. His theory leads him to make a distinction between absolute and relative ethics. Absolute ethics belong to the future ideal state of man. The relative are a rough code adapted to our present condition. The absolute ethics has not found much favor with scientific men. In the absolute ethics there is nothing remaining of the element of consciousness which was derived from the various forms of pre-moral restraints. The sense of duty is temporary, belonging only to relative ethics. With the complete adaptation to the social state moral sentiments will guide men as spontaneously and completely as now do the sensations. All this is Egoistic Hedonism. But Mr. Spencer sees an altruistic as well as an egoistic element in nature. These seem to be in conflict with each other but a reconciliation is possible. Both have rights but they are mutually dependent. They have been evolved simultaneously. In the progressing ideas and usages of mankind a compromise between them has been slowly establishing itself. The tendency is towards the merging of the interests of the individual and interests of citizens at large into one common interest. Conflict produces pain but when altruism has become perfectly spontaneous the happiness of each will be complete. In this way Mr. Spencer has tried to establish the perfect identity between natural law and ethical law.

Mr. Spencer's theory started with the individual and found it very difficult to escape the grasp of Egoistic Hedonism. Mr. Leslie Stephen started with the social organism. The true unit is not the individual but society. Society is not an aggregate but an organism of which the individual is a member, a social tissue adapted by various modifications to various specific purposes. The ethical end is not to be represented as the greatest good of the greatest number but as the health of the organism. Life is not a series of detached acts but a growth. An action enters into and modifies the very substance of the fundamental tissue. The scientific criterion is not happiness but health, but the two necessarily tend to coincide. Pleasure may be regarded as the sign of the smooth working of the social machinery. The moral laws may be identified with the conditions of social vitality. Moral approval is the name of the sentiment developed through the social medium which modifies a man's character in such a

way as to fit him to be an efficient member of the social tissue. It is the spiritual presence which generates and maintains morality. The conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race ordering us to fulfil the primary conditions of welfare. Man as a member of the social organism is necessarily sympathetic. Every extension of reasoning power implies a wider and clearer and closer identification of self with others and therefore a greater tendency to merge the prudential in the social axioms as first principles of conduct. Evolution by the law of natural selection produces not merely a type of conduct but also a type of character. But in regard to this sociological ethics we may ask whether our sociological knowledge is sufficiently advanced as to make such ethics really scientific. Is conduciveness to the preservation of the social organism a sufficient criterion for the construction of a scientific morality? Is the individual wholly absorbed by society?

Prof. Sidgwick, the last and greatest of the Hedonist philosophers, does not attach much importance to evolutionary systems and takes up the problem of ethics as left by J. S. Mill. He surrenders the hope of solving it in the terms of feeling and turns to a rational solution. He seeks a proof of Utilitarianism in a rational basis. The proof is not psychological but logical. The end is sentient good but the regulative principle is reason. We find it necessary to employ a rational principle in the choice of sentient satisfaction. The bridge on which we pass from pleasure is not feeling but reason. Feeling needs the instruction of man. Our love of self must be rational in contradistinction from a more sentient love of self. The path of prudence is not alone the path of virtue. Our own good is not necessarily the good of the whole. The mere feeling does not constitute the bridge between egoism and altruism. The dualism of individual and general happiness is for feeling irreconcilable. Reason alone furnishes the solution. The impartiality in which each is to count for one and no one for more than one is the impartiality of reason. In the distribution of happiness among the competing interests of the individual and among the competing interests of different individuals a rational principle must be employed. The constituent parts of the sum total of happiness are not all of equal importance. Some interests in

the life of the individual and some individuals in the life of society are more important than others. Reason alone can discriminate in this inequality and secure the maximum of happiness. His criticism of Intuitivism is trenchant and his approach to the common ideals and standards so close that his defense and exposition of Utilitarianism are exceedingly plausible and strong.

Recently there has sprung up the school of Perfection. It has however two branches. The one is influenced by Hedonism and sometimes calls itself Eudemonism, the other by Intuitivism and calls itself Perfectionism. But both branches look for the fundamental principles of ethics in the concrete nature of man. Virtue and happiness are essential ends of our nature, just as feeling and reason are essential elements, and both must be recognized. We have both sense and reason, experience and pure intuition, and both have their place in determining human action. The new theory aims to assign each element its normal place and bring them at last into the perfect unity of right character. Janet in France and Mackenzie in England and James Seth, now of Scotland, but lately in America, are distinguished representatives. The thorough development of the method of this school will probably be the next phase of ethical science. It is likely to be more philosophic than scientific.

We have not taken special notice of the Pantheistic ethics of Paulsen or the Pessimistic ethics of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, not because they are in themselves insignificant, but solely because as yet they have exerted very little if any influence at all in England and America.

It is not possible within the limits of a single article in the *QUARTERLY* to give an exhaustive examination of all the features of the *New Ethics*. That would require a minute criticism of every principle in each theory. But that is not necessary. There are great common principles to which a decisive test may be applied.

The *New Ethics* has a wide practical influence. It falls in with the materialistic, commercial spirit of our age. Materialism is in the air. It is boldly asserted that men are losing interest in a future life. They are too much occupied with the gains and pleasures of the present life to think or care much

about another. Success is measured by material emoluments. It falls in also with the scientific spirit of the age. The progress of the natural sciences has been magical. New discoveries are continually being made. New fields of study and of business are opened up. Our young men care little for culture. They crowd the halls of the technical schools. Science has become arrogant and denies the claim of knowledge to any thing that does not submit to its own peculiar methods. Foreign subjects are donning the ill-fitting livery. It is the fashion of the times. The New Ethics claiming to be scientific suits the public taste. It commends itself also by its simplicity. It offers a definite conception of the end of life. It has a plausible unifying principle under which the most diverse elements are brought. Duty is linked with good. It brings morality under the all dominant law of evolution. It seems to give a satisfactory interpretation of life as we find it and as we think it ought to become. It indulges by its utilitarianism our selfishness. But there are grave objections to it.

The New Ethics attempts the impossible. It tries to reduce morals to a natural science. The spheres are entirely different. Natural science deals only with facts. Ethics deals with worth or with values. Natural science discovers what is; ethics seeks to learn what ought to be. The end of natural science is ideas, laws and causes; the end of ethics is ideals of character. Natural science may be said to be descriptive; ethics is normative. Natural science may be very helpful to ethics in the facts that it can furnish. It may collect facts in the history of morals such as moral opinions, moral customs, moral laws and moral institutions as they have existed in the various ages and countries of the world. It may discover physiological facts and guide ethics to moral laws that had been overlooked. Ethics must look to psychology for the evidence of its principles and for the explanation of the moral faculty. It must look to political science and the new and wider science of sociology for a clear explication of civil and social relations that it may set forth more clearly our duty to our fellow men under the manifold conditions of our social organism. But natural science can never become ethical. The canons of natural science can not by their nature be applied to judgments of worth. Herbert Spen-

cer told us in his *Data of Ethics* how natural life acts to be most happy but not how it is under obligation to act. The penalty of the violation of natural law is loss of pleasure but not ipso facto a loss of right character. The New Ethics is condemned by the method at which it aims.

The New Ethics is based on a false psychology. It has a false conception of the nature of man. This fundamental objection lies against the whole school of Hedonists from Aristippus to Sidgwick. It exalts the sensibility above the reason and makes the feeling, and not rationality, the chief element in human nature. Aristotle said that ethics is the study of the peculiar and characteristic function of man, the energy and virtue of man as man. He called man a political animal but he thought him political because he is moral. The political is derived from the moral and not the moral from the political element. His moral nature is the ground and reason for human society. That which distinguishes man from the brutes is his reason. We define man as a rational animal. The science of ethics finds its supreme end not in a state of the feelings which we have in common with the other animals but in the character of the will directed by reason which is peculiar to man. The reason is not the servant of the feelings. The supreme law of reason must be found in the reason. The ultimate end is the dignity of reason, the rationality of action registered in a worthy character. Happiness comes from the harmony of life with reason. Virtue is the eternal purpose of a rational life and carries happiness with itself as its necessary consequence. This removes the paradox of Hedonism which Sedgwick is forced to admit: We attain happiness by forgetting it. When we seek happiness as an end we miss it, but when we seek virtue we are in harmony with our highest and best nature and find ourselves happy. Happiness is the evidence of having reached the great purpose of our being.

The New Ethics either falls into the fallacy of the ambiguous middle or it juggles with the words well-being and good and pleasure. Well-being has two sides. It denotes a right state of character as well as a happy state of feeling. Good means virtue and it means that which will produce happiness. Pleasure is either the satisfied feeling or the object producing the

feeling. Well-being and good in the major mean happiness and in the minor they mean virtue and the illicit conclusion is drawn that the supreme end of life and the ultimate standard of duty is the happiness. The end of man is well-being, and ethics is the science of well-being but Hedonism has no right to draw the conclusion that it is the science of happiness. Well-being as it consists in right character excites our admiration but as it exists in happiness it awakens our sympathy. The two feelings are by no means the same and are proofs of the radical difference in the two judgments.

The New Ethics is too complex for practical life. As a theory it commends itself by its seeming simplicity, but as soon as we try to apply it to real life we find ourselves hopelessly entangled. Who has the opportunity to weigh and balance pleasures and decide as to the innate consequences of each course of action upon the happiness of the world before he is compelled to act? How can one determine which will afford the greatest amount of pleasure, his escape from lingering torture by violating an oath or his submission to suffering like Regulus is said to have done because he kept it? Some Hedonists have been frank enough to admit that the calculus of pleasure is very unwieldy in deciding upon duty. Pleasure or happiness may often guide us to duty but it never absolutely and finally determines it.

The New Ethics ignores the existence of God. Physical nature conceals God. Natural science dealing with matter and material laws has no door opening up to God. Psychology and sociology dealing merely with human phenomena have no place for God. It is unscientific to speak of God except as a fact that a very large part of men have believed that He is. It is unscientific to inquire about the origin and nature of ethics, matter or mind. For anything that science can know either or both together with physical and psychical laws, may be eternal. All such questions are turned over with a half suppressed sneer to metaphysics. A natural science of ethics must be an ethics without God. Bentham spoke of religious fears among the sanctions of moral law because as a matter of fact they play a part in the motives of some people, but neither he nor Mill, nor Stephen, nor Spencer, nor Sedgwick has any use for the hypothesis of God in their

theories. The leaders of The New Ethics may deny the charge of materialism and atheism but that is the way their theories point. They are certainly not theistic. But to those of us who are accustomed to look at ethical subjects in the old way, an ethics without God is little less than absurd. The older Utilitarians, like Paley, had to call in the will of God to get out of Egoistic Hedonism, and the later ones taking no account of the authority of God have struggled ineffectually with the problem of linking egoism and altruism together in a rational theory. Sidgwick speaks of the irresolvable dualism. Without the relations of persons we can not conceive of obligation or duty. A stone or a brute cannot be under obligation, nor can a person be under obligation to a stone or a brute. If there is no God who made us all alike in personality and responsibility, why are we under obligation to our fellow men? Why is not might the only law among men as it is among brutes? What is it that suspends the law of the survival of the fittest and puts us under obligation to protect the weak who are in the way of our personal advancement? His pleasure may be as important to him as mine is to me, but why should I care about that? The life of the sparrow is as important to it as that of the hawk is to itself but it is right under the law of evolution for the hawk to eat the sparrow because he is able to do it. Why may I not crush my weaker neighbor because I can do it? I am told that my sympathy and reason forbid it but unless my sympathy and reason find a ground in the infinite reason and love of God there is nothing to bind me by them. An ethics without God is like a house without a foundation. It has no stable, ultimate basis upon which to rest. Our reason is finite. It is not self-supporting. Its authority rests in that reason who created it and if God is denied where, pray, is its foundation? An ethics without God may put on the old ethical livery and use the old ethical terms but the essence is gone. It is at the very best a system of prudence that may be wise but not obligatory. The old ideas of authority, duty, obligation, moral law, virtue, conscience, are surreptitiously introduced into the New Ethics and they give force to it but such ideas are foreign to the system. This is the way the ethical common sense of mankind looks at it as soon as it is understood and must look at it until those princi-

les which Moses embodied in the Decalogue and Christ reaffirmed and expounded in the Sermon on the Mount and Socrates appealed to when he recalled the world from scepticism has been evolved out of us.

The New Ethics denies the freedom of the will. The New Psychology on which it is based knows nothing of self but a stream of consciousness. It does not recognize a real personal self to be free. Herbert Spencer speaks of the illusion of a free will originating in involuntary and incoherent actions being changed by frequent repetition into coherent and voluntary. Desires which determine the will are closely akin to the external stimulants which excite reflex action. Volition is only a higher form of reflex action. Hedonists have generally been determinists. Even Prof. Sidgwick, the rational Utilitarian, avowedly minimises the importance of the doctrine of free will. The New Ethics is logically necessitarian. But the denial of self-determination is subversive of ethics. If the will is not free there is no obligation and no responsibility. We must be free from not only all restraint but all constraint outside of the self or we are not accountable and can not be justly punished. It is a postulate of morals, a clear dictum of the practical reason. Philosophers may puzzle themselves over the speculative proofs but no man ever doubted the fact. A system of ethics that denies it is fundamentally wrong.

Once more, the New Ethics disregards the fact of a future life and thus debars itself from completeness. It talks about the future of society and of the world but not of the individuals who constitute the society. The ethical life in no individual attains completeness. No one has ever become morally perfect. Morality is pre-eminently personal. It has its own individual private circle that no society can invade. Conscience is sacred. If there is no future life this personal character must be forever incomplete and the highest hopes and aims are forever disappointed. There never can be perfect morality. Virtue never attains its perfect vindication nor does vice receive its full condemnation. The New Ethics in disregarding a future life deprives itself also of some of the strongest motives of a right life. Hope of reward and fear of punishment enter into our motives. No motive can be stronger than everlasting virtue combined

with everlasting happiness. No deterrent from vice is so powerful as the fear of everlasting punishment. But for these the New Ethics has no place.

The New Ethics may make morally, socially refined and distinguished men, Utilitarianism may make philanthropic and patriotic men, but the old ethics makes noble heroes and martyrs to virtue for virtue's sake. This is proved true by the whole history of the world, and "by their fruits ye shall know them."

ARTICLE III.

THE MONISTIC TENDENCY OF PHILOSOPHY. ✓

BY REV. ARTHUR H. SMITH, A.M.

Tendencies often proceed quietly and continue comparatively unobserved for a long time. Little attention is paid to them until new and special conditions bring them to the public view. This has been true of the slowly developing tendency to Monism in Philosophy. The monistic tendency has been present in much of the philosophy of the last two centuries but it was obscured by other and then greater issues. But today it is plain enough that the tendency of present philosophic discussion is distinctly and strongly in the direction of Monism. This is due to the wonderful discoveries and formulated conclusions of modern science during the last three or four decades, for science is certainly monistic. The result is that we are confronted with a "naturalistic" or "scientific" Monism which recognizes no distinction between Man and Nature or between God and the world. Monism may be defined as the explanation and interpretation of the phenomena of the Universe by "referring them all to a single principle," this, in opposition to the dualism of an earlier day which has been largely given up by scientific and philosophical circles. It is essential to know whether this single principle shall be materialistic or spiritual. It is a vital question—whither will this monistic tendency lead us?

THE GENESIS OF THE TENDENCY.

We may be aided in our understanding of the present tendency by a brief view of its genesis. Passing over certain monistic tendencies in some of the ancient philosophies, and considering only the recent past, that which is now distinctively known as "Monism," had its rise in the Pantheism of Spinoza. Descartes had carried the dualistic philosophy to the extreme, and from this the system

of Spinoza was clearly a decisive reaction. The Cartesian philosophy presented mind and matter, God and the world, as quite separate and antagonistic substances, with no common meeting-point between them. Spinoza argued the existence of only one absolute substance, self-existent and infinite, "the sole power of being from which every finite thing derives its existence." (Schwegler. *History of Philosophy*.) Mind and matter are simply the two sides of this one substance, with the logical end that God and the world meet in a practical identity. This is Pantheism and Monism. The influence of Spinoza was immediate and far-reaching, though his Pantheism rather than the monistic idea attracted first attention. The former was effectively attacked but the latter continued to exert a quiet but powerful influence upon the development of philosophic thought. Even that great and original thinker, Immanuel Kant, was not able to get away entirely from Monism, especially in his earlier works, in which he took the ground that the mechanical (monistic) interpretation of phenomena is the only possible and true explanation of the natural world, affirming that "there can be no science without this mechanism of nature." In his later and maturer works, however, the reaction was strong towards dualism, and in his critique of judgment, he declares "the necessity for the subordination of the mechanical principle to the teleological," recognizing the presence of design and the operation of supernatural final causes. Teaching the distinction between the Pure Reason and the Practical Reason, Kant developed a dualism "according to which the Ego, as theoretic, is subjected to the external world, while as practical, it is its master, or in other words, according to which the Ego stands related to the objective world, now receptively and again spontaneously." (Schwegler.—*Id.* 309).

Powerfully influenced by the Kantian philosophy, but deviating therefrom, Fichte developed his subjective idealism and Schelling his system of objective idealism, the former especially being monistic in tendency. It remained for Hegel to strive after an absolute idealism, in which the natural is subordinated to the spiritual, and yet both comprehended as one. He deduced everything from "the Idea," "the world, culminating in man, being a growing manifestation of a spiritual principle,—of the

Divine Reason,—in the course of a necessary (though not un-free) self-evolution." This was idealistic Monism, for any system of complete Idealism is monistic. The ground of Hegel's philosophy may be difficult to grasp clearly, yet he has come nearer, much nearer the truth than either the naturalistic or the idealistic Monism of the present. In his idealistic Monism he laid the emphasis upon the Idealism and not upon the Monism. To-day the emphasis is upon the monistic principle.

In the strong reaction from Hegel's system two lines of thought become prominent. The first goes back to Kant and adopts his conception of the "thing-in-itself" as the ground of its speculative system, approximating at last to Spinozism. Of this line Schopenhauer and Von Hartman are representatives. The second line swung to the extreme of reaction. It originated in the marvellous findings of modern investigation, and exalting the scientific principle, subordinated philosophy to a materialistic science. It has been represented by John Stuart Mill, Darwin, Spencer, Buchner of Tuebingen, and others, and most recently by Prof. Haeckel of Jena, in whom "Scientific Monism" reaches its full tide. While Haeckel is by no means to be considered a great philosopher, and while his influence is likely soon to wane, yet his "Riddle of The Universe" has been so widely and popularly read and has brought Monism forward into such prominence of late, that it is necessary to give some attention and criticism to his teachings. Not only has the volume mentioned had a wide circulation in Germany but, in the English translation, it has had a very wide reading among English speaking people, and especially among the working classes of England, and to a less extent among those of America. Among the more intelligent men of these classes it has served to give a powerful impetus to the skepticism which had already gained some hold upon them, their educational advantages having been too limited to qualify them to discover the weaknesses and fallacies of the book. Men of more intellectual training and mature judgment see them at once but that does not prevent the evil.

II. HAECKEL'S SYSTEM OF MONISM.

Let us inquire as to Prof. Haeckel's system. He approaches the question of the explanation of the Universe by declaring that philosophy is ultimately confronted with but one simple but comprehensive enigma—the "problem of substance." (P. 15) This problem of substance lies deeper and is fundamental to those which have been called world-enigmas, such as the nature of matter and force, the origin of motion, the origin of life, the origin of simple sensation and consciousness, rational thought and speech, and freedom of the will. This substance, Haeckel and his Monism conceive of on the principle of causation, as the ultimate and sufficient cause for all cosmic facts, for all the phenomena of the Universe. His conception of Substance is not clear but he presents it as the one reality which is everything, and of which everything and every being in the world are the product. This Substance, of which Mind and Matter are but the two sides, is in "eternal motion," working continuously and irresistibly, with the result that the Universe, with all that it contains, is the product of "a perpetual and necessary process of evolution." The "Law of Substance" which is absolute and infinite in power, is the unification of the two great cosmic laws, the chemical law of the persistence or indestructibility of matter and the physical law of the persistence of force or "the conservation of energy." Haeckel asserts the universal sovereignty of this as "Nature's supreme law," and that it "teaches us that every phenomenon has a mechanical cause." Not only does he refer material and physical phenomena to the causality of this law, but the phenomena of mind also, while the soul is considered as but the necessary product of its evolutionary process. It is not surprising then to find that God, Freedom, and Immortality are sweepingly denied, for there can be no place for them in such a materialistic system.

It is beyond the limits of our purpose at this time to enter into any exhaustive discussion of Haeckel's principles, but there are several characteristics of the "Riddle of The Universe," which we may mention as having impressed us as going far to destroy its argument and influence with careful thinkers. We have been impressed by its manifest bias, its extravagance of

statement, the absence of proof, and its inconclusive logic. The author's manifest bias is immediately apparent in his first chapter, in his rabid impatience with the Christian religion and its doctrines, as for example, when he declares that the freedom of the will is "a pure dogma, based on an illusion, and has no real existence." (P. 16.) He is utterly unable to comprehend how thinkers who had once accepted a naturalistic monism could change their minds to a more conservative position. He refers rather bitingly to the changes of view of Kant, Virchow, du Bois-Raymond, Wundt, and others, who in their younger days and earlier writings accepted the former monistic principles, but later turned away from them. Instead of acknowledging these changed views as the fruit of maturer judgment, intellectual progress, and the accumulation of experience, he contemptuously suggests as the explanation that they had less prejudice and more energy, with clearer vision and judgment in their earlier years, while in their later years there was gradual decay of brain, with defective vision and judgment. (P. 102). This is nothing less than insulting to such men, and reveals his inability to see more than one side of the problem. The same spirit is shown in the charge (P. 196), that in the Christian Church the doctrine of a future life is "materialism of the purest type," "teaching that the material body shall rise and dwell in a material heaven." This is both bias and ignorance, being false. It is evident that Haeckel is sadly lacking in a judicial mind, as many rabid utterances show: e. g.—when he refers to the premature deaths of great men and the "brutal facts of human history" as sufficient to destroy the "untenable myth" of a wise Providence and an all-loving Father. (P. 225).

Extravagant statements are common, as when he declares that the order of primates first appeared at the beginning of the Tertiary period,—"*at least three million years ago.*" (P. 14). Likewise he makes the coolest claim to the simian descent of man saying, "sufficient for us, as *an incontestable historical fact*, is the important thesis that man descends immediately from the ape, and secondarily from a long series of lower vertebrates," and, "thus, by the discovery of the fossil man-monkey of Java the descent of man from the ape *has become clear and certain.*" (P. 84 & 87). Of like character are the extravagant assump-

tions without proof that the human soul is derived from "a long evolutionary series of other mammal souls," and that, through a period of at least *fourteen million years*" since the commencement of the Triassic period, (P. 168); and again, "throughout the whole of astronomy, geology, physics, and chemistry *there is no question* to-day of a 'moral order' or a personal God," whose hand disposes all things. And he says the same is true of biology. (P. 269). He is often indifferent to the necessity for proof of his positions, as when he sweeps away the long-established arguments for the immortality of the soul, (P. 203); and at times he descends to the frivolous in argument as when he jests about the mother-in-law in the future life, and of Henry VIII and his six wives. (P. 208). Indeed the author seems to count confidently on the ignorance of his readers in many of the claims he makes, like those referred to, together with such charges as that of material resurrection against the Christian doctrine of a future life, and that of anthropomorphism against our conception of God. With such serious blemishes as these constantly appearing, Haeckel's pantheistic Monism loses its force and is discredited in the minds of all fair-minded thinkers.

In the end the author concludes that we must leave everything to "blind chance," while he confesses that in the search for the solution of the riddle of the universe, the mystery of the substance is still unknown, becoming more enigmatic the deeper we penetrate. He announces his new monistic religion as the cult of "the true, the good, and the beautiful," in which he professes to find compensation for the loss of God, Freedom and Immortality. (P. 380-382). To our mind this is a pitiful end, revealing the darkness and hopelessness of a purely naturalistic religion. In the last analysis such Monism must be considered as thorough-going atheistic Pantheism.

III. THE EFFECT OF THE TENDENCY.

It is certainly a serious question as to what the effect shall be of this philosophic tendency, which has been given expression in the "Riddle of The Universe." While this book has had a wide reading and considerable influence among the cultured classes,

it has been especially influential for evil and unbelief among the intelligent working classes of Germany, England, and to some extent in America. No single book in the last ten years has had such a power towards skepticism among the working men as this, and chiefly because it is free from an excess of technical terms and is written in a popular style calculated to reach these classes. It is a sad fact that multitudes of city workingmen have been alienated from the Church and religion by the economic tendencies of present-day industrialism, and among them Haeckel's "Scientific Monism" has found a fertile field. However the field has been by no means surrendered to Haeckel and protest strong and positive against such a materialistic philosophy has been made. One of the most effective apologists for religion in England at the present time is that distinguished scientist, Sir Oliver Lodge, who is doing so much to stem the tide of skepticism among the workingmen. The latter through the influence of Sir Oliver, are beginning to understand that the German philosopher has not said the last word as to religion. He tells them, referring to Haeckel, "The progress of thought has left him as well as his great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century." He describes him further as "the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as a pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh direction." While Haeckel would have us believe that soul and mind, the powers to think and feel, have no reality apart from the material body, and contemptuously denies the suggestion that there may be something immaterial operating through material organisms, Dr. Lodge answers, "I challenge him to say by what right he gives that answer," and then with vigorous and powerful argument maintains that "there is no scientific reason for denying the reality of soul-existence, the personality of God, the freedom of will which constitutes moral responsibility, the efficacy of prayer, and the life hereafter." But Sir Oliver not only deals in negations toward the skeptical

philosophy of the day, but his influence is also positive and constructive as is also that of other able apologists.

IV. THE COUNTER TENDENCY.

Among the more educated classes this problem of monistic philosophy is being met by a strong counter tendency to the development of a spiritual Monism as opposed to materialistic Monism, and in harmony with Christian Theism. While Science may be considered as monistic, there are many scientists who are monists of a very different type from Haeckel; such men as Dr. Paul Carus, the late Mr. G. J. Romanes, Prof. Lloyd Morgan, and Mr. W. H. Mallock, who are advocates of Theism. It cannot be denied that Monism exercises a strong fascination upon the mind, because it professes to give the unity for which the mind craves, founded upon the facts of Science; but instead of being permitted to drift into anti-theistic presentations, it should be directed into positive theistic form. This some very able thinkers have been doing, notably the Rev. W. L. Walker, of England, in his recent volume, entitled "Christian Theism and A Spiritual Monism."

The author's chief object is "to show how the great Christian pre-suppositions,—God, Freedom, and Immortality,—in their specifically Christian character, can be established on the basis of such a monistic conception of the world as the facts of science demand and as philosophy is feeling after." Mr. Walker gives a thorough and fair examination of Haeckel, frankly recognizing the monistic principle, but showing conclusively the utter weakness of the latter's system in failing to recognize the place and value of Mind or Spirit. He takes the ground that Monism must be accepted in some form as the explanation of the world that Science deals with and which we know, but the reality of the spiritual world must be recognized and given its proper place. So far as Evolution is concerned, the author holds that it proceeds under the influence of a Power, which is neither Matter nor Force, but an omni-present and all-working Reason,—God. This conception leads to a spiritual Monism which acknowledges Mind and Matter as the two sides or aspects of a single working Power, but the spiritual side, "in virtue of which

we know anything at all about the matter, or about 'Matter,' is first and deepest, and the material world simply its necessary expression and instrument." In such a philosophic system, the spiritual is the dominant side, though the material is not obscured but given its rightful place in the cosmos,—the ordered world,—in relation to the creative and determining Power. "Religion itself leads of necessity to a Monistic conception of the Universe," says Mr. Walker. "Theism derives all from God; but God is Spirit. If everything proceeds from this spiritual Source, then everything, Matter as well as Energy, must be spiritual in its origin and essence. There is really no other alternative. If we do not hold a spiritual Monism, we leave one side of the Universe unaccounted for or unrelated to God." (P. 185). Scientific Monism when conceived in a rational way, and not perverted into atheistic materialism as by Haeckel, does nothing against such a theistic view and conviction, but rather confirms them. And if the spiritual element be given its due place, it is easy to show how truly Science supports Religion.

V. THE EFFECT UPON THEOLOGY.

Let us now turn for the moment to the effect of this philosophic tendency upon theology, for this has a vital bearing upon our theistic and Christian faith. There is a very intimate relation between theology and philosophy. Theology holds a royal position among the sciences. But if theology is the king then surely philosophy may be considered the queen of the sciences. As in many other relations in life, this relation depends largely upon the character of the bond which unites them and the degree of harmony which exists between them. Philosophy ought to be a helpful ally to theology, because its very idea "rests upon the assumption that the universe is a rationally ordered whole." Let me quote a paragraph from the late Dr. Valentine, (Christian Theology, Vol. I, P. 37): "There has always been a strong affinity between theology and philosophy, a tendency to unite their lines of thought and explanation. Philosophy tends to become theological, theology philosophical. Ever since the days when Plato's philosophy reached up into the high realm of theistic and spiritual verities, and Christianity, in turn, employed

his thinking in support, and, in some degree, in elucidation of its divine truths, this tendency has been evident. The history of doctrine in the early Church shows abundantly, and sometimes only too strongly, a moulding and coloring influence on theology from its contacts with encompassing philosophic speculation. To say nothing about the gnostic and other heresies which broke the peace of the Church, the Alexandrian type of theology, so influential in Greek Christianity, is a perpetual historic reminder of this moulding force. In every century since, we find systems of theology shaped in greater or less degree by prevalent philosophies; and at the same time some philosophies determined in large measure by believing submission to the dogmas of the Church. Every prominent system of modern philosophy has made itself felt in theology—sometimes sending waves of influence over large spaces of the theological realm.”

This is very true to-day. The present wide-spread unsettlement of theological belief and statement is due, not only to a negative and destructive criticism, but also in part to the insidious undermining influence of a “scientific Monism” which is skeptical, sometimes materialistic, sometimes idealistic. To our mind, this is the trouble with Rev. Reginald J. Campbell, that versatile London minister, whose “New Theology” has aroused such a stir in England. He is certainly powerfully influenced by the monistic philosophy, although it has been difficult to determine whether his views set in the direction of a naturalistic Pantheism or of a monistic Idealism of the type of Hegel. But now, it seems to be the latter. While Mr. Campbell has declared that he believes in the divinity of Christ, his words are chosen with such care that he makes his meaning obscure and simply deepens the impression that he no longer believes in the deity of Christ as the accepted standards of Christian faith hold; while his view of God becomes more obscure and idealistic. It should also be noticed that the wide-spread cult of Christian Science is but the fruit of monistic philosophy. In teaching the unreality of matter it is but the reproduction of the idealistic Monism of Hegel, and in its pantheistic teaching that God is all, it goes straight back to Spinoza. Christian Science makes strange bed-fellows out of Spinoza and Hegel.

There is no need of argument to show that materialistic Monism strikes directly at the fundamental doctrine of God and places itself in a position of hostility to theology and the Christian religion. Some Monists after stripping Deity of all His sovereignty and creative activity, strive to leave a dim and shadowy divine Being, but Haeckel goes to the logical extreme and sweeps away the conception of Deity altogether, and blinded by his prejudiced inability to give fair consideration to the Christian position, charges anthropomorphism against the Christian idea of God. This charge, which Reginald Campbell has echoed in milder form, deserves an answer, and we give it in the words of Dr. Valentine, (*Id.* P. 209) ; "If it be objected that this process simply makes an anthropomorphic God, a being fashioned in the mould of our own minds, it is sufficient to reply that our knowledge does not cease to be knowledge, when we know, as we must, according to the laws and measures of our own faculties. Our faculties are not proved false by their being human. Our knowledge on every subject must be human or anthropomorphic. The firm basis, on which, nevertheless, we may still assert the competency of our faculties to reach all the way up to God, is in the great truth of our being made in His image—in the likeness of His personality." This answer is conclusive. The materialistic form of monistic philosophy not only denies the existence of God but, teaching that man is but the natural evolution of material forces, denies the freedom of the will and immortality, and leaves man under the crushing weight of determinism and a hopeless death.

There is also another side of the monistic tendency,—the other extreme of Idealistic Monism. While the naturalistic Monism of Haeckel has appealed strongly to the uneducated and the working world, the latter appeals influentially to the cultured classes and has found voice in some of our universities. It is insidious and dangerous, referring all things to Absolute Mind, and defining matter only in terms of the spiritual. Conceiving God as all, it denies any distinction between God and the world, or between Mind and Matter. It degrades man and ends in determinism, while it has no place for the doctrines of sin and Redemption, or for Christ and the Incarnation. Surely the call of the hour is for the Christian Church and Christian The-

ology to contend courageously and with unshaken faith against these destructive philosophic tendencies.

VI. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

What then, is the solution of these problems brought to the front by the tendencies of the hour? It seems to us that Mr. Walker's Spiritual Monism comes near to suggesting the true solution, although it is certainly not the final word. It is quite different from the Idealistic Monism to which we have referred, for while it points to God as the ultimate monistic principle and First Cause, it recognizes the distinction between God and the world and between Mind and Matter. Matter is real and is the opposite side from Mind, yet both owe their existence to God, a spiritual Being, and therefore Spirit dominates Matter. Thus the way is clear for the great doctrines of Christian Theism.

We believe the solution of the problem lies in the recognition of an ultimate monistic principle,—not a principle, which is unintelligent, blind in action, and causative of adventitious effects; but an ultimate principle which is actualized and embodied in a personal Being, spiritual and intelligent,—God, who is manifested in a dualism of Mind and Matter, the fruit of His Will. This is creative Monism. There is no good ground why this conception of Final Cause should not be considered both rational and Scriptural. There are two fundamental principles which we cannot escape, try as we may:—the monistic principle in the Universe and the dualistic distinction between Mind and Matter. Certainly Religion leads of necessity to a monistic conception of all cosmical existence, because Theism derives all from God, who is a Spirit, transcendent and intelligently active. Therefore we cannot escape the necessity of the conception of one self-existent eternal Being. It may be claimed that it is difficult to conceive of eternal self-existence; but at the same time it is an impossibility to conceive of infinite space, absolutely devoid of any existence; for space is relative to existence, and without existence there is no space. Therefore being shut up to these two alternatives, (infinite space and eternal self-existence on the one hand, and the negation of space and existence

on the other), we cannot but choose the former as the only rational conclusion. There is eternal self-existence.

Furthermore this self-existence must be spiritual. The difficulty of conceiving of matter as self-existent is evident. Neither Spencer nor Haeckel makes the attempt. In Spencer, the final cause is "force"; in Haeckel, the "law of substance." There they stop, practically acknowledging that they are up up against a dead wall, beyond which they cannot reach. Far more rational is it to conceive of a personal spiritual Power, self-existent and eternal, in whose intelligent, creative activity, is found the final cause of cosmic material. Kant acknowledges this with fine candor:—"There is, therefore, a Being of all beings, an infinite mind and self-sustaining wisdom, from which nature in the full range of all its forms and features derives its origin, even as regards its very possibility." And he says again, "The proposition that God as the universal First Cause, is the cause of the existence of Substance, can never be given up." Indeed most of the philosophers find themselves face to face with creative principle. In Kant's "Thing-in-itself," in Hegel's "Idea," Spencer's "Force," and Haeckel's "Substance," there is creative power. That is what it is, though they do not wish to use the term. Why should men hesitate to go as the Christian theist does, and bow before the Almighty God?

Equally insistent is the ever-present dualism of Mind and Matter. Any view that denies this practical dualism, evident to reason and experience, and that either sinks Mind in Matter, or sinks Matter in Mind, ends in philosophic ruin. But we must avoid the errors of the older dualism. We cannot understand why the conservative dualism of the day, after it has asserted the creation of the world, should then proceed to exalt the created cosmos to a position of equality with God, by asserting the dualistic antagonism of God and the world. Such a conception is a limitation of God and an undue exaltation of the world, minimizing the former's transcendence. Can that which is created be considered rationally from either the philosophic or scientific or theistic view-point, as antithetical to its Creator? We think not. There is a dualism, however, but it is a dualism of a created spiritual world and a created material world; a dualism of Mind and Matter, whose First Cause is one supreme

Power, both transcendent and immanent. Mind and Matter are the two sides of His creative intelligence, distinct but intimately related. The world also is distinct from God and subordinate. Naturalism and Materialism have sought an evolutionary First Cause; Theism or Religion posits a creative First Cause, who by means of His established universal laws, may use evolutionary processes in the course of world-development. This is Creative or Spiritual Monism.

Such a Monism, based on the oneness and the unifying spiritual energy of the eternal First Cause, and at the same time recognizing the created dualism of secondary causes, is in harmony with Christian Theism, and at the same time scientific. It opens the way for the solution of the great problems of existence. It points to God as transcendent but also as immanent, because of the divine unity into which He has bound all things by the dominance of the spiritual. It solves the question of human freedom for it presents man, not as identified with God, but as a distinct personality, who seeks God to be reconciled to Him, and who therein exercises freedom. While a materialistic Monism looking at man as the mechanical product of cosmic forces, closed the door to immortality, a spiritual Monism seeing him in his relation to God, opens the door wide to eternal life. Such a conception of God and the world leads at once to a clearer apprehension of the reality and naturalness of the Incarnation and of Christ's redemptive work. If God is divine, reaching out in love to His creation, if He is the Principle of the world's being and life, He must realize Himself in the highest life of the world, that is, in Christ. Such a creative or spiritual Monism may not be the final word, but it is worthy of future study and development and offers the only safe corrective of the skeptical monistic views which have been current.

Towards some form of monistic thought Science and Philosophy are undoubtedly moving. "The trend of modern thought is towards the conception that the whole world is one, but one *life*, not one machine; one in terms of spirit, not one in terms of matter, motion, and force." If Monism is to be defined as the explanation of the phenomena of the universe by referring them all to a single principle, there should be no longer any obstacle to prevent both Science and Philosophy leading directly up to

the monotheism of the Christian Religion. The three are not antagonistic but mutually helpful, and neither should hesitate to seek the assistance of the others when needed. After Science and Philosophy have done their best and noblest, we are yet left standing in the presence of certain great mysteries and ultimate realities,—the universe itself, our conscious human personality, and above them the one vivifying and directive Energy,—the eternal, personal God. Upon these Christian Theism alone offers the certain light of final truth. Science and Philosophy, confessing the limits of their field of vision, need the help of divine Revelation and the Christian faith, which centers in the divine-human person of Jesus Christ. The need is scientific justification for the acceptance of the light which Religion offers.

As to ourselves, as individuals and seekers after truth, there are certain ineradicable heart-questionings which arise spontaneously out of this self-conscious personality of ours, questions relating to God, the world, the soul, freedom, sin, redemption, immortality, judgment. These are irrepressible; which fact is evidence that answers may be had; and if a materialistic Science and a naturalistic Philosophy fail or refuse to give satisfactory answers to the inquiring soul, we must appeal to divine Revelation. It is irrational to expect us to be content to sit in darkness, when light is at hand. Here we must take our stand, positively holding that it is perfectly rational to seek the explanation of these problems from the theistic stand-point, and legitimate and valid to construct a philosophy under the light and guidance of Revelation. Thus, and thus only, can we find answers which are full and explicit, answers tested and confirmed in the joyful experience of the fathers who have held fast the faith and have gone before us. Such a philosophy, accepting the aid of Theism and Revelation, may be monistic,—but it will be a Spiritual or Creative Monism. As such it will not be far from the truth.

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

BY HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, D.D.

Religion and politics are the two most important interests of mankind. They mark the radiating centers of all human history. Without the institutions of religion and politics men would relapse into barbarism and lead godless and lawless lives. No man can afford to be indifferent to their interests or shirk the responsibilities they lay upon him.

The deepest element in a man's life is his religion. A people without a religion does not exist, or if it does exist it exists only as an abnormal or deficient specimen of the genus to which it belongs. A man's religion is the chief thing about him, as Carlyle said it was. It is not something to be put on and off at will, to be employed for purposes of expediency. It is not a delusion, the outgrowth of ignorance or superstition. It is the expression of the divine life in man working its way out through the ages in the progress of the race. This interest of man is represented by the divine institution which is called the Church.

Next after religion the most important interest of man is his association with other men in that institution of society which is called the State. The state represents that organized order without which society would know no security. The state is not a mere pact grounded on expediency. It is a divine institution. It has its vindication in the moral nature of man. Its function is not only to protect man in his material interests, but to secure to him freedom for his moral development as well. It has for its end the fulfilment of the divine purpose in history.

The question as to the relation of these two divine institutions is as old as human society. In one sense, as a separate and ethical corporation, the ancients had no Church. The Church and the State were one, or, if they were two, they were like the Siamese twins whose life was so vitally related that they could not be separated without destroying both. This identity or loose intercommunion arose from the common germ out of which both

grew; viz: the family. This is the state of things which meet us in the first pages of the book of Genesis. Long before the promulgation of the Mosaic law we read that Melchizedek, king of Salem, went out to bless Abraham, and he was a *priest* of the Most High God. In Homer we find Agamemnon, the king of men, performing sacrificial functions without even the presence of a priest. In the sober historical age of Greece we find the king of Sparta performing all public sacrifices. In Rome the Emperor assumed the title of Pontifex Maximus. In Egypt, when the Pharaoh did not happen to be born a priest he had to be made a priest before he could become a king. Israel's kings were anointed by Israel's high priests.

With the advent of Christianity came a vastly different state of affairs. Christianity came into the world as a power for personal regeneration. It was not, and is not now, in the first instance, an institution. The Church grew out of Christianity, not Christianity out of the Church. As soon as the Church became the primal institution of Christianity it came into contact with that other great social institution which we call the State. At the time Christianity began to radiate its influence from the little country of Palestine the State had reached its most masterful form in the Roman empire. Rome gives us the norm of the State in its modern sense. It had an admirable body of public law—so wise and ample, indeed, that today it is the basis of the public law of Europe and America. The chief instrument of administration was the Roman army. We are accustomed to think of the Roman army as standing for Rome's brute force; but it was, as Goldwin Smith in his essay on "The Greatness of Rome" has pointed out, "the first triumph of intellect over muscle." Discipline was its watch-word. Both in military and civil life the Roman was the first to develop fully the idea of law. The great word he has contributed to the language of man is *lex*. We owe to the Roman our conception of the State as an entity, our reverence to law as a rule of life, and our belief in the people as the source of power.

But while the Roman government had become such a magnificent institution the Roman world was in a state of social anarchy in the first century of the Christian era. The vices which Rome had inherited with her conquests had eaten the

heart out of her moral life. Theoretically governed by law she was actually governed by lust. A great despair had settled upon the rank and file of her citizenship, while her Emperor sought to tighten the cords of his waning power by appealing to Roman regard for the State as divine.

Into this world of social disorganization the Christian religion came with its doctrines of the new life and the brotherhood of man. A new life of purity and social equality appealed powerfully to the Roman slave and the Roman harlot, and later when its genius was understood, it appealed to Roman soldiers and Roman officers as well. The Christian communities became so many little democracies scattered throughout the empire. It was impossible that between two such institutions as the infant Church and the hoary Roman empire there should not be conflict. The imperial government feared, hated and despised the Church. It feared the Church because it could not understand its genius and had vague misgivings that the Church was undermining the foundations of the empire. It hated the Christians because the Christians held aloof from its public festivals and celebrations, and would not join in the worship of the State. And finally the empire despised the Church because the Church was, for the most part, made up of the offscourings of the Roman world.

The attitude of the infant Church toward the empire was a mixture of submission and abhorrence. Jesus' words about tribute to Caesar were a recognition of the rights of government as such, and of Rome as a great governmental institution in particular. Paul, the only apostle who dealt with the matter beyond a mere exhortation, laid down principles which have been the bulwark of law and order ever since. And those words were written, you will recall, when the supreme magistrate for the Roman Christians was a dissolute young man, intoxicated by the discovery that he might do almost as he pleased with the lives about him, not by reason of any defect in the idea and purpose of Roman law, but by fault of the degenerate world of the day. The Jews were never easily governed, and a Jewish Christian with his head swimming with the new ideas of Gospel freedom would not find it easy to respect a government with a Nero at its head. Nothing could be more unfortunate than that the

Christian disciple, whose Master was so respectful to governmental authority, should become associated with anarchy in the capital of the world. With Roman life Christianity had nothing in common. The book of Revelations reflects like a mirror the judgment of the Church upon the Roman world. It was Babylon the great, the mother of harlots, the abomination of the earth. The thought of reforming the Roman empire never entered the Christian mind of those days. So gigantic an abomination only the swift judgment of God could destroy. On the other hand, Rome was not satisfied with the attitude of the Christians. They withheld what Rome deemed essential, and therefore the empire tried to exterminate them; but the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church. It was a long test of strength. But Roman hate was not equal to Christian endurance. One by one the Church had been winning to her standards men of power until finally she won a Caesar and under Constantine took her seat upon the imperial throne. The significance of this fact was, not so much the establishment of the Church—though that followed also—as the recognition of a new ideal. Persecution was at an end. Men were no longer compelled to worship Caesar as divine. He was nothing but a mortal man. God's servant, it is true, but himself subject to the judgment of Christ. Vast and important changes followed the conversion of the Emperor and the peace of the Church. Gladiatorial shows—the disgrace of the ancient world—disappeared; the condition of the slave was ameliorated and slavery put in the way of abolition; personal purity was exalted and the Christian type of character became the accepted type. This was the effect of the ascendancy of Christianity upon the state. In the transition the Church lost her simplicity; but henceforth she became the monitor of the west. For a thousand years the state was subservient to the Church there, and to her Europe owes her civilization.

In the east the Church fell into the iron grip of the State under Theodosius the vindictive Spaniard, and from that moment its development was arrested and its influence shorn. One needs but look at Russia today to see the effect of the over-emphasis of the State. With freedom of thought utterly arrested, depraved by a corrupt priesthood, weakened by secession after secession,

what has she been for a thousand years but an inert mass used to sustain the despotism that holds it in subjection? "The Church in the east, from the days of Theodosius has been simply a function of the state, and has been used by the state to support the policy of the state. * * From Ivan the Terrible to the Czar Nicholas the autocrat of Russia has found in the clergy the ready instruments of his cruelty and despotism. The clergy are dependent on the Czar and dependence is the fruitful parent of slavery. An imperial church in an imperial state must either subjugate the state, or be subjugated by the state."

The undisputed supremacy of the Church in the west was equally bad for her. The Church became a huge political organization without whose sanction not a sovereign of Europe was deemed rightfully to wear his crown. The Pope stood at the apex of earthly greatness; he was by far the most important personage in Europe. In the eloquent words of the late David A. Buehler, "Imperious successors of the humble Galilean fisherman claimed the right at will to absolve people from their allegiance to their rulers, to make and unmake kings. Europe was covered with a vast ecclesiastical net-work, all threads of which led to Rome. Monks and priests, with mitred abbots and lordling bishops, swarmed everywhere, holding the keys of the heaven and hell, and wielding mysterious control over the minds and hearts of men. They became the confessors of princes and people, entered the family circle and controlled domestic relations, regulated marriage and divorce, watching over the beds of the sick and dying and sat in judgments on wills. They exacted tithings and fees, acquired large wealth, immense estates, extensive jurisdiction and special privileges. They carried with them their own courts and laws, and claimed to be amenable only to the Church." The decrees of the Pope were absolute, not only for individuals but for nations as well. It was only a question of time until the Church would pay the penalty for such usurpation of power, and that came in her humiliation at the hands of Philip of France in the matter of Sicily, and in the consequent schism of Papacy. The Council of Constance put an end forever to the absolute and divine right of popes, while the Protestant Reformation of Germany restored to the State its rightful functions. Luther was a powerful factor, not only

in casting down the Papacy but also in setting up kings. That was an inevitable first step, where the State had been trampled under foot. The *immediate* result of the Reformation was the establishment of national churches in northern Europe, but the *ultimate* result was the freedom of both institutions in the reciprocal relation in which they exist in the United States. We do not mean to say that America was Luther's ideal, or the ideal of any other of the great reformers, but it was the logical outcome of the principles they advocated.

We cannot trace the relation of State and Church in America by a straight line. New England was settled by the Puritans who established a theocracy—a marriage of Teutonism and Hebraism—one of the noblest efforts in history to realize the rule of God on earth. Most of the other sections were settled for commercial reasons—though here and there a colony of Protestant immigrants bore testimony to the missionary zeal of the Old World movement. This was particularly true of the Swedes who settled along the Delaware. Naturally all adherents of the State-church idea would scan our declaration of principles in a constitution with a keen and critical eye. British writers, and some American who look at everything through an English eyeglass, have in recent years been fond of asserting that the patriot colonists took their ideas of liberty and the principles of the Declaration of Independence from Rousseau. England of course claims that hers is the ideal relation between Church and State. But, as a careful student of the pamphlets which the colonists put out in abundance in the agitation for freedom has noted, one searches in vain for the name of Rousseau, while the names of Grotius, the great Hollander, and Puffendorf the German, and Burlamaqui the Swiss—men who were influenced directly by the Reformation—abound. Burlamaqui's book, "The Principles of Natural Law," devoted exclusively to the principles of liberty, is particularly notable. "To this day," says Sydney Fisher, "anyone going to the Philadelphia Library and asking for No. 77, can take in his hands the identical, well-worn volume which delegates to Congress and many unsettled Philadelphians are said to have read more than any other. It was among the first books that the library had obtained, and perhaps the most important and effective book it has ever owned. Burlamaqui

belonged to a Protestant family that once lived at Lucca, Italy, but had been compelled to take refuge in Switzerland, where as a teacher he gave his life to the championship of human liberty. His little book, which came to America in 1748, dealt with the principles of liberty. It was an attempt to get away from the arbitrary system of things which had entrenched themselves through centuries of endurance, and to obtain for the State a foundation which grew out of the nature of things—the common facts of life which everybody understood, and, which being natural, would be permanent. Men naturally, he said, draw together to form societies for mutual protection and advantage. Their natural state is a state of union and society, and these societies are merely for the common advantage of all the members. There is no divine right of kings, but there is a divine right of social compact for government. The principle is familiar enough to us, but we must remember that it was a revolutionary principle then. It had been supposed for centuries that the divine origin of the state centered in the divine right of the king. Burlamaqui found it to consist in a state of nature which is of God. Government is a necessary institution, springing out of the very form and nature of our existence. Governmental power may exist in a variety of governmental forms, from the simple patriarchal form to the complex structure of the modern State; but the essential idea is the same in all forms. And of this St. Paul has given us the classic generalization—"The powers that be are ordained of God." The authority of all governmental power is of God as life is of God. "The authority of the state," says Newman Smyth, "is derived immediately from the moral value of the social relations which it organizes. * * If these primal relations of humanity have moral worth, and are to be brought to their highest possible realization, then the state is invested with their ethical authority." Which means that there are social relations existing before the State, and back of the State, to give embodiment to which and to safeguard which the State is organized. The State is a sort of a generalization of the will of the individual citizens. Or, as another has put it, "The visible sovereign is the representative of the invisible sovereign." If the authority of the State be the fulfilment of the ethical instinct of the citizens, then the State ceases to be a divine

institution in two circumstances. If the person vested with sovereign power ceases to be a public person and becomes a private person; that is, if the ruler ceases to live for the benefit of the State and in his public capacity seeks to promote his private interests, he no longer has the authority of God. Or the conscience of the people may rise so that their will is no longer represented by the forms of government. In that case, only that ruler has divine authority who gives expression to the righteous will of the people. There may have to be more than one readjustment until the government does express the will of the people, but no one will fear such readjustments so long as this high doctrine of the State prevails. Men like Milton and Cromwell were not afraid to uncrown kings. Milton thought of the State "as one huge Christian personage, one mighty growth or stature of an honest man."

Now the point of our review is simply this—the attitude of the Church, and specifically the Christian minister, towards civic affairs in a State where an established religion is prohibited by constitutional provision. It has been said that on the face of the matter there is no relation. But while that constitutional enactment may rule the Church out of the courts of the State, it does not and cannot dismiss the Church from the higher court of the public conscience. There is still an internal, reciprocal relation between the two which legislation cannot annul and statesmen cannot ignore. The two operate largely on the same individuals, and the work of one influences that of the other. As a matter of fact with us the State assumes a receptive attitude toward the church. It asks its prayers; it frames its laws on Christian principles; it protects the church in its worship and exempts its property from taxation; it recognizes Christianity as a part of the common law of the land. In speaking of the government of the ancient Greek cities Pres. Woodrow Wilson has said: "In every way the political life of the city spoke of religion. There was a city hearth in the prytaneum on which a fire sacred to the gods was kept ceaselessly burning; there were public repasts at which, if not the whole people, at least representatives sat down to break the sacred cake and pour out the consecrated wine to the gods; * * There were festivals at certain

times in honor of the several deities of the city, and the council always convened in a temple. Politics was a religion." And politics is religion still because it has to do with major morals, with the relations of men with each other in communities, with honesty and self-repression and truth in speech and trade. The one cry that goes up from man to God universally is for justice. All the prophets of Israel, and Jesus Christ the fulfiller of all prophecy, declared it to be the will of God that righteousness be done on earth; and when that is done His kingdom is established.

The Church, therefore, has its first duty to the State in vigilance that no legislation be enacted which is in conflict with God's law. That of course means fundamental morality in the laws of the land. There are very many state enactments in which self-interest and morals are so combined that there is no difference of opinion and therefore no conflict in making them a part of the statute law which governs us; but there are questions where the higher and the lower interests do conflict, where human greed arrays itself against man's best interests as comprehended in the divine law; and then it becomes the duty of the Church to speak, to lift up its voice and spare not, and to employ every legitimate means for the defeat of the immoral program. On the other hand, there are many things in which the State in its enactments has fallen short of the standard of divine law—as, for example, in the matter of divorce—and in these the Church has the plain obligation of making the right so clear that public opinion will demand it as the law of the land. It is the function and duty of the Church to clear the atmosphere when men's minds get befogged on such questions. It is not corrupt officials alone who mar the operations of the State. A greater evil is false political principles and ideals. False ideals live on, while corrupt officials die or may be displaced. The worst political heresy that was ever spoken in this country was that "politics and the Ten Commandments have nothing in common." Nothing will insure the downfall of a state more quickly than just that sentiment pressed to its logical conclusion. And that is the truth back of Pres. Hadley's assertion that "mere training in sociology and politics and civics and finance and all manner of studies intended to inform young

Americans concerning the mechanism of the political world in which he lives will not be sufficient to remedy the political evils of the nation."

But a more serious difficulty in the way of good government than wrong theories and ideals has been found. There seems to be something lacking in the natural human will to execute good ideals. Few things are more disheartening than the different attitude of obligation which the average man has to his family and to the State. He is keenly sensitive about the honor of his home; he endeavors to promote its welfare, he will sink himself in its interest. Toward the State he is luke-warm and neutral. He does not concern himself about its affairs or its character unless his own palpable welfare is involved. "It is as clear as noonday," said ex-Pres. Cleveland "that if the patriotism of our people is to be aggressively vigorous, and equal to our national preservation, and if politics is to subserve a high purpose instead of degenerating to the level of a cunning game, our good men in every walk of life must arouse themselves to the consciousness that the safety and best interests of their country involve every other interest, and that by service in the field of good citizenship they not only do patriotic duty, but duty in its broadest sense." And an able editor has recently said: "The religious *conscience* and *moral* nature must be stimulated equally with the brain to make the complete citizen. When the schools teach men both to know what is right and to do it as a religious duty, then we shall have the ideal citizen, and not until then." But the Christian Church is the only institution that teaches men to do right as a religious duty. And therefore, when a man brings the motives which the Church inculcates to the problems which the State presents we have what Lord Rosebery has well described as "the most formidable and terrible of all combinations, the practical mystic, combining the energy of the man of action with the mediation of the man of prayer." To create such statesmen is one of the highest privileges of the Church. Such a statesman was Washington, of the early days of our history. Again and again in his talks, in his letters, in his state-papers and formal addresses he expresses most devoutly his conception of the work he was doing as God's work. The same is true of Lincoln. Though not of the communion of the Church, no man

was more responsive than he to the inculcations of the Church on the matter of public duty; and the result was that the farther he went into the great gloom of the civil war the more profound became his conviction that it was God's cause, that God was only demanding the things that were his; and so he came to say, "If this war goes on till for every drop of blood drawn by the lash through 250 years of unrequited bondage another must be drawn by the sword, even then God's judgments would be true and righteous altogether." The same was true of McKinley. When he entered the Presidential office, the best that could be said of him was that he was a high-minded politician with the endowments of statesmanship. Men spoke of him as an opportunist, one who kept his ear to the ground and was swayed by external influences. But whatever truth there may have been in the criticism, national problems so great soon presented themselves in his administration that popular sentiment was found to be an utterly inadequate guide, and with his naturally religious nature he fell back upon the divine will urged from ten thousand pulpits as the only safe chart by which to steer the ship of state.

Not to refer to those who are now actively engaged in public administration—some of whom are doing heroic service for the cause of good government—our point is that the Church has an obligation resting upon her of counseling and admonishing civil rulers as to their duties and holding before them the standard of God's word. All of the men we have mentioned had an open ear for that council, and the man who would refuse it could not be elected to high office in this land.

There come times, too, when the minister of God is called to the public championship of righteousness—times when wickedness has enthroned itself in high places, when a base and godless tyranny is crushing down freedom, or the nation is in immanent danger of being swayed by wrong motives. When the struggle for American independence came, John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg gave notice to his congregation down in Virginia of his farewell sermon. A large audience assembled. At the conclusion of the service he exclaimed, "There is a time for peace and a time for war, and now the time to fight has come," and throwing back his clerical

robe he stood before them in a colonel's uniform and the next day was off for the war.

During our Civil War, when public sentiment in England threatened to nurture the Confederacy into success, Henry Ward Beecher left his pulpit to stay the impending peril by his advocacy of the principles of abolition upon the British platform. In the splendid victory over municipal misrule and plunder in the city of Philadelphia, the initiative of reform came from the pulpit of that city. By the confession of public men and the press, the ministers took the lead. The methods for arousing public sentiment and keeping it alive were of their devising, and it is safe to say that they are as much feared in that community as public chastizers of iniquity as the press itself.

There have always been, and doubtless always will be, men who seem incapable of interpreting Christianity in the light of public duty. To them religion is a temperament, an attitude of soul. They do not deny its application to life, but it is to what they call the religious side of life. They believe that it is to be kept as far as possible from the loud contentions of public life. They forget that the Gospel "is not only the power of God unto salvation for the individual, but also for society. Its mission is to enthrone righteousness in the single soul and also in the corporate life of men; to effect personal regeneration and also social regeneration; to break up encrusted abuses, to eradicate wrongs, to reshape and reorganize society in harmony with the thought and purpose of God." The Gospel has more than a private, personal significance; it has its message for the corporate life of mankind, its program of civic righteousness. What the duty of the Church toward the State may be, only the exigencies of the times can determine; but the interests of these two great institutions of God can no more be separated than we can dissect the human body without destroying life. To speak of the absolute separation of Church and State is to speak of the separation of soul and body. When the Church is true to itself and true to its God it is the conscience of the State, and that function will never leave us in doubt as to the meaning of her Lord when He said, "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's."

ARTICLE V.

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE.

BY PROFESSOR J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

I. MARRIAGE.

In the Word of God marriage is regarded as a holy institution, established by the Creator for the happiness and well-being of the most exalted creature on earth, and as a means for the orderly propagation of a race of beings originally created in the image and likeness of God. In its essential nature it is a union of two persons of opposite sexes in one organism. Mutuality, or the reciprocal discharge of pertinent and appropriate duties, belongs to the institution and is necessary for its ideal realization; but mutuality does not constitute the very essence of marriage. This, the essence of marriage, lies deeper than the works and duties that pertain to marriage and promote its ideal realization. The essence of marriage lies in the personal union and in the mutual possession. Then comes the physical, ethical and spiritual identification for the united discharge of the duties and callings of human existence.

On these points the Scripture is clear. When God had created man in his image and after his likeness, and had given him dominion over all things that live and move on the earth, yea, and over the earth itself, he declared: "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make a help-meet for him." (Gen. 2:18) (1)—meaning, undoubtedly, that it is not proper, not profitable nor advantageous, that man should be alone, should be without any creature of his kind to live with him, and to en-

(1) The Hebrew words translated in our English Bible viz: "A help meet for him," undoubtedly mean a "help" corresponding to him, his counterpart adequate to his needs. This clearly implies, just as experience proves, that man has needs, and also capacities, which he cannot himself supply, and capabilities which cannot be expressed nor exercised in himself. It is as though God had complemented his own work, and had finished it in regard to man (*ish*) by creating woman (*isha*). It is not said that God created "a help meet" for the animals. Woman is not only distinguished, but dignified, by the way in which she came into existence. She is man's counterpart, his *alter ego*.

able him to fulfil the divine command to be fruitful and multiply, and to replenish the earth, and to subdue it. To remove this condition of loneliness and of impotence God made a woman. But he did not make her out of the dust of the earth. He made her out of a piece taken from man, that the man might recognize her as bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh (Gen. 2:23), thus at once establishing a more intimate and permanent union than any that can be established by a contract or by a compact where parties are themselves the principals. And here the comment of Matthew Henry is as sane as it is sentimental: "That woman was made of a rib out of the side of Adam; not made out of his head to top him, nor out of his feet to trample upon him, but out of his side to be equal with him, under his arm to be protected, and near his heart to be beloved." (2) The woman (*isha* the Hebrew feminine, corresponding to *ish*, man) was made as over against the man, his counterpart, a creature corresponding to his nature, to his needs and to his condition, his other self, his equal, but with a personality that is her own, and for this very reason man's counterpart, his equal. Hence when the Lord brought the woman unto the man he at once comprehended her nature, her quality and her destination, and he exclaimed: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. She shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man. Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." (Gen. 2:23, 24.)

In this narrative we have the primitive conception of marriage, given by the father of the human race, before his mind had been darkened by sin and his heart perverted by carnal passions. According to this conception the *husband* is more than *man*. The *wife* is more than *woman*. Each has become part of the other; each is now agglutinated (*Dabak conjunctus, conglutinated*) with the other in such a way as to be each inseparable from the other, except by the introduction of a cause not contemplated by the original institution. And if we analyze the

(2) *Com. in loco.* See a very scholarly article entitled *The Biblical Teaching concerning Divorce*. By Ernest D. Burton in *Biblical World*, February and March, 1907.

narrative a little more closely we find that marriage in its ideal and in its original conception is monogamous. It is the union of two and of only two persons of opposite sexes, of one man and of one woman. This is clearly implied in the words, "his wife" and "one flesh." Perpetuity of the union is implied also in the words: "They shall be one flesh;" they shall abide together. And it is implied that the union shall be regulated by love—"one flesh," "for no man ever hated his own flesh." (Eph. 5 : 29.

Polygamy is thus left entirely out of the question. The circumstances attending the original institution, and the predicates used in describing marriage as a state and a relation define it as monogamy. Had man remained free from sin the ideal would have remained the real. Polygamy would not have been introduced among men, and divorce would have been morally, and because morally, really, impossible. A man and his wife would have lived together, the two, until in God's estimation the institution, in their case, had served its purpose.

But with sin came the carnal desire, which itself is sin. Some men were not content to have only one wife. They sought and obtained two, or more; and some women were willing to become wives to men who were already living in wedlock; though the practice of polygamy, so far as we know and may infer from the primitive Mosaic record, did not have the divine authorization. We do not read anywhere that God said that a man should at the same time have two wives. However, polygamy was practiced by some men, who, in certain aspects of their lives, are held up as models for imitation. Abraham had two wives, one principal and one secondary. Jacob had two of each kind. But one does not have to inquire very minutely into the domestic history of polygamy to discover the evils of the system, and hence to perceive reasons for concluding that it does not have a divine origin and cannot have the divine approval. God chooses a man to execute a work in whom he perceives the qualities conducive to success. But he punishes his elect for their sins. Jacob and David suffered the bitter consequences of their polygamy in the multiplied sorrows that came upon them through the children of plural marriages.

On the contrary the most beautiful pictures of domestic fe-

licity are associated in the Scriptures with monogamy. De Wette declares that "the Hebrew moral preachers speak decidedly for monogamy, as is evident from their always speaking of one wife, and from the high notion which they have of a good wedded wife: A virtuous woman is the diamond of her husband, but a bad wife is like rottenness in his bones. Prov. 12 : 4. Whoso findeth a wife findeth happiness. Prov. 18 : 22. A house and wealth are an inheritance from parents, but a discreet wife is from the Lord. Prov. 19 : 24." Also Ewald declares: "Whenever a prophet alludes to matrimonial matters he always assumes faithful and sacred monogamy contracted for the whole life as the legal one." And Jesus Christ who is the infallible interpreter of the spirit and intent of the Old Testament, and who is our lawgiver, has forever settled the case for his Church by his appeal to and ratification of the original institution of monogamy. "Have ye not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let not man put asunder. So that they are no more two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Matt. 19 : 4-6. Which has thus been interpreted by Stier: "The bodily fellowship is not merely the basis of *marriage*, but also that which is alone essential; it may, indeed, and in a certain sense, should be sweetened and glorified by friendship of soul being super-added, but marriage subsists as such apart from that.. Observe the distinction in 1 Cor. VI, 16, 17. *One flesh*, i. e., one person, forming together one man within the limits of this life in the flesh, for this world; beyond these limits the death of the flesh has separated the marriage tie"(3)

Such is the divine institution of marriage. As interpreted by Christ it is monogamous, and is also the most intimate, the most vital, the most compact, the most personal, the most mysterious, the most permanent, of all earthly relations. Practically it is a personal identification, and is made the symbol of the union of Christ with his Church, which is the bride, the wife of the

(3) *Words of Jesus.* Matt. XIX, 8, 9.

Lamb. Rev. 21:9. The man as *husband* and the woman as *wife* are each a part of the other, and consequently they together constitute one body, one mental, moral and spiritual organism. And as a union of divine origin and of divine consummation—"Whom God hath joined together"—it cannot be broken by any ordinance of man. Hence we speak of the *vinculum matrimonii*, that is, the bond or fetter of marriage. The diremption of this *vinculum* is called *Divorce*, that is, the putting asunder of one man and of one woman whom God hath joined together.

II. DIVORCE.

Now on the supposition that marriage is such a union as we have described it to be according to the Scriptures, the question arises, Do the Scriptures justify divorce, that is, the absolute diremption of the *vinculum matrimonii* on any account whatever? It may be laid down as a fundamental principle that no law is of absolute and exclusive application when the thing or the condition for which it was instituted has become changed in its essential character. The law governing marriage forms no exception to this principle. When marriage *de facto* ceases to be marriage *in essentia*, the *vinculum matrimonii* is already dirempted. All that can then be done is properly to signify the changed relation that has been effected between two persons who were husband and wife.

Now while on the one hand, it is certain that the Scriptures of the Old Testament contain no command instituting divorce for any cause whatever, it is certain on the other hand that divorce was much practiced among the Jews. Moses found it in use. He instituted laws to regulate it, and to guard the wife against arbitrary conduct on the part of the husband in the matter of sending her away. He required that the husband who wished to put away his wife should "write her a bill of divorce," which made it lawful for her to become the wife of another man. But the ground of it is not well defined. Indeed it is very indefinite. It reads as follows: "When a man taketh a wife and marrieth her, then it shall be, if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he shall write her a bill of divorce, and give it in her hand,

and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and become another man's wife. Deut. 24:1, 2.

Because of the indefiniteness of this regulation there arose diverse and even almost contradictory interpretations. The School of Thammai interpreted it to mean: "No one shall divorce his wife unless there shall have been found in her some unchastity, a thing or matter of nakedness, since it is written: Because he hath found the *nakedness* of a thing in her." The School of Hillel say: "Even if she have burned his food in cooking, since it is written: Because he hath found in her the nakedness of a thing." Rabbi Akiba says: "Even if he find another fairer than she, as it is written: 'If she find no favor in his eyes.'"

The interpretation of the School of Hillel seems to have been generally followed by the Jews in the time of Christ. Hence it is quite probable that it was this interpretation that inspired the question addressed by the Pharisees to Christ: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" Matt. 19:3. The answer is exactly what we should expect from him who had already expounded the divine intent of marriage. Matt. 5:31-33. It agreed exactly with the prophetic spirit which had broken away from the established custom and had declared through the mouth of Malachi: "Therefore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth. For I hate putting away saith Jehovah, the God of Israel." Mal. 2:15. 16. He declared that the Jewish custom was due to the hardness of men's hearts. "But from the beginning it hath not been so," said he, by which he undoubtedly meant to say that the institution of marriage does not contemplate divorce, or the putting away of wives. Marriage is to be regarded as a permanent union. However, he concludes that there is one thing that makes divorce lawful, namely, fornication, which among us is technically termed adultery, or the criminal intercourse of the married apart from the relation of husband and wife. "Who-soever putteth away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery." Mat. 19:9.

Why now is adultery a lawful ground for divorce—for the complete and final and permanent separation of two persons

whom God hath joined together? The answer lies in the very nature of the institution of marriage, which, as we have seen, is the union of one man and one woman in the closest and most intimate of all earthly compacts: *They twain are one flesh*. The husband can say, as in no other instance on earth, *This woman is mine*; and the wife can say, as in no other instance on earth, *This man is mine*. The possessive, *mine*, describes and defines a condition of ownership of the entire person, and of all that the person has and can do, and can render, and can surrender. Hence a third person cannot come into the purview in such a way as to claim proprietary rights, or in such a way as to be chosen as the recipient of a bestowal to which the other has the right. And as the ownership is consummated and sealed by the *debitum conjugale*, 1 Cor. 7:3, which is a mutual giving and receiving, it must follow that adultery, which is the formation of a new union and the consummation of a new partnership, must break the seal of marriage and destroy the original ownership; for in the highest sense of the words, it is treason, it is robbery, it is a defrauding of that which is due. 1 Cor. 7:5. It takes away that which has been pledged to one person and surreptitiously bestows it upon another. It is the destruction of that oneness of the flesh which is predicated in the original institution of marriage. He who has committed adultery has sinned against his own flesh and has in effect consummated a new marriage, has indeed two wives, or it may be more than two. "Know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh." 1 Cor. 6:16. Hence the adulterer is no longer agglutinated with his wedded wife, for when he is one body with the copartner of his robbery he cannot be agglutinated with his wedded wife, since marriage is not the union of three persons into one flesh, but the union of two bodies into one flesh. The lawful marriage has come to an end. The wedded wife has been defrauded, put away, supplanted. That which by divine appointment belonged to her exclusively, has been taken from her, and has been bestowed upon the harlot. The wedded wife cannot now be expected to live with a man who has robbed her, and has deceived her, and has proved himself false in that very quality by which she finally and by consummation became his wife. She now has the right to demand and to have a formal severance from the bond which

has come to exist in name only. Or if the wife has been the transgressor, then the husband is the aggrieved party. He has now the right to institute and to prosecute proceedings for a formal separation from her who *was*, but is not *now*, his wife in the essential sense of the word *wife*, because she has bestowed on another the *debitum conjugale*, and by so doing has destroyed the *unity of the flesh*.

Therefore we conclude that *Adultery*, whether it be committed by the husband or by the wife, is a Scriptural, as we believe it is a rational, a moral, and a civil ground for divorce; "because," as Meyer says, "adultery destroys what, according to the original institution of God, constitutes the essence of marriage, the *unitas carnis*, while on this account also it furnishes a reason, not merely for separation *a toro et mensa*, but for separation *quoad vinculum*." (4).

In such an interpretation and application of Christ's answer to the question of the Pharisees, Mat. 19:9, Protestant theologians with few exceptions are agreed, and the Protestant churches are agreed without a single exception known to the writer. But the Roman Catholic Church, which teaches that marriage is a sacrament, and hence cannot be invalidated, see in the answer of Christ to the question of the Pharisees a ground for separation *a toro et mensa*. Of divorce *vinculo matrimonii* that Church knows nothing.

But is adultery, strictly defined as "the unfaithfulness of a married person to the marriage bed," the only ground for divorce according to the words of Christ in Matt. 19:9? Some persons have thought, and we believe correctly, that Christ here lays down a principle, under which may be catalogued other sins against wedlock, as, for instance, *Sodomy* and *Bestiality*. These acts show a moral turpitude and a repulsiveness of demeanor that are irreconcilable with the fundamental conception of marriage. Either is a crime against nature. Either is a radical abuse of a high function. Either is, essentially, robbery. Man was not made *man*, and woman was not made *woman*, for any such degradation. Besides, *Sodomy* and *Bestiality* are an abuse, and ultimately they bring the destruction of the highest

(4) Com. Matt. 19:9.

pathological, physical and social function of man and woman. We believe, therefore, that either is a just ground for divorce, because either is a species of adultery, and can be easily comprehended under Christ's "except." It is unreasonable to seek to hold either man or woman in matrimonial bonds to one who has sinned so monstrously against the natural use.

But beyond Adultery as genus and species as defined above, we believe it is not warranted to seek causes of divorce in the words of Christ delivered in answer to the question of the Pharisees, Matt. 19:9, for we must remember that the question contemplates the *putting away* of wife or husband on justifiable grounds. Christ answered by referring his questioners to the fundamental fact that in the beginning they were made male and female, and that they twain should be one flesh. He could not, under the circumstances, refer to anything, or include anything, connected with his proposed Church, for the Church would raise questions and produce conditions which the Pharisees could not be made to comprehend. The answer given was exactly suited to the question asked, to the nature of the case as understood by the Pharisees, and to the comprehension of the Pharisees. Any answer more comprehensive than the one given: "Except for fornication," would have been irrelevant.

But now the Church has at length been established by the Holy Spirit who takes the things of Christ and shows them to men, that is, interprets and applies the principles enunciated by Christ as need and occasion demand. A new order is now introduced, not an order that vacates any fundamental principle, but an order that makes an adaptation and an application of fundamental principles to the new conditions that have been created by Christianity, whose central conception is the salvation of the soul. Christ came to seek and to save that which was lost. Whatever contradicts and contravenes this central conception must be abated as an evil. Marriage *per se* does not contradict nor contravenes the central Christian conception. It is as lawful under Christianity as it was under the law. It is still the union of twain in one flesh. The circumstance that it has been contracted and consummated and now exists between a Christian and a *non-Christian* does not in any sense invalidate its essence, since the essence of marriage is not union in spirit,

in soul, in religion, but in bodily fellowship. Hence the injunction of the Apostle Paul: "If any brother (that is, a heathen who had become a Christian) hath an unbelieving wife, and she is content to dwell with him, let him not leave her. And the woman that hath an unbelieving husband, and he be content to dwell with her, let her not leave her husband." The marriage between such is lawful. It is not to be disturbed by the Christian spouse. And the reason given for this broad and salutary interpretation of the matrimonial relation shows the benevolent and salutary intent of Christianity: "For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy." 1 Cor. 7:12-14. Such a union is entirely lawful, and it may be most salutary, and it may be the means of promoting the central aim of Christianity. The believing partner may be the means of sanctifying the unbelieving partner, and the children of such a marriage are enrolled on the side of Christianity and are constructively members of the Church. They are Christian children. "Yet if the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: The brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases: but God hath called us in peace." 1 Cor. 7:15. If the unbeliever is not willing to live with the believer, he is not to be constrained. He is to be allowed to take his course. If he will not have the Christian woman to wife he has renounced marriage; he has torn his body from her body, and by such severance and renunciation he has released the wife, has indeed *put her away* from him in all matrimonial relations. He is not now a husband in any such sense as that contemplated by God when he created them male and female. He has renounced the wife's power over his body. He does not render due benevolence. He has defrauded her without her consent—1 Cor. 7:4,5—things that are contrary to the conception of marriage in every fundamental aspect of the institution. That is, by desertion he has vacated marriage in every one of its functions. The vow made in the presence of witnesses to love, to keep, to respect, to comfort, to live with, has been broken in its roots. The two can no longer be husband and wife according to the divine intention, nor according to human needs, nor according to the destined ends of wedlock, which are, to avoid fornication

and to multiply the race. In a word the deserter has renounced possession, and has refused the wife power over his body, 1 Cor. 7:4, for this she cannot have in the case of wilful desertion. Thus, she, the deserted wife, has suffered deprivation. As a consequence of the desertion and of the deprivation the *vinculum matrimonii* is dirempted. The relation of husband and wife has ceased to exist as a bodily fellowship, that is, in that everything that constitutes the essence of marriage. As a consequence the deserted party is not under bondage, is exactly in the condition in which she would be in the case of the death of her spouse. Rom. 7:2-3. She is not, and she cannot be, the wife of a man who has abandoned her, and has deprived her of all that is given and implied in the unity of the flesh. *She is free.*

Now this conclusion does not contemplate separation temporarily on account of business, or in discharge of civil or military duty; but it contemplates deliberate, wilful, malicious desertion with the intention of not again returning to matrimonial relations and marital duty. Or as Dr. Harless has stated the case: "This is that culpable separation which Paul has in view (1 Cor. VII), and in which he pronounces the one so deprived of possession, without blame on his part, free of the duty of considering himself still bound to the depriver." Or as Dr. Kling has interpreted the passage, 1 Cor. 7:15: "He (Paul) here assigns the reasons why a divorce should be allowed on the part of the Christian; and the words cannot simply mean: He is not bound to crowd himself upon the other, but they carry the further implication: Is not unconditionally bound to the marriage relationship like a slave—'is free.'"(5) Or as Meyer explains: "Under such circumstances the Christian is not enslaved. Nay, surely, God hath called us to peace so that thus an unfriendly living together through constraint would be contrary to our calling—is not enslaved, so as still to remain bound in marriage to such a deserter. There is no command of Christ, or of any other authority, which makes the believer the slave of a spouse who separates himself from the believer. The expression brings out the unworthy character of such a relationship."(6) Or as

(5) Lange's Com. *in loco*.

(6) Com. *in loco*. ed. Heinrici

the *Expositor's Greek Testament* says: "The Christian wife or husband is not to *seek* divorce from the non-Christian; but if the latter insists on separation, it is not to be refused. * * * The brother or the sister in such circumstances is not kept in bondage; cf. ver. 39—the stronger ob. of this passage implies that for the repudiated party to continue bound to the repudiator would be *slavery*. Christ's law forbids putting away husband is not to *seek* divorce from the non-Christian; but if (10 ff), but does not forbid the one put away to accept dismissal, that is, to accept the divorce that has been thrust upon him. Indeed there can be no other rational conclusion from the words: 'The brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases.' "(7) Marriage contemplates a living together, not a dwelling apart, a living in peace and not in a condition of alienation, of separation and of hostility.

But the question arises *a propos* to this conclusion: Is there not a contradiction between Christ and Paul, inasmuch as Christ says: "Except for fornication?" We have already intimated that the question of the separation of a non-Christian from a Christian could not have come naturally and relevantly into the purview of Christ when he made reply to the question of the Pharisees. It was of Jewish matrimonial relations that they inquired. Christianity was as yet unknown. When Paul comes to reply to the letter of the Corinthians (Cor. 7:1), a new condition has arisen, for which Christianity, not Judaism, must make provision. The question now is, What is the matrimonial status of a Christian husband or of a Christian wife, who has been abandoned by an unbelieving spouse? Paul answers that, under such circumstances, the Christian is not enslaved—is free. God hath called us into peaceful relationships. Primarily in peace with himself, which is the supreme consideration, and secondarily in peace with regard to all the relations of this life. The Christian is not to be the aggressor. But the peaceful relation with God is endangered by holding on to a deserting husband or wife, who, to desertion, as will always be the case, joins either hatred or indifference to Christianity. And

(7) *Com. in loco.*

so long as the deserted spouse imagines himself in bondage to the deserter, he can have no peace of mind.

We thus have two grounds for divorce. In the case of adultery the injured party may *put away* the transgressor, and may bring an action for the formal nullification of a marriage which has been destroyed in its inner essence. In the case of desertion, divorce has been already effected, in that the deserter has shown that he will not have the one deserted as spouse. Desertion vacates every relation, purpose and end of marriage. It only remains to have an authoritative declaration of the diremption of the *vinculum matrimonii*, in order that the injured party may be *declared free*.

And now under the head of desertion, as under the head of adultery, the question may be raised: Are there grounds for divorce that as species may be subsumed under *desertion*? We may begin the answer to this question somewhat as we began the answer to a similar question when discoursing on adultery. In the relation of the Christian spouse to the *non-Christian* spouse we discern a principle. "God hath called us in peace." The twofold peaceful relationship is of fundamental importance, for it is connected with the salvation of the soul. Then whatever tends to destroy this relationship, or virtually interferes with God's call of us, and to us, can be and must be construed as embraced in the scope of 1 Cor. 7:15. The highest concern is the calling of God, for that has direct relation to the salvation of the soul. All other relationships must give place to the higher relationship, and to the eternal destination. *Marriage is for this life. The calling of God has as its end the eternal life.* The oneness of the flesh must be subordinated to the union with Christ. "Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ?" Do habitual drunkenness and malignant cruelty interfere with the higher end, and tend to destroy the holier and more important union? Then they bring about just that condition that is included in the scope of the Apostle's argument. They are in principle a desertion of the Christian spouse. They stand in the way of peace, and make it hard if not impossible to maintain it. They endanger the call of God and the salvation of the soul. Shall, then, the Christian spouse be exposed to the temptation and the

danger of alienation from Christ by cleaving to an habitual drunkard, or to the perpetrator of malignant cruelty? Emphatically, *no*, for Christ says: "If any man come to me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple;" and the drunkard and the wife-beater cannot take refuge under the Apostle's words: "If he please to dwell with her," for the words do not contemplate the case of habitual drunkards and the practicers of malignant cruelty. Neither are drunkenness and cruelty contemplated in the divine institution of marriage. "God hath called us in peace." The Christian cannot preserve, cultivate and enjoy peace with a drunken and cruel spouse, for such are antagonistic to peace. Drunkenness and cruelty mean war. Shall God's saints be held in bondage to such abominations? Such is not in accord with either the letter or the spirit of their high calling in Christ Jesus. As far as in them lieth they are to live in peace with all men. But it is not possible to live in peace with the habitual drunkard and the perpetrator of malignant cruelty.

Moreover, the habitual drunkard and the wife-beater have deserted the wife in almost everything that constitutes the very essence of marriage, namely, bodily fellowship, for the Christian spouse cannot have bodily fellowship with such in any sense contemplated by marriage, for in so far as the spouse is a drunkard, or practices malignant cruelty, he has renounced the other's power over the body, and cohabitation with such is the equivalent of brutality, and the fruit of such cohabitation is emphatically the offspring of the flesh.

The case then is a clear one. We have only to keep before us the highest purpose of our being, namely, the calling of God which is the salvation of our souls. Hence we thoroughly agree with Martensen, who says: "We cannot but acknowledge that Lutheran divines are fully justified in including among valid reasons for divorce, continued cruelty, personal ill-usage (*saevitiae*) and plotting against one another's lives (*insidiae*). So Melancthon, and after him the Danish theologian, N. Hemmingsen." (8)

(8) *Christian Ethics*. (social), Eng. Translation, pp.41-2.

III. REMARRIAGE.

By remarriage here we mean the marriage of a person who has been divorced in accordance with the teaching of the Divine Word.

We start with the premise clearly given in the New Testament that divorce as contemplated by Christ, Matt. 19:9, and by Paul, 1 Cor. 7:15, means complete diremption of the *vinculum matrimonii*. The spouse who puts away a spouse for adultery is no longer the spouse of that person. The spouse who is maliciously deserted by a spouse, is, *eo ipso*, free. In both cases the innocent party is absolutely without matrimonial relations,—if a man, no longer a *husband*; if a woman, no longer a *wife*, and as innocent cannot be required to suffer for the sins of the one who has wronged him (her). In Matt. 19:9, it is he who puts away his wife for any cause “except for adultery,” and marrieth another that committeth adultery; and it is he who marrieth a woman put away for cause other than adultery, that committeth adultery, for he marries a woman who is the wife of another man. The same is undoubtedly the meaning of Matt. 5:32. Luke 16:18, and Mark 10:11, 12, dare not be interpreted in contradiction to the passages in Matthew, for he was present at the interview with the Pharisees and heard all that was said by the Master. Luke and Mark were not present. Matthew has given the fuller and therefore the normating account.

We have no hesitation then in saying, that, according to the teaching of the New Testament, a person who, being innocent, has obtained a divorce from an adulterous wife or husband, is entitled to marry. In the case of such an one the wedded relation has ceased. The law of marriage hath no dominion over such. Hence he or she shall not be called an adulterer or adulteress should he or she marry another. Rom. 7:3.

The same conclusion must also be announced in regard to the spouse who has been finally and maliciously deserted. He or she is not bound to the deserter. Such an one has recovered power over his own body. He is therefore at liberty to enter new conjugal relations, for the deserter has ceased to be a spouse. And this conclusion is rendered invulnerable by the following considerations: 1. Marriage is honorable in all. 2.

Marriage is the normal condition for every male and female as the end for which God made them such. 3. Marriage is a preventive of fornication, 1 Cor. 7:2. 4. Marriage is a bar to incontinence, "since it is better to marry than to burn," 1 Cor. 7:9.

Yet a word in reply to an objection. Does not Paul say, 1 Cor. 7:12, "To the rest say I, not the Lord?" Does he not by this declare that he speaks by human, not by divine authority? Here we must take in the scope of this part of Paul's letter. In verse one of this seventh chapter the author begins to answer certain inquiries which the Corinthian Christians had addressed to him in a letter. Up to and including the eleventh verse he expounds the fundamental principles of wedlock when both husband and wife are Christians, and says, verse tenth, "To the married I give charge, not I, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband; and that the husband leave not his wife." Paul refers the indissolubility of marriage to the authority of Christ, who had spoken on the subject, Matt. 19:9. Divorce is not contemplated in the case of wedded Christians, who as such will not commit the sin for which alone Christ permits divorce. The law that Christ applied to the Pharisees as being under the law, is applicable to Christians, for Christ did not abrogate the law. Paul speaks categorically by referring the Christians to the Supreme Authority.

But now in verse twelve he turns "unto the rest," to those marriages in which one spouse was a Christian and the other a heathen, and he says, "I, not the Lord." He could not appeal to Christ as authority, for Christ had no such cases before him, and hence he said nothing on the subject of mixed marriages, about which the Corinthians had written Paul. As Vincent says: "These cases are not included in Christ's declarations." (9) Or as Alford has interpreted: "Our Lord's words do not apply to such marriages as are here contemplated. They are spoken to those within the covenant, and as such apply immediately to the wedlock of Christians, but not to mixed marriages." (10) So also Meyer, who says that Christ had no occasion to speak of mixed marriages.

Thus an examination into the scope of the passage and into

(9) *Word Studies*, in loco.

(10) *Greek Testament* in loco.

the differences of the cases presented, brings us to the clear conclusion that there is no contradiction and no discrepancy between what Christ teaches in Matt. 19:9, and what Paul teaches in 1 Cor. 7:15; nor does Paul mean to have us infer that he speaks without authority, when he says, "I, not the Lord." Any such supposition is refuted by what he says in verse seventeenth: "And so ordain I in all the churches." He enunciates principles, which have universal application wherever the Christian Church exists.

We sum up our discussion by saying: (1) Marriage is a divine institution having its essence in the union of the flesh. (2) Divorce is allowable on account of adultery and malicious desertion, because they are incompatible with the unity of the flesh. (3) Remarriage of persons lawfully divorced is permissible.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PLACE OF CHRIST IN LUTHERAN THEOLOGY.

BY REV. F. S. GEESEY, A.M

When we speak of God and divine things, or of God and the relation between God and the universe, of which theology treats, there must be a revealer of God. For deity absolute, God existing in and by Himself, apart from any relation to aught that is finite is a god unknown and unknowable. In our Lutheran view of theology, the term means more than a cold speculative consideration of God and divine things. Lutheran theology demands a living insight of a regenerate mind into the truths of God. Concerning Christian verities St. Paul writes: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God; for they were foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. 2:14). Luther's own maxim was: "*Oratio, meditatio et tentatio faciunt theologum.*"

The truth ascertainable concerning God, and especially the truth and doctrine embraced in Christianity, is revealed truth. Such revealed truths and doctrines as taught in the Holy Scriptures, the enlightened or sanctified mind and heart of the Church under the training of the Holy Spirit, has always used to formulate our Lutheran theology. Lutheran theology can never surrender the supernatural character of the Biblical revelation. To supply humanity's mighty spiritual and soteriological needs, there must be a self-disclosure of God to man. This we have in our Christian or Biblical revelation. Thus the revelation which God has given in the Old and New Testaments, is the supreme authority for the articles for our Christian faith. The great formal principle involved in and that brought about the Reformation of the 16th century, was the supreme authority of God's revealed will—His Word. This decisive authority of God's Word is the accepted principle of all orthodox Protestantism, but especially of the Lutheran church, the mother of the Protestant world. Hence, whatever weight may be given to knowl-

edge from other sources than Holy Writ, such other knowledge cannot become ruling authority for Christian faith. The Lutheran Church has but *one* source of Christian knowledge viz:

Scripture, and not Scripture and tradition, as the Church of Rome would have us believe and teach. Our theology also "assumes that these Scriptures have been given under such divine adaptations that, while they are authoritative, they are understandable under the Holy Spirit and an adequate guide in all Spiritual truth needful for Salvation." (1)

Therefore, revelation in our Lutheran theological sense, is not a mere human discovery of God but a Word, a Logos from God, as to his mind and will. Much truth is indeed discovered which is of a scientific and philosophical nature, and such truth is of God and in harmony with His Word, if the science and philosophy be true. Reason, Nature and Revelation are from the same divine Author, and when properly interpreted, there is no conflict. Reason and Nature speak often when and where Revelation is silent, and *vice versa*. Revelation is, however, above Reason, and hence all other truths other than revelation, are of a lower sphere and not ruling for articles of faith.

From Eden to Bethlehem, we have a progressive disclosure of God, until the Logos; "who being in form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." (Phil. 2:6, 7), that he might take on himself our humanity and tabernacle as our Redeemer among us. The truth, therefore, as it is in this Redeemer, opens to view the full and free salvation for this fallen and sin-ruined world, a fact which has always characterized the Lutheran theology with its Gospel of faith and love. The self-disclosure of God through Christ for human salvation brings us to the place Christ occupies or holds in Lutheran theology. Hence Lutheran theology teaches a Christocentric doctrine and system, because the Scriptures give Christ such a position.

Perhaps in nothing else can we get a better idea or view of the position Christ holds in Lutheran theology than in the scene of the Crucifixion of the Saviour, hanging between the two malefactors on the central cross. The scene of our Saviour's cruci-

(1) See *Christian Theology*—Valentine, Vol. 1, p. 24.

fixion upon Calvary's central cross, is indeed very suggestive and typical of what place Christ holds in Lutheran theology. Each of the four evangelists, in his description of the crucifixion of Christ, states explicitly, that the cross on which Christ Jesus, the God-man died, was the central one of the three which were then and there erected. "On either side one, and Jesus in the midst." One may ask: How did it come to pass? Was it a mere chance occurrence? We answer: Would the four Evangelists record it, if it had been but an incident? We believe not. From a mere human stand-point, it might have been malice on the part of Christ's malignant foes that He was thus nailed on the central cross, as though they would by it heap upon Christ Jesus, the greater and deeper guilt, and thereby brand Him as the greatest malefactor in all Palestine. For a mere human explanation of the reason, such a view may pass, but it will not suffice. We believe God's hand, the hand of Providence, fixed the relative location of the cross upon which His adorable Son, the God-man, our Saviour, died.

The central position of Christ on the cross was an impressive object-lesson, a visible Gospel, addressing itself to the eyes of Christ's enemies, teaching that Christ Jesus is the Saviour of the penitent and the impenitent. A Saviour that is near, willing and able to save to the uttermost all them that come to God by Him.

And in addition, Christ's position on the cross exhibits to all the world a lesson of what God's Word everywhere declares, that in all the relations of God to man and of man to God, Christ Jesus, the Incarnate God-man, the crucified and resurrected Lord, is the central object of the moral universe. Therefore, in Lutheran theology, Christ Jesus is morally, and spiritually, and chronologically, and mediatorially, "in the midst." Here we might take up these different heads mentioned; but we shall rather speak in a general way on the subject of Christ's place in Lutheran theology. Thus related to Christ are all divine purposes and revelations, and economies and providences of God to man. And all possibilities and hopes and destinies of all humanity for salvation for all ages, stand also in like manner related. Christ Jesus is the periphery of the whole Christian circle as well as the center, and becomes, therefore, the pivotal

point around which all things moral and spiritual revolve. This position Christ Jesus does not hold only in Scripture and therefore in Lutheran theology, but the same position He holds in secular history. When we ask the question, What makes the difference between a Christian nation and the semi-civilized and barbarous, the answer is: Christ Jesus is the dividing line. His teachings have and are molding the nations of the world. Even in civil and secular history Jesus is central, "On either side one, but Jesus in the midst." But not to digress. Coming to the doctrine of Salvation or Soteriology, which has an objective and a subjective side, Christ Jesus is central. The work of Christ in the atonement and redemption for sin, which expresses the objective side of Soteriology, places the God-man between God, the offended one, and man, the offender. "For, if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life." (Rom. 5:10). See also 2 Cor. 5:18, 19. Col. 1:20.

Thus the subjective side of the doctrine of Salvation, which is the inner work of the Holy Spirit, awakening faith, renewing the heart and sanctifying the life of men, taking the things of Jesus and showing them unto men, also makes Christ central; because souls are being sanctified through the truth as it is in Christ Jesus, and because the work of the Holy Spirit is based on what Christ did in His state of humiliation and now does in His state of exaltation. If it were not for the atoning work of Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit's mission could have no place, because without Christ's work of redemption there would be no opened way to life eternal, no Deity satisfied, and man not reconciled, that is, no opened way to reconciliation and no "means of grace" to apply by the Holy Ghost. "He," says Christ of the Holy Spirit, "shall testify of me." (John 15:25). Also John 16:14, "He shall glorify me, for He shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you." Also John 16:13. Thus the omnipotent Christ, one in purpose with the Father, is working through the Holy Spirit. Hence in the subjective as well as in the objective work of salvation, is Christ Jesus in the midst, central.

In the person and offices of Christ, Lutheran theology makes Him the center, giving a Christo-centric doctrine. Not

from the first time our first parents fell from holiness into sin, did God design to redeem man, but from eternity. "Human salvation was guaranteed in Christ before the morning of creation dawned." (2). "Who saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." (2 Tim. 1:19.) In the fullness of time this redemption designed from eternity, was accomplished by God's only begotten Son, Christ Jesus.

This Christ in His divine nature alone is not the Saviour of the world. As such He is the anointed of God, and is our Prophet, Priest and King. But in Christ Jesus, the God-man, we find full and complete redemption and salvation from sin. Christ's work as priest "is not simply an equal function with the prophetic and kingly, but the *heart* of the redemptory service, to whose aim and consummation the other two are needfully conjoined. It is conceivable that the Son of God could have accomplished the teaching and kingly functions without incarnation, but not the priestly. The priestly office thus ranks with the all-surpassing importance of the incarnation itself, and subordinates as collateral or tributary all His other activities in the work of human salvation. It marks the central and determining function of the Saviour of mankind. It is instructive to observe how the Apostles put their emphasis on this and hold it before the reader's mind." (3)

The turning point that divides between Lutheran theology and other variant views on religion and theology is met when we ask the question which Christ, on Tuesday of Holy Week, in the Temple at Jerusalem, asked his enemies when they vainly tried to entrap Him, viz: "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is He?"

The Lutheran church thinks and makes much of Christ. In our doctrine of the duality of the natures and a unity of the person of Christ, we have in our Lutheran theology, or rather Christology and Sotierology, an inner citadel of Christian theology that is most invincible. The opponents of the person of Christ see that if this doctrine stands, all must stand, and we of

(2) *The Higher Rock*. By Dr. Wolf, p. 138.

(3) *Christian Theology*. Valentine, Vol. II, pp. 103-4.

the Lutheran Church are most sure that it will stand. All the higher critics have not to any serious extent weakened our Christo-centric system, Christ incarnate is the miracle of miracles, the central one of all, and carrying all else along with it. "Christ is Christianity." Though Christ was born of a sin-tainted woman, yet we teach and believe that birth gave to Christ a human nature without the taint of sin.

Says Dr. Valentine in his *Outlines of Theology* "There being no generation in the ordinary sense, and the assumption of the human nature was entirely by the power of the Holy Ghost."

Thus the Logos, by whom all things were made, took on Himself human nature through the Holy Spirit. Therefore Lutheran theology holds that for the Roman dogma of the "Immaculate Conception" by which the virgin mother herself is declared to have been born a sinless being, there is no shadow of Scriptural authority.

Hence this dogma of Rome is not a discovery, but an invention to provide or prove a sinless mother for an impeccable Christ. The supernatural creation or conception of our Saviour's humanity in the womb of the Virgin Mary is a matter of faith and is not for our reason to speculate upon.

In the teaching of the person of Christ in regard to the doctrine of the *communicatio-idiomatum* the true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, a point of difference is formed between the Lutheran and the Reformed.

"All orthodox Christendom has been wont to accept part of the teaching here involved. But Lutheran dogmatics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries developed some special features, one of which at least has not been accepted by general theology." (4) The one feature rejected "by general theology" is the third genus of the doctrine of the communication of attributes, called the "Genus Magestaticum." This technical statement or its substance was often denied by Reformed theologians, and formed a point of Christology on which the Lutheran and Reformed theologians divided during the Reformation and are still divided. For a Lutheran to surrender or reject this

(4) See *Christian Theo.* Valentine Vol. II, p. 72.

"Genus Majestaticum," would be to yield his faith and teaching of Christ's omnipresence as the God-man.

He would also have to yield his doctrine of Christ's real presence in the Lord's Supper. Thus we shall adhere to this "third genus" and preserve our crown. The Reformed theologians have taught and still teach that Christ Jesus, in His human nature is not present on earth, either in the Lord's Supper or anywhere else. Some of the Reformed are preaching an omnipresent God-man, but in their theology such an omnipresent God-man and Christ's real presence in the Lord's Supper, in His human nature, are denied.

The Calvinists say: The glorified Christ is absent in heaven, yet they declare He is efficaciously present through the Holy Spirit, communicating to the true believers all the benefits of His atoning sacrifice. Thus in the Lord's Supper the Calvinist has a divided Christ, if he has any Christ at all. He puts Christ's human nature in heaven only, and makes His presence (His body and blood) simply a spiritual presence. Would this be feeding on Christ? If there would be any virtue or efficacy in the Lord's Supper, according to the Calvinistic view, that efficacy would not be mediated by the body and blood of Christ, the God-man, but by the Holy Spirit. If the Lord's Supper is a spiritual feast or a memorial of Christ, *only*, then we would have no need of a sacrament to have all that. Because, if the mediation is not by the body and blood of Christ Jesus, and the feasting is not on the glorified body and blood of Christ, the God-man, in a "sacramental, supernatural," and "incomprehensible and spiritual" manner, then such feasting could take place *where* and *whenever* faith in Christ is exercised, without the elements, bread and wine. How different the Lutheran confessional statement is: "The true body and blood of Christ are truly present in the sacrament under the forms of bread and wine, and are there distributed and received." See Augs. Conf. Art. 10.

The Lutheran theology teaches that the theanthropic person cannot be divided. But in the unity and wholeness of Christ's person, since His exaltation. He is Almighty, Omnipresent, Omniscient and Infinite in all divine perfections. Such a statement gives all that is necessary to a correct view of the

Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist. Thus the Lutheran view, and we believe the Scriptural one, of the Lord's Supper, rests fundamentally in the doctrine of the person of Christ, and especially as expressed in the *communicatio idiomatum*, viz: that the properties of both the divine and human natures are actually the properties of the whole person of Christ, and are actually exercised by Him in the unity of His person in His glorified state.

Therefore we believe and teach, that Christ Jesus is present at His will, and according to His promise. This presence is not in His divinity alone, but in His entire divine human nature and person in both natures. "*Lo I am with you always.*" (Matt. 28:20). "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." (Matt. 18:20). The sacrament of the Lord's Supper is not a feasting on the sacrificial virtue or efficacy of Christ's body and blood, but a communion of the whole Christ, the Bread which came down from heaven to give life to a lost and sin-ruined world. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is not the communion of the body of Christ?" (1 Cor. 10:16).

Christ cannot be thought of as giving His "body and blood," i. e., His humanity, separate from His divinity, in the Eucharist, as some theologians have taught. In our Lutheran theology, the terms "body" and "blood" express the complete human nature of Christ, and the union of the divine and human natures, inseparable. We believe that the whole and undivided Christ gives Himself as the nutriment of the new man in the Lord's Supper. In His gifts Christ gives Himself in all His atoning sacrifice. He who trusts, and with all his heart, believes Christ's words, "given and shed for you for the remission of sins," shall partake naturally of the bread and wine, but sacramentally of the body and blood of Christ. The vital need on the sinner's part is faith in Christ's work and word. And he who thus receives Christ shall realize in Him all grace.

Christ Jesus is "in the midst," central, all along the line of our Lutheran theology. When on earth, in His state of humiliation, He accomplished our redemption by paying the ransom, through which man's reconciliation with God was and still is effected. Since His ascension Christ preserves, increases, guides

and protects the Church thus established, and the powers of death and hell shall not prevail against it. In this organic Church Christ is eternal. The sanctuary is His dwelling place. Christ is in the Church's ministry. He calls, inspires, and ordains His ministers. Christ is in His Word. It is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth on Him. Christ Jesus is in the Church's sacraments. These are the vehicles of His real presence and grace. He is in the Church's prayers,—*"If ye shall ask anything in My name I will do it."* (John 14:14). Also in the conflict and warfares of the Church. Christ Jesus is central, as the mighty bulwark of defense, cheering the Church on in her God ordained mission, breaking down the barriers before her, until, in triumph, the banner of the cross shall wave over this sin-cursed earth, and at last "every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. 2:10, 11).

But Lutheran theology does not only place Christ as the center of its system, but also as the center of the Christian life of every individual soul. The soul that always exalts Christ, that gives Him the supreme, the central place in its faith and trust and love, as its Saviour, is a saved soul. Why? Because that soul has by faith put itself, through faith in Christ Jesus, into the very center of God's pledged love and means for salvation.

To one personally, Christ Jesus must be central in the things of God and heaven. By faith and trust, for time and eternity, the individual sinner must put Christ, his Saviour, between himself and sin, and guilt and death, yea, between himself and hell itself; between himself and God. As the way, the truth and the life, the sinner's Prophet, Priest and King. One on the right hand and the other on the left, but "Jesus in the midst." Oh, the perfume of Sharon's Rose! How sweet to them who walk in such a divine enclosure. When the old stock of corn was entirely exhausted, the people of Egypt and the surrounding countries came to Pharaoh for corn, but "Pharaoh said unto all the Egyptians, go unto Joseph." (Gen. 41:55). And why this command? Because all the corn of Egypt was placed in the hands of Joseph. What a Gospel truth is here

shadowed forth! The Lord Jesus Christ is the "one mediator between God and man." (1 Tim. 2:5). All the treasures of grace are placed in Christ's hands, and He is the administrator of the everlasting covenant. "No man cometh unto the Father but by Me." "I am the door." "By Him we both have access by one spirit unto the Father." No! there is no use in coming to God, the Father, for pardon, acceptance and peace, and for any or all blessings of daily life, without a recognition of the mediatorial character, position and fullness of Christ Jesus. The Lord Jesus Christ is the true, the spiritual Joseph of the Church.

Yes, Christ is central in all things pertaining to redemption and salvation, the sinner's righteousness, but not according to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but according to the whole Christ, or both natures in one person. The very end of the incarnation consists in making and having Christ Jesus mediatorially "in the midst."

Lutheran theology from whatever point of view one might give the exegesis of God's Word, moves toward and finally comes to Christ, the sole and ultimate Logos of God. The higher critics have not as yet shaken this Christo-centric system, and never will. Are not the Calvinists and other Reformed churches rather coming our way? We have no need of calling assemblies to take counsel and revise creedal statements in order to get nearer the truth, nearer the center; because we are already in the very heart of God's love and will to all mankind, in having Christ Jesus for our center. The light from our Lutheran center is radiating out to the very circumference of other denominations, and they are beginning more and more to follow the light toward a Christo-centric system. It is, perhaps, unpardonable and mental suicide for a minister of God's Word to be blind to Scriptural criticism. The patient judgments of modern critics may have made (to some people) the Bible more luminous. But many were moved from their old land marks of truth and fidelity to the living truths of the Bible, by an over exaltation of higher criticism. Lutherans and Lutheran theology have not been seriously affected by the higher, critical *octopus* and its results. Doubtless all that the higher critics have attained in their alleged discoveries, and so-called "new

views" might be found in Tom Paine's *Age of Reason*. Doubtless, should we apply the methods in vogue by some higher critics to disprove the historicity of different authors and parts of the Old Testament, we might, in like manner, disprove many facts in English and American history. The authority of the Old Testament does not depend on the results of higher criticism, nor on the Jewish Talmud, but upon the testimony of Jesus Christ, the Jehovah of the Old Testament, who became the God-man of the New Testament.

The Lutheran theologian and preacher has no negative Gospel to teach or preach. He gathers among other things, the legitimate negatives, but then he stands on the summit of the ruins of criticism and proclaims to his students and people, the positives, the "Thus saith the Lord."

Should we acquiesce in much of what the higher critics have produced, we would have little or nothing standing of that Apostolic Gospel which must be recognized as essential to Christianity and material for articles of Christian faith and salvation.

As ambassadors of Christ, we need to cast our message along Christo-centric lines, then shall we arouse, inspire, quicken and lead lost and condemned humanity back to an Eden restored to God and heaven, by the "new and living way," and implant in our hearers the certainty of Christian faith through a Christo-centric doctrine.

ARTICLE VII.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF FAITH.

BY REV. E. E. ORTLEPP.

Shall we continue to preach the noble discovery of the Reformation, the Biblical and Lutheran doctrine, that man is saved by faith alone? Or must we, if not abandon, at least modify that central truth in accordance with modern conceptions of religion? One reads so often that the Church must remodel her worn-out tenets in order to retain her hold on the masses!

The Lutheran Church stands all by herself in the unceasing and unequivocal teaching of the *Sola Fide*. On the one hand, Roman Catholicism, believing in justification by works, attracts—a strange paradox—not the legalistic element, but the weak, unthinking people who shun the responsibility of speaking face to face with God, who prefer the lulling tutelage of the priest. On the other side the extreme predestinarians render the believer an irresponsible puppet assigned to a blissful hereafter, nobody knows why; and these,—again a paradox—develop a stern legalism. Between these extremes, and probably their misshapen offspring, roams Rationalism which, if it looks for a Savior at all, seeks him in human reason and character. Among these main pillars of human fallacies grow luxuriantly the creeping plants of Gnosticism, misapplied Mysticism, Swedenborgianism, wrongly conceived Pietism; and so forth. At last Modern Criticism swings the shining battle-ax not only to hew down the idolatrous images of the grove, not only to clear the garden of injurious weeds, but to chop the roots of the Tree of Life itself.

Any and all of them deny or obscure the *Sola Fide*. Must the plainly dressed Lutheran Church, with nothing but the old-fashioned gospel in her hands, bow down to them? Or learn of them? Yes, learn of them that, when the sure foundation of the Word of God is forsaken, the shadows of superstition and agnosticism fall across our path. Learn of them: to appreciate better and to preach more diligently the sufficiency of faith. Our age

certainly needs it. When in 1800 Franz Volkmar Reinhard, then perhaps the most famous preacher in Germany, in a sermon rose above his ordinary rationalism and told his hearers that the Church must return to the great truth "that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of law," "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus," (Rom. III), he created a profound sensation which earned him many innuendoes! And who knows whether it would not have a startling effect in some modern congregations where ethical, sociological and political discourses are regularly dispensed as food for the souls.

To every Lutheran, salvation by grace through faith in Christ alone, is a precious reality, for the Word of God tells him so; in the words of August Herman Cremer, "The Pauline doctrine of justification (through faith alone) has the whole Bible on its side." The same Bible however admonishes us, "Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you."

Therefore this article endeavors to state why The Sufficiency of Faith is a doctrine not only valid at all times, but also helpful and satisfactory to every earnest seeker after truth. It is superfluous to demonstrate that, of course, by 'faith' is meant not the mere historical faith, nor the ready consent to a dogma, but that heartfelt, childlike, obedient confidence in God and absolute reliance on Christ's merit: living faith, saving faith.

I. FAITH AND HUMAN NATURE.

a. *Faith is the only condition that corresponds to the capacity of human nature.* Man is so constituted as to find his true element and highest welfare in faith. In this sense faith is natural, unbelief is unnatural. Jesus always took for granted that men should believe; but he marvelled because of the unbelief of his countrymen. This human capacity for faith is expressed in Tertullian's *testimonium animae: anima naturaliter christiana*. True, the Bible says that "all men have not faith;" II Thess. 3, 2. But such lack is not owing to a Divine decree forbidding faith to certain people; nor is it due to a deficiency in the human make-up; it is rather the fault of the delinquents

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themselves, because they have perverted and depraved the best desire of mind and soul. Thus Paul speaks of "men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the faith." II Tim. 3, 8. The Master describes the cause of that corruption: "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." John 3, 19. He also points out the perverted and depraved desire of unbelievers: "How can ye believe, which receive honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only?" Jo. 5, 44.

Without such perversion the human heart is a prepared field for the seed of faith, sown and fostered by the Spirit. This faith even the little faith, rests on and also finds its expression in, the profound longing of the soul for happiness and peace, for salvation, for God himself, in whose image man is created. The world is so full of God that a man must forcibly shut his bosom against the divine influence; "for in him we live, and move, and have our being." The life of faith is our real life. To speak with F. de Rougemont: "*La foi est le dernier fond de notre être, le foyer de notre âme, la vie de notre vie.*" In it we have found an aim worthy of our immortal spirit, a mode of life satisfying our secret wants. For God has so constituted all men "that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, though he be not far from every one of us." And now as Augustine confesses, "*Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te.*"

b. *Faith forms the only basis on which all men are equal before God.* Faith breaks down the barriers between Jew and Gentile, and all have the same chance. Because they believe, "many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven." Matth. 8, 11. The patriarchs of old who hoped for the promised Messiah, and the Christians nowadays, are at no disadvantage as compared with the disciples who walked with the Son of Man, for all had and have to believe. Bond or free, man or woman, rich or poor, ignorant and learned; the child carefully guarded by loving parents, or the waif, the prodigal son, the dying thief,—all are before God in the same condemnation, and all may partake in the same hope. "The Scripture hath conclu-

ded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." Gal. 3, 22.

Or where do we find another basis so broad, so universal? Supposing the condition of eternal life were the comprehension of God and his mysteries—who could be saved? Apart from the fact that no two intellects are alike, and that not all men are able to be theologians or philosophers, where should such understanding begin and where should it end? Let us recall the ancient legend of St. Augustine's dream: Absorbed in deep thoughts, proud in his wisdom, the churchfather walked on the shores of the ocean studying the deep things of God. There he saw a boy playfully digging a hole in the sand, with a shell filling his little reservoir with water from the sea. Asked Augustine, What art thou doing, my son? Said the boy, Oh, I just want to pour the ocean into this hole. Smilingly the wise man replied, Not in a thousand years wilt thou accomplish it! Then the angel—for such the boy was—arose, beheld the man in surprise, and said: And thou wilt comprehend and confine the great God with thy human thoughts in thy human head? No, sooner may I pour the ocean into this hole! Augustine awoke. Or let us imagine that the condition of salvation were character-building, ethical perfection, the life beautiful within and without, following the exalted standard of the Old Testament: "Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy." Or with the humble Nazarene as a pattern, try to come "unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Where then, among the greatest and best, is one who ever reached the goal? What are we to think of Abraham the father of the faithful, whose errors are recorded; of Moses who brought the law, but whose sin barred him from the promised land; of Isaiah the preacher of holiness, who calls himself a man of unclean lips; of David the man after the heart of God, who wails, "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight." Turning to the New Testament we meet a Paul, whose boast his finical enemies did not deny: "Touching the righteousness which is the law, blameless." But Paul himself discounts such perfection when he complains, "I know that in me (that is, in my flesh), dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not."

Note how he despairs of his own efforts, taking refuge at the feet of a merciful Savior: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Rom. VII. Now his belated epigoni, with the gleanings of his knowledge, pretend to surpass him, surpass him so much as to need not kneel at the cross, but hand in hand with the Nazarene boldly approach the throne of God in equal beauty, in equal right! If that were possible, despondency would smite all conscientious men who struggle all their life against besetting sins and, despite their attainments, repose their hope in the grace of God. Thank God, it is an impossibility! The real Christ, like the fabled picture of the Savior, is still always a foot higher than the pygmy or the giant confronting him. Finally, can the condition be that easiest and most pleasing makeshift of human pride: salvation by works? What kind of works? Great works no doubt! However, if a great length of time for pilgrimages etc. is implied, my neighbor finds no opportunity, as he has to work for his daily bread. If a great number of men must be influenced, God has denied the chance to many whose place is in the kitchen, the stable, the factory. If great endurance is required in self-flagellations or extended fasts, our sick friends can do neither, whilst the big fellow across the way finds it a healthy exercise. If great gifts are demanded, John D wears the saintly halo at present, and the poor John without the appendix stands in the corner abashed. No, not so much great works as rather *good* works are expected, works which rich and poor, high and low alike can do; for it is the effort, the sentiment back of the deed that gives value. Exactly! For that is just the conviction of the Lutherans: "The Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart." But one step more. Behold a lifelong invalid, the helpless Lazarus upon his bed; not only did he have neither means nor opportunity to do good works, but he was a recipient of charity all his days. Will his lack of good works exclude him from salvation? If he loves the Lord? Any priest admits that God, no matter by what gracious act, or gift, or dispensation, will save that soul. Now then, if the grace of God must interfere with some men, in some respects; why not with all men and in all respects.

Who knows which of our works the all-knowing God calls good or evil? Why not throw open the gates of hope to all with the invitation of Jesus himself: "This is the will of him that sent me that every one that seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life."

c. *Faith alone assigns to man his true position in the world.* It makes us blush with shame under the leveling reproach that 'all have sinned and come short of the glory of God.' This revives the mortifying contemplation that, by nature, man has deserved the very opposite to salvation. Then the mere fact that God made provision for our redemption reveals an abyss of patience, love, and divine mercy. Nothing can be more humiliating to haughty mortals than the acceptance of divine grace without vestige of merit, without even an explanation of the Why or Wherefore of the inquiring mind. Despite our fancied virtues, it places us before God wretched, poor, blind, and naked, subsisting by grace from day to day. For that faith itself, which receives the gift of grace, is no meritorious act or function of ours: "I believe that I cannot by my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ my Lord, or come to him; but the Holy Ghost has called me through the gospel, enlightened me by his gifts, and sanctified and preserved me in the true faith." Is it surprising that haughty mortals with their vaunted dignity disdain to stoop so low?

Yet the moment of unconditional self-surrender to God marks also the beginning of a new relation: "Ye are all the children of light." As children of the Heavenly Father we need no longer be satisfied with the position of contemptible slaves who, at the whim of a celestial tyrant, are offered a corner in heaven to witness the festivities going on. No longer are we plodding servants who toil for meals and lodging, and who receive reward according to their exertions. We have found the Father's heart and home and will, and all things are ours. David, when called from the flocks into the royal palace, underwent no such change as the sinner does who leaves the way of the world to enter the realm of faith. The whole universe is our home. And our school.

d. *Faith alone employs and ennobles all the best qualities in man.* As children we are not content to perform contract work.

Our gratitude to the Redeemer impels us to serve God with all our strength. There the entire man is involved: not only reason, which we certainly use and develop; not only intellect and character, though these are by no means neglected; not only the yearning heart to taste the riches of God's goodness in everything; but all these combined and elevated in faith

Because faith controls all the finer qualities of man, it is superior to any other form of serving God. It furnishes the deepest motives, highest aims and ripest efforts for good works, without depending on their value. It is an incentive to make ourselves as perfect and useful in body, soul, and mind, as any man can be; it constrains us to follow in the steps of Jesus where and when none will follow who does not believe in saving grace. Without such faith an earnest man generally becomes a fanatic, like the ancient Jew; or a spiritual acrobat skillfully balancing himself on the slender rope of his rules, like the Pharisee of old. Or the more superficial moralist adorns himself with the paints and feathers of his virtue and, as the Indian chief wished to impress the white man, so he hopes to win the applause of God! Sometimes those classes of people grow weary of the fruitless task of pleasing they know not whom or why; then they turn into atheists. Hyperreligion, in legalistic, moralistic, or rationalistic form, is the precursor of irreligion, because but one side of human nature was engaged, not the whole man as in faith. But atheism is the same fair world, the same precious Bible, the same open heaven, the same sinful heart, the same longing for peace,—with the guiding star of faith hiding his consoling rays.

II. FAITH AND THE GRACE OF GOD.

a. Faith alone gives God the proper glory. Nobody is slandered so much as our heavenly Father, if but in the false conceptions of religion. Some represent him as a despotic sovereign who, with or without regard to Christ's death, arbitrarily divides mankind in hopelessly lost and unfailingly saved souls. Others conceive him as a hard-hearted taskmaster who expects to reap where he did not sow; who burdens the people with a law which no man is able to fulfill; and then he punishes in time and

eternity the subjects lagging behind. Such as abhor those ideas, but fail to exchange them for truth, practically make of God a lenient, nearsighted old man whose fondness for children will not let him use the rod on any one. How great is God that, having worked in the world these thousands of years, man in his own wisdom is unable to comprehend his plainest act! As Jesus says: "If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you of heavenly things?" John III.

How full of light, how transparent is the whole scheme, if we turn to the Word of God and accept salvation by faith! Now the severe law of Sinai is our pedagogue "to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith." Gal III. This life abounding in asperities, has no experience except it works for good to them that love God. The sin-ridden heart, vainly trying to feed the spiritual man with lifeblood and vigor, becomes the temple of God, in which grace fulfills the fondest dreams of peace, joy, and virtue. If any man thinks he may glory of excellencies that outshine those of him who claims to be saved by grace, we will not contradict him; we rather urge him the more to yield himself to the care of the divine gardener, and he will be astonished to see how the natural grown buds open in surpassing beauty. God has special missions for men who, like John, could develop their talents in calm pursuit, as well as for those that are tossed about and torn by passions until saved as a brand plucked out of the fire, like Peter or Saul of Tarsus. In every case: Never is God greater than when he is gracious; he makes a specialty of being merciful; and never do we glorify him better than when accepting his free grace.

b. *Faith alone sees a real redemption in Christ's death.* Because faith opens the door to all who will come. The dying Mediator does not appear on the scene like a superfluous *deus ex machina* to interfere in favor of souls that were selected long ago to inherit heaven, and whom God could and would have justified in some other way. The doctrine of atonement is no longer a new application of Jewish sacrificial notions, nor "a silly roundabout theory derived from the Greek sacrifices," as it was lately termed by a German professor. Nor is it a sham invitation according to which Christ's blood *was* shed for all men and God *will* have them all saved, yet he *does not* save all: why

not? Nobody knows! Excepting his favorites, all are cast away—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*.

To faith, Redemption is the crowning work of God. It is not only the fairest example of his love, but the vital evidence of his existence and of his interest in men. It is the cornerstone of true religion, for without it God is nothing and man is nothing, and all obligation to worship God ceases. Yes, man is fearfully and wonderfully wrought. We subscribe to every word contained in Pascal's noble paragraph: "Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature, but a reed that thinks. It is unnecessary that the whole universe arm itself in order to destroy him. A vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. Yet though the universe annihilate him, man would still be far nobler than that which kills him, because he knows that he dies; while of the advantage the universe has over him the universe knows nothing. All our dignity, then, consists in the power to think." (*Pensées*, XVIII, 11). But and if this walking miracle is placed into these earthly lowlands here to begin and end his existence; or if he must exert his own energy to climb into a happier state now and later; why should he waste time in thinking of a God who pays no attention to him? Because he has created us? Perhaps, if this Creator can see and hear at all, he passes through the world as one wanders through an art gallery or through a park swarming with a queer population; and we owe him no more than he owes us for the free amusement we provide. Or what has he done to endear himself to the thinking mind, to draw irresistibly toward him our finest, deepest nature, our all? * * The cross of Christ alone has power to seal blasphemous lips and to incline the wondering heart to pray, "Remember me!"

c. Faith alone gives absolute certainty of being saved. A true believer trusts no human authority, does not depend on his own judgment or feeling, will not even build his security on the purest and holiest Church. He goes directly to the Word of God, where the Father speaks to him, and in faith he enters into the closest communion with the Savior. This was the cheering distinction between Reformation and Catholicism of the middle ages which harassed the penitent with unceasing observations, throwing him from one uncertainty into another.

The Romanists still cow their followers with the threat of an unsecured lot in paradise. One of their prelates was lately reported to have said that he would be afraid in the company of one who claims to be sure of his salvation. We do not doubt it. The Romanists have repeatedly felt uncomfortable in the neighborhood of Protestants who rested plea and argument on the Bible. On the other hand, people who decline the conciliatory meddling of the priest, because they present their own virtues, their private sentiments and imaginary perfections as a title to salvation, can never rest in peace; for the slightest declination of their mental compass, a sudden change in the weather of the soul, leaves them steerless on the ocean of doubt. If one of them musters courage to assert his salvation as beyond dispute, he is most assuredly of shallow heart, lacking earnestness as touching questions concerning himself and eternity; his is *Koehlerglaube*.

Only he who believes in the Son and his free grace *has* everlasting life in this time already. The eternal life hereafter is but the unfolding and perfecting of that which a believer here possesses, the possibilities of which are dwarfed and held in confinement by the limitations of body and earth. Viewed from this exalted standpoint, all other forms of approaching God or of seeking his salvation, deserve the name of superstition; not so crude as pagan follies, but superstition nevertheless. The heathen pleasing the idols with offerings, the dancing and the howling dervishes, and the Italian bravo who asks the Virgin to bless the weapon with which he waylays the traveler,—they are different in degree, but not in kind, from him who tries to flatter himself into heaven. It presupposes a low conception of God fashioned after human models, else they would not think of paying him in currency not cashed in heaven. It is an idea infinitely below that glorious one set forth in Holy Writ, that the great God, before whom the children of men and their glories are as nothing, promises and actually bestows free grace on all who believe in Christ Jesus.

III. FAITH AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

- a. *The doctrine of free grace "by faith alone" is the central*

truth of the gospel. With it the gospel of Christ as the Savior of mankind stands or falls. It comes from Christ and leads directly to him. Not counting the innumerable instances in which the words "faith" and "believe" recur in the Gospels and Epistles, Jesus used them at least ninety times.

Why should the Son of God come at all if he did not accomplish something extraordinary for mankind? Simply to teach us nobler rules of conduct? But we had the peerless law of the Old Testament, which today no man is able to fulfill. That ancient law, imperfectly as it was and ever will be kept, produced types of men and women like Moses, Jeremiah, Zachariah, Elizabeth and Mary—what more do you want; where is the need of a still steeper path? Or to teach a new conception of God—in regard to his Omnipotence and wisdom, perhaps? The modern telegraph, and telescope, and microscope, have explained more clearly the vast wonders of creation than Jesus ever attempted to do. Or did he reveal a more penetrating and consuming holiness of the Most High? What remains to be added to the seraphic "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory?" If there the prince of prophets faltered, "Woe is me for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts"—where shall we common mortals find refuge if Jehovah appears in still more dazzling array? However, Jesus is said to have made known the God of Love, the Father of mercies. The God of Love! A strange love that failed to ameliorate the fate of humankind one whit beyond what it was before the coming of Christ! The same tempests beat upon, and the same dark floods roll over heath, hearth, and heart, as in the days of Job. A remarkable love that would provide for the fairest among men no more than a manger and cross, a path of poverty and an end in shame! A peculiar Father of mercies who either has from eternity destined many of us to perdition whether we try to please him or not; or who, at best, leaves it to our frail powers to scale the walls of heaven! It seems that certain adorers of the "God of Love" rather mean a hazy, far away, evanescent "Highest Being" whom an "upright moral man" affords a refreshing sight. To tell of such a God, no Jesus was needed;

the Jewish Sadducees anticipated such religion before him. Again, it might be argued that Jesus came to set an example of how to serve God and be a perfect man. There is exceedingly poor consolation in the fact that Jesus once attained perfection. What does it benefit me to see him on the Mt. of Beatitudes, soaring into divine heights, if he cannot come down to lend a helping hand to the struggling sinner! The depressing thought occurs that he is the rarest, the only exception, in the history of the world, and that common mortals may never hope to reach his standard. The example of Christ! Is it really so encouraging to behold the immaculate Beautiful misunderstood, slandered, insulted, persecuted, stoned and crucified? Is such life worth living? Is it worth while to be good and to serve God at a risk like that? No: The more exalted Jesus stands before the meditating mind, the more one is entangled in a thousand riddles, in a labyrinth of doubt where the golden thread is not discovered until one draws the last conclusion and crowns the sublime Son of man as the Son of God, as the Lord of all. And it must be the crown of thorns of the dying Redeemer.

Otherwise Paul committed a tremendous mistake when he preached Christ Crucified as he did. He ought to have invited the world to follow the rules of Jesus who had selected the best, the lasting parts, of Moses and the prophets. By so doing Paul would have saved himself from much persecution and others from bloodshed, war and useless sacrifices. And as to Jesus? We might place his bust in our lararium, as Alexander Severus did, might praise him as we do Homer or Socrates; that would be all. All? But if those millions of souls were not satisfied that lived and died in him? And if the living God were not satisfied that this Jesus deceived the ages to pay him worship, honor, and glory, which belong to the Most High alone? We will not pursue this thought, but merely indicate it as showing that the whole gospel of Christ stands or falls with the atoning sacrifice of the Son of God who secured free grace to all who believe in him.

b. *The doctrine of free grace "by faith alone" forms and gives the highest expression of the Christian religion. The usual assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. These are generally based on the words of St. James, II, 14 and 17: "What*

doth it profit, my brethren, though a man say he hath faith, and have not works? Can faith save him? Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone." "What has always been objected to the Protestant doctrine of justification, and what always will be objected, is that it makes it too easy for man to reach the aim. While the heathen brings at least his offerings and the Jew seeks righteousness by the hard road of the law, the Christian need but accept in faith what Christ has done for him. This is said to be a doctrine directly dangerous to the masses. For these the doctrine of James is held to be the only practical one. And this only practical doctrine is also termed the only Evangelical one. Jesus did not promise the kingdom of heaven to every one that saith unto him Lord, Lord; but rather to him that doeth the will of the Father in heaven. *Matt. VII, 21.* Jesus, they maintain, demanded of his followers not only faith, but also the keeping of the law in thought, word, and deed, as in their opinion, the whole Sermon on the Mountain proves. And not according to faith, but according to its exercises in works toward the brethren will Jesus judge men. *Matt. XXV.*" (*Kahn's Dogm.*, III, 443.)

Yes, faith without works is dead; faith without morality is a chimera of the perverse mind. Meanwhile let us not overlook the opposite: morality without faith is a thin polish; works without faith are the earrings and bracelets of vanity. "For whatsoever is not of faith is sin." *Rom. XIV, 23.* Far from contradicting justification by faith, James rather confirms the doctrine. Far from weakening the character or lulling the soul into lazy security. This doctrine kindles ardent desires of following Christ in the power of Christ. "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water." *John VII, 38.* "He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do." *John XIV, 12.*

This doctrine includes and demands every Biblical virtue or truth of which other people make a specialty. The false martyrdom that induced enthusiasts to seek a useless death was a caricature of the duty as witnesses of Christ. Mysticism was an exaggeration of spirituality. Where constant stress is laid on repentance and sorrow for sin, as in the case of Francis of

Assisi who shed tears in his devotions until his eyes were weakened, or in the case of the modern anxious-sear, there the daily repentance born by faith is distorted. Predestination is partly a feverish search for certainty which in faith every one may have; and, partly, a desperate attempt at sounding the mysteries of salvation that receive their clear and peaceful light through faith. Regeneration, sanctification, or whatever a denomination may push into the foreground, simply is a rather detached from the harmonious whole. Faith does not remain in the periphery, does not single out appealing essentials, but gathers and uses the entire Biblical store into the highest and only adequate expression of Christian doctrine and life.

c. *The doctrine of free grace "by faith alone" furnishes the most powerful incentive to practical Church-work.* At the first glance it might not seem so. The pagans of classical antiquity, who were contented to dwell in huts of clay while making the temples centers of art and riches; the ancient Jews, so lavish in the erection, so liberal in the endowment of the national sanctuary; the Islamites even, with their extended pilgrimages and considerable gifts: these and others apparently put the followers of Christ to shame. Again, behold the Roman Catholics crowding several times each Sunday their stately churches, supporting splendidly their numerous and large institutions of learning and charity, providing well for priest, bishop, and higher dignitaries, and showing creditable zeal in all activities of their religion. Must not those who profess faith as the moving principle blush when they think of their small congregations with meager-salaried pastors, or of their plain and poor churches, of their whole missionary enterprise at home and abroad, which generally signifies a living from hand to mouth, not seldom a weary toil under a burden of embarrassing debts? Where, then, is the power of faith?

It is surely well to heed the lessons taught us by others. But note a few explanatory remarks. There were people under the old dispensation whose faith was imputed to them for righteousness; so also the Roman Church may have many who, despite the errors of their leaders, depend more on faith than on works; and their influence may be greater than we are able to judge. As for the genuflecting thoughtless masses. it is always easier to

interest them in a religious system appealing to the senses, than to educate them with a doctrine bared of all human bywork and aiming at direct intercourse with God; it is easier to drive or guide them on the beaten path, than to let them walk in freedom of conscience; that the Roman sheep are shorn perforce, is a public secret. Again, service of God with them is tantamount to aggrandizement of the Church, and vainglorious pride has much to do with the success of the Roman Catholics. "Church history shows us characters with an unconscious admixture of Greek, Roman, or even Northern paganism. Who is not aware that, for instance, the great popes of the middle-age, a Gregory VII, an Innocence III, those forceful and much admired princes of the Church, were characters in whom Christianity and Roman paganism were peculiarly mingled? For while they fought for the kingdom of God it became to them a kingdom of the world; and they wrestled for the 'Eternal City' which they sought to make the queen of the world in a new sense." (Martensen, *Ethics*, III, 437.) The same confounding of the temporal and the eternal prevades the Romanist camp today. As a consequence their practical religion is thoroughly official, glaring, obtrusive, and little room is left for that quiet hidden exercise of Christian virtues noticed alone by the recipient and by the Father which seeth in secret. It is different in the Church in which grace by faith is preached. Here nothing is demanded or taxed, no inducement on earth or in heaven are offered, no boastful competition encouraged. There may not be so much ostentatious work for the *visible* Church; but in respect to the *real* task of individual believers and congregations: to win souls for Christ, to build the kingdom of heaven, to prepare men for eternity, faith will be found the proper and most powerful motive. How can it be otherwise if a man truly believes that the Son of God has shed his blood for him! Then the whole life must be one continuous gratitude in thought, word, and deed.

Thus, from whatever side we investigate the question, we discover numerous reasons to rejoice in the *Sola Fide* and gain new impulses to keep on preaching the central, consoling, saving truth: The Sufficiency of Faith.

ARTICLE VIII.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROMOTE CONGREGATIONAL LIFE ?

BY REV. A. SPEICKERMANN.

That in this world the Church of Christ is the mightiest institution of divine mercy and human welfare is admitted even by the enemies of Christianity. For where is a power that has penetrated so deeply into the moral, social—yes, even the political—life of nations, as that institution that works like a salt of the world and has the promise that even the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it? In the first Christian era it showed its power in the fraternal congregational life of unselfish Christians; in the middle age, in the dominion of theocratic ideas, and in modern times, in the emphasis of Christian principles in the social and political life.

If under the guidance of history one walks in his spirit through the centuries of Christian development, one will notice progress everywhere. And yet, here and there one will hear the question, What can be done to make congregational life more effective?

How must we explain this question? Are those people, who maintain that the Church is going down rapidly, right after all?

This is not the case at all, according to the statistics of Dr. Carroll. According to him—to mention only one example—the Lutheran Church in America during the past year shows an increase of 287 ministers, 546 Churches and 116,087 new members. That does not look like retrogression. But why, then, this eternal lamenting and asking: What can we do to excite and promote Christian life?

Now, dear brethren, the question is, as you all know, nevertheless entitled to consideration. In most cases, however, it is a question of local nature. It is sufficiently known that in different towns and places the loyalty to the Church is not the best. The causes of this evil state are manifold. Think only of the

bad example of a pastor and his religious inability to win souls for eternity; but think, also, of the impious, materialistic tendencies of whole counties, where, I feel sorry to say it, people show just as much understanding for God's Holy Word, as does the cow show for a new barn door, and where the Gospel's arrows recoil as ineffectually as did the arrows from the armors of a knight of the Middle Age.

Thus you can well understand that many a man of God becomes discouraged, and, like that mighty Old Testament prophet who, looking at his scarce success, exclaimed like one who is tired of life: "It is enough!" But as God revealed to Elias that beside him there existed seven thousand pious men who had not bowed their knees to Baal, so he could nowadays tell many a pastor who suffers from the pain of ill success and thinks himself the only one that has remained loyal to his God: There is many a one in your congregation that could become a praise of my glory if thou couldst only understand how to touch him with the power of the Holy Word.

Indeed, brethren, nowadays a great many stay away from Church, not because they are dead to religious life, but because they dislike some ecclesiastical forms, and the ecclesiastical sermon gets lost too much in abstract thought. Being people of practical life, they do not know what to do with such theories. But what can be done to produce a change?

This question would easily be answered if such great men of history as Luther, Zwingli, Calvin and Wesley would be consulted. They could show us the spring out of which they drank courage and power and faith. Luther at the head of all would lift high the Book of books and say with sparkling eyes of faith that this Book and the Holy Spirit communicated by it would bring about the deepest and most lasting regeneration of the Church and of all her forms of life.

Would God the question would be solved in this way! But too many who lack a deeper insight into this matter, this seems impossible. They think they must show their wit by pressing the Holy Ghost into forms which they themselves have invented or which, at least, they think right. Had they a right understanding of the activity of the Holy Ghost, they would leave it to the latter to create the forms in which He wants to move.

This, of course, would render unnecessary a great many artificial means and arrangements that nowadays are introduced for the purpose of vivifying congregational life. The presence of the Holy Ghost would prevent the danger of an outward Christianity. For the emphasis of outward circumstances is a great mistake. We observe it nevertheless. It shows itself in the effort to educate Christian personalities by economic help. This sounds like the doctrines of Social Democrats who, as you know, teach that moral and religious life is not possible without an improvement of economic conditions. One refers to the common ownership of the first Christians to derive from it the ecclesiastical necessity of economic help. To this end one has arranged, especially in large cities, a number of Churches with numerous departments. One finds in these Churches not only great, magnificent rooms for Sunday Schools and associations for younger and elder people, but also drug stores for the poor, agencies for finding new places, industrial schools and who knows what else.

Such a complicated Church is called an Institutional Church. Her advocates say that the Church has to take care of the whole man and to see to it that Christians are educated not only for death and heaven, but also for life. This, they say, is done in the Institutional Church. Some here and there have lifted this idea to heaven and declare it to be a mighty contribution to the solution of the social question. There are, however, some who have raised their voices against such an institution. Among its sharpest opponents is Rev. A. C. Dixon, of Ruggles Street Baptist Church, Boston, who for some years was at the head of an Institutional Church, but then gained the conviction that it was a spiritual failure. He defended his position by calling attention to the fact that persons who for lack of places could not be considered, often felt a growing hatred toward the Church and that thus people would rather be drawn from it than to it. The same way with the hospital of an Institutional Church. Often persons made the Church responsible for not being healed.

Dr. Dixon's arguments were answered by Dr. G. R. Robbins, of Lincoln Park Institutional Church, Cincinnati. The latter said Dr. Dixon has been traveling too much. A man's whole energy diligence and diplomatic wisdom were required for the

administration of such an institution. Be that as it may, Institutional Churches, like that of John Wannamaker's, in which the spiritual element is not neglected, may be a blessing to many. It is certain that the Church in its present form cannot concern itself about physical and financial interests, for in most cases they rather lead from than to Christ. A Biblical declaration like: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness," shows the correctness of this standpoint and the position taken by Dixon which found its characteristic expression in the words: "It is easier to reach the bodies of men through the souls than the souls through the bodies."

This opinion of Dixon we can endorse as it is in harmony with the doctrines of the greatest of all reformers, who, as you know, expected man's whole salvation from the Work of God and its effect upon the soul. The correctness of this doctrine can be proved by the fact that through social and economic help very few will be driven to the gospel, and that often with the increase of wealth the ecclesiastical and religious interests grow cold. If, therefore, from this point of view we look upon the Institutional Church, it will not be hard to acknowledge Luther's Biblical standpoint according to which God's Word shall be preached firmly and faithfully, and without human tricks and accessories.

But how about revivals? Can they, perhaps, produce the changes after which Christianity, or at least parts of it, are longing so much? There are some who want to hear nothing about revivals; yes, they even go so far as to fight them wherever opportunity is offered. According to their opinion, revivals are nothing more and nothing less than an overflow of sentiments.

These persons, of course go too far. For there are revivals that are genuine. Among these one can mention that in Jerusalem; further, that in the sixteenth century and perhaps a number of modern movements. They most generally follow a time of great corruption, and like a refreshing and vivifying wave, they spread over the dry fields of religious poverty. Like a mighty stream they tear everything along with them, they animate religious thinking and lead man to self-knowledge and advancement in religious life.

This, however, cannot be said of a great many of these move-

ments. Of many it must be said that they are an artificial product of unscrupulous and ignorant evangelists, who play with the imaginative powers of their audience and work more for their own pockets than for the spread of the kingdom divine. Of course these people understand in a masterful manner how to fill the phantasy of the people with sweet or frightening pictures, and through the use of personal magnetism they understand also how to throw their listeners into a state of mind in which, as though hypnotized, they are without force of will and with burning zeal meet all the desires of the evangelists. Unfortunately this enthusiasm, called forth in so unnatural a manner, does not last very long. With the departure of the evangelist, disappears also generally the Christian sentiment of his convert. That, of course, such a sentiment is not produced by the Holy Ghost is clear.

Some have, however, made the attempt to maintain their genuineness, and referred to this end the phenomena accompanying them, for instance: *Visions, voices from on high, revelations from heaven, attacks of unspeakable terror, sudden cries, the hearing of Jesus' voice, and prostrations.* But almost all these can be explained by an over-heated imagination, an imagination which is not guided by reason or revelation.

Of course, this kind of revival is injurious. In a moment it blazes up like a straw fire and is gone almost as quickly. The object of this kind of evangelist, aside from making money, is the winning of new Church members. Can they present the latter in large numbers, then they have satisfied their ambition. Of course, little or nothing is accomplished for the kingdom of heaven in this way, and unless we get evangelists who put on their program repentance and faith as the only factors of spiritual progress, we cannot expect from the revivals a lasting blessing for our congregational life. Revivals in the Biblical sense of the word should be had every Sunday. Each sermon should contain something reviving. That would be Lutheran, for Luther's sermons are full of inspiration, full of light, full of power, and hereby they are continual revival. A genuine Lutheran needs not therefore these revivals that in some Churches last weeks, yes months, and provide their visitors with religion for the whole year, or until the next revival.

Not long ago there came to me a man whose religion seems to be alive only at the time of revivals and said: "How is it that the Lutherans are the only ones in town that have no revivals?" "O," said I, "we have them every Sunday, and you are hereby heartily invited to participate next Sunday."

To meet, of course, the wants of the people through the ecclesiastical sermon, it will be necessary not only to study the Bible, but also life in its many phases. Had the wants of the people been satisfied in this direction, then many of the societies, associations and clubs that have been called into existence for the purpose of renewing the Church, would have been rendered unnecessary, or had at least not gained such an importance as they now have. It was a very sad sign of the times when a few years ago Court Preacher Stoecker in Germany painfully exclaimed: "The life of the Church has fled into societies," thus expressing the fear that the Church could no longer satisfy the religious life, but that this life was dependent upon societies.

Such a state of affairs can, of course, become fatal to the development of the Church, if those societies pursue sectarian tendencies. Many "Gemeinschaftsleute" in Germany call the Church a Babel from which one must stay away. From such sectarian efforts, of course, no blessing can be derived for the Church. But American societies, also, can become a danger to the Church and do harm rather than good to the congregational life. For many of them are exposed to the danger of superficiality. That shows itself especially in those societies and clubs which, for the purpose of attracting people, arrange theatrical performances and other pleasures. They succeed in attracting people to their entertainments, but make a failure when they attempt to educate living Christian personalities.

This education can as before remarked, be accomplished only by the Word. When we think of the Word, we, of course, mean the pure gospel. But even this word of life which is so dear to our hearts modern theologians will deprive us of. They assert, to speak frankly, that Christianity in its present form is outworn,—that it has done its service and can go. The astonishingly advancing natural science has proved a great many dogmas to be untenable. Among these hateful dogmas seem to trouble them most the supernatural birth and the resurrection of Christ.

For—thus they maintain—these were supernatural and therefore without any value for a religion that, like all other sciences, had to submit to the inductive method.

Theological science would be of value only if it would rest on the same principles of explanation that had made modern science and especially natural science, so great and popular. And now they describe that Christianity which is adapted to modern standards, but this Christianity of the advanced schools is as much different from the Christianity of the Bible as is the eagle from the camel; for it flatly denies the fundamental facts of the Apostolicum, and instead of Christian virtues it praises only superficial moral ideas, ideas that can satisfy temporarily educated theorists who are inclined to sentimentalities, but which can never meet the wants of the people. The people will have no stones, but bread—bread which nourishes the inner life. It is satisfied with the religion of the Apostolicum, which has given to its fathers light and power and comfort in the gloom of life. But what has modern theology given, except the impulse to study? Has it strengthened the congregational life? No, it has rather weakened it through the undermining of its sublime foundation of faith.

But if modern theology has not promoted the home Church, has it then, perhaps, any success to show among the heathen? Not that I know of. How can a Christianity deprived of its main contents, in which the Founder plays only the part of a wise and good man, win the respect of the heathen? One need not therefore wonder at all that a Christianity such as the modern theologians have it, has made no progress at all except among academicians.

But if this modern Christianity that is so rich in self-contradictory hypotheses, cannot exercise any influence upon the lives of the people, then it is of no practical value. For more than one reason do we therefore give it the consilium abeundi; for modern theologians can never lift congregational life up to a higher stage of life.

The four aforesaid plans for working upon the Church as a whole originate, no doubt, in good and helpful hearts. Just how far they are right, must be decided by the Holy Scriptures. Clearly and distinctly the latter describe the religious life of

the congregation. As to the forms, however, in which this life has to develop, the Scriptures say nothing. The holy writers no doubt knew that the outward form of the Church a thousand years after their death would have an entirely different form, for the outer forms of development change with the circumstances. That, however, cannot be said of the religious life itself. The latter is always submitted to the same law and its process of development is the same with a man nowadays as it was with men living one or two thousand years ago. The word: "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved and thy house," is still a living word and the indispensable condition of true Christianity. The neglect of this conscious, personal and spiritual Christianity is, according to my opinion, the cause of the failure in most of the religious movements of our time. I mean those movements which must be called rather a human product than a work of the Holy Spirit. What good can all the great organizations of the Church do when they lack the condition *sine qua non* that is in this case the life principle of the Holy Ghost? Indeed, shall our congregational life experience a new turn, then the education of Christian personalities must not be neglected, for these in their union form the ideal congregation. What streams of life may flow from single Christian personalities you can see from the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Or has not Martin Luther by his unselfish personal devotion and through the concentration of his powers upon the one needful thing, freed a flood of life, which tore along with it the whole German nation as in a wild stream? Have not Christian personalities in towns and places where a sad and cheerless desertedness prevailed and impiety and skepticism ruled supreme, called forth new life out of ruins, life that suddenly flourished and produced the good old faith with its fresh hope and its faithful love?

On the basis of the influence of Christian personalities one can quietly assert that the latter are the main things in the building up of congregational life; for the Christian personality is the foundation on which alone true Christianity is possible. For true Christians are through the same Spirit connected to a harmonic body. The striving after one common goal animates their powers and gives them the feeling of holy solidarity.

They know no greater and holier ideal than to carry spiritual stones to the Lord's temple. Would God we had a multitude of such Christian personalities! O, how soon would be changed the picture of congregational life!

But where lie the causes of so many grievances of the present? Now, you can find them with the pastors as well as with the laymen. The pastor can harbor many hindrances which weaken his ability. If, for instance, he fears he may lower his dignity by mingling with the people through social intercourse, he will do well to understand that in cities such an intercourse is a demand of necessity. The bad influences to which laymen are exposed increase continually. Occasional advice and help from the pastor could therefore do no harm. Descend therefore from your proud horse, dignified lord! Mingle with the people, not to satisfy your desire, or theirs, for gossiping, but to let them feel that you participate in their well being. Thus you and I will gain a basis of operation from which we can storm against the stronghold of unbelief and those hindrances of faith which arrest the progress of congregational life. In all our endeavors we should be guided by the great spiritual purpose to educate persons as children of God. Our common sense, led by the Holy Spirit, will tell us in the different circumstances how far we can go; but there should always accompany us the consciousness that on our part we cannot guide congregational life if we have not become Christian personalities that we may go ahead with a good and noble example. The latter is often a mightier sermon than many of our sermons which in pathetic tone fall from our lips, and the removal of a fault which degraded us in the eyes of the members of our congregation a greater progress than the increase of our salary. For if we grow, our congregation will grow. And that is the main thing.

On the other hand, we cannot deny that many a layman has to remove a great many hindrances before he can develop into a free Christian personality which fills out its place in congregational life. Many laymen, being in the claws of wealth or a good income, are unfit for the purposes of the Kingdom Divine. We often find that among the immigrants. For many of these there was a time when they had nothing to eat and were as poor as church mice. Ah, how they then would cry to God and un-

derstood how to praise Him as their only help. And then prosperity came and poured out over them the horn of plenty; and behold, those people who first had raised an outcry against the wealth and vain glory of their possessors, developed into creatures who for arrogant behavior and disgusting conceit could not be equaled. Of course with these people you find the Bible in the corner and it is covered with so much dust that with the finger you could distinctly write the terrible word, "Lost!" That such people cannot elevate congregational life upon a higher plain of life is clear, and clear also that their membership serves only selfish ends.

But I know still another thing that sometimes troubles the pastor, as well as the members of his congregation, and not seldom is the cause of strife.—I mean the tongue. It is often too late when one cries, "Bei Gott, ess war nicht boes gemeint!" for sensitive persons are too easily offended and a congregation too easily weakened or even destroyed.

But while the removal of personal hindrances is one of the main tasks of our Christianity, yet we should not forget that there are other things that must be given our whole attention. To make our congregational life most effective, it will be necessary that the pastor and the members of the congregation regard themselves as being one together. These intimate relations make impossible the staying away from the service where, according to the doctrines of the apostles shall be cultivated the unity of spirit. The services should therefore be attended by church members just as regularly as by the pastor. This has been solemnly promised at the altar by the members of the Lutheran Church. Is this promise kept? Not always. A large number of people appear only every Pentecost. If the pastor asks why they do not visit the Church more frequently, then excuses will be had in multitudes. The pastor well knows that some have been sick or have been kept away by sick persons; he well knows that often roads softened by rain or made impassable by snow-drifts, prevent people from coming, but he knows also, that many conceal behind their excuses nothing but laziness and lack of energy and spiritual zeal. For this reason they often refrain from asking the question in order not to hear such thoughtless and frivolous excuses.

It would be a good thing if these people, touched by the thunder of the Word of God, would be aroused from their death-like sleep and be driven to the fulfillment of their congregational duties. For if one wants to use the rights of a congregation, one should not neglect his duties toward it. One of the main duties of a church member is the regular attendance of the services. The phrase: I can edify myself at home just as well, sounds pious, but is nevertheless condemnable.

In his time already the apostle warned against lukewarmness when he exclaimed: "Do not leave your meetings as some do." Sadly it sounded out of his heart, for he knew that one coal does not burn as long as many put together. He knew also that being together and working together will strengthen the bond of unity and the feeling of Christian solidarity. On the basis of this apostolic view it is clear that we are morally obliged to support as far as we can, the congregation of which we are a member. This can best be done by use of the means of grace, for they will strengthen the spiritual life which throbs in the body of the congregation.

With the removal of personal hindrances and the participation in the services and the means of grace, however, the duties of a church member are not yet exhausted. A third thing is required: I must work for my Church. But, you say, do we not have the pastor, whom we pay for his work. Now the pay is fine and good and undoubtedly necessary to Church work; and it is also very fine if with progressing prosperity and the increasing wants of life, the minister's salary also keeps pace; but it may be said right here that the hearty co-operation of pastor and congregation is necessary to a progressive development. All members must work, each one in his place. The reason why so many congregations do not prosper cannot be explained by the lack of good material, but by the indifference that has captured so many.

It cannot be denied that modesty often keeps many people from taking an active part in the congregational life; but I have more than once made the observation that generally those make the best Sunday School teachers who thought least of their ability. Humility is one of the most beautiful Christian virtues, and makes a person especially capable of rendering services in the Kingdom Divine. With the humility of the Sunday

School teacher must be associated love and interest. If the children feel this love and interest on the part of the teachers, they will put their whole trust in them. This marks the beginning and the possibility of a Christian influence.

If, moreover, the Sunday School teacher understands how to make the instruction interesting by striking illustrations from the Bible or from daily life, then the children will hardly be able to wait for the time when they can go again to the Sunday School. But the impression which they will receive there will also be communicated to the parents, and the latter, should they have become cold and indifferent in religious things, will be filled with new zeal. The influence of the Sunday School upon the congregational life should therefore not be underestimated.

The Bible Schools also which here and there have been arranged in Churches can render good services to the congregational life. One must not say we are lacking instructors. In most cases this is not true. As in Sunday Schools persons often decline the office of a teacher for modesty's or love of comfort's sake, so in Bible Schools. And yet, Biblical instruction is, as every one knows, very much necessary in a land where religious education is not obligatory as in Germany, and children often show an astonishing ignorance in the most simple Biblical subjects. Recently to my question: "Of what does Still Friday remind us?", one answered with a confident smile: "Of planting of potatoes." I hardly knew whether I should weep or laugh.

The ignorance in religious things imposes upon the Church the duty to lead and educate through systematic instruction the young people. The Lutheran Church has a fine opportunity to work along that line through its catechetical instruction. A prominent speaker of the Congregationalists acknowledged this when he said to me: "You Lutherans have through your catechetical instruction the power to keep the children within the bounds of the Church. We cannot do it." Surely a number of other denominations have to make the same confession with him. This, of course, will induce us to plant into the hearts of the children better and more faithfully, not only the doctrines of our Church, but also to lay a solid foundation which cannot be shaken by the storms of unbelief. But the spiritual life thus

awakened needs protection and growth. For this reason it is recommended that young people, under the guidance of experienced leaders, meet for the promotion of Christian life. The young people's societies and especially the Christian Endeavor meetings met the needs of youth. They were, however, not everywhere welcomed and by some they were sharply condemned. But in the course of time they have made many friends and as, moreover, they have adapted themselves to the different denominations, it looks as if all opposition to them is broken.

In the Lutheran Church we have Christian Endeavor in form of the Luther League which when led right will become a training school for good church workers. And workers we need everywhere. Of course, a church member can work in many ways. Those possessed of a good voice can unite their voices in the choir for the glory of the Almighty; for song is a power, as Origines testifies. He asserted that in the first Christian era more people were won by songs than by sermons. Modern choir songs will also have their effects when the members devote their voices to songs out of love for the kingdom of heaven, and keep away from the three devils whom William Booth calls: (1) The quarreling devil; (2) the dressing devil, and (3) the court-ing devil. Has not many a choir been ruined by these three devils?

Women and missionary societies can also render many services to a congregation. With loving hearts they can take care of the poor in the congregation and in foreign lands, and by their presence and works of love lead the hearts of the people among whom they do missionary work to Christ. This is noble work, work that considerably lightens the burdens of the ministry.

The pastor needs the help of the church members. The view that the pastor could get along without co-operation of the members is just as false as the opinion that the head of a man could live without the body. This fact suggests the necessity of co-operation. We must not say that this cannot be done, for this phrase does not exist in the dictionary of the Kingdom Divine. We must not say, either, that there are so many others, let them go ahead, we are not needed. Here again we say, in the kingdom of heaven each one of us has to fill his place. If one cannot preach, one may speak a good word for the Kingdom of

God or the congregation to which he belongs. If one cannot be an elder, he can support as far as possible those who have so burdensome an office. If one cannot write for the kingdom of love and mercy, then surely one can spread good literature among the people and especially among the members of the congregation to which he belongs. How beautiful it is if, for instance, the papers of the Church and the congregation develop into an ever increasing spiritual power.

This can all be accomplished, of course, only through the Holy Ghost. If this Holy Ghost is not the motive of all ecclesiastical and congregational endeavors, the congregations will make failure. If, however, He is the heart of their lives, then our congregations will experience so charming a springtime as did nature recently, when she threw off the cold, unfriendly garments of winter; when her streams and rivers and brooks freed themselves from icy fetters and went their way roaring and singing and murmuring; when grass and bud shot forth and vales and hills put on a dress of soft green; when flowers lifted their many-colored heads toward heaven and the air was filled with the melodious songs of the birds. O, come such an Easter, such a Resurrection, in our congregations! To make it possible we must exercise prayer,—not that prayer which, in selfish way thinks only of one's self, not the prayer that refers to outward things but overlooks the essence of Christianity,—but the prayer which is called forth by the Spirit of Pentecost and unites with other prayers, and thus strengthened draws down the help of the Almighty.

ARTICLE IX.

THE TRUE SPIRITUAL IDEA.

BY J. M. CROMER, D.D.

The extreme materialistic character, and the perverted spiritual tendencies of the age make this subject one in which the more thoughtful will be much interested. We approach the study with a deep sense of its fundamental character. It lies at the basis of creation, revelation and human redemption. It is fundamental to the whole sphere of right development in both philosophy and religion. It is the spiritual, after which philosophy vainly groped, and which gave origin to all human religions, and which is the chief characteristic of Christianity.

Creation had its crowning climax in the formation of a creature who embodied in his being both the spiritual and the material. Hitherto the spirit world and the material world had remained in well defined and distinct separation. The true order was that the spirit world began giving life to the material world, and the work of creation grew until, in the counsels of the Almighty One, it was decreed to make a being in the image of Himself, who should reflect His glory, and whose destiny should be final perfection in Him.

We cannot fully grasp the idea of spiritualized matter,—that it was possible for God, so to speak, to graft the essential element of His own being, which is purely spiritual, into matter to form a new being which should unite these opposite elements in His own nature. This is what God did when He made man. Hence man stands as the connecting link between the world purely spiritual and the world purely material or physical. Whatever progression or evolution in form may be discovered in the purely physical order, and however these may lead up to man on his physical side, to him who looks upon creation in its entirety and ultimate end, there can be only the one idea, viz: that the work of physical creation proceeded until a being was possible which by intelligence and physical perfection could receive the high and god-like endowment of spirituality.

This, then, is the impassable gulf in the creative act across which the physical creation cannot pass, save in the personality of man himself. The representative character of the purely material world finds its highest and last form in man.

The routine of nature is dust, grass, herb, tree, animal, man, and in this circuit all the laws of nature toil their god-prescribed rounds. All the ambition of nature is satisfied in man. Whatever yearning and groaning and longing to be clothed upon with a higher life is distinguishable in brute creation finds its complete fulfilment in man. Whatever representation nature can possibly have in the new worlds that are to be, must be through the resurrected and glorified body of man. All creation is honored in him. He stands its divinely determined lord and master. Even the grossest form of materialism cannot object to the law of representation. It is the only means of reaching the highest court of authority even in the realm of spiritual intelligence. It is the fundamental form of the best known government and gives voice and rights to all.

Looking at this question therefore in this light which does fullest justice to the material world, there is a broader view given in the finally glorified life of man, who, standing before the bar of God's judgment a redeemed sinner, fully represents nature in his spiritualized body and gives fullest meaning to the triumphant victory of redemption. All nature, therefore, can be said to stand in the most holy place of spiritual triumph, when man in his resurrected body sings the song of Moses and the Lamb.

There is not in the original essence any war between the material and spiritual, nor in the divine order of things any reason for any conflict between them. In the pure order all would be glorious harmony and our Lord would be unchallenged God of all. Thus nature and her laws would lead man along her own beautiful unerring way up to nature's God.

But in the spiritual as in the natural world there seem to have been violent upheavals. In the formation of the earth, whether by a cooling process, or as a late professor has ventured to suggest, by a heating process, (which by the way would cause the revision of all the theories of creation) there have been great volcanic eruptions, confusing and often even reversing the na-

tural order of things in the earth's formation, thus making it almost impossible, in places, for the geologist to determine the normal order of strata and formation.

So in the spiritual world there have been upheavals. The internal disorder of man's spiritual nature burst forth in what in the moral world was the greatest possible upheaval and overthrow of the moral order, in a positive act of disobedience, where by the whole fundamental law of God, as pertains to man's spiritual being has been overthrown, causing such confusion as to make it impossible for purely human moral scientists to determine or discover the normal rule of human conduct.

We have come narrowly to fix the struggle for spiritual supremacy between spirit and matter, and to ally all the forces for good upon the spiritual side, and the forces for evil on the side of the flesh. What we need to remember, however, is that the whole spiritual conflict is truly spiritual. So far as the relation between spirit and matter is concerned, that has been fixed from the beginning. We do not "wrestle with flesh and blood" says Paul. That would be a combat in which we might more easily balance forces and win. But our conflict is "with principalities and powers," and "the rulers of this world," "against spiritual wickedness in high places." These are all in grammatical apposition with "the wiles of the devil," mentioned in the preceding verse.

The seat of sin is in the spiritual, and here it wages its conflict, and here it must and will be defeated. The connection of the flesh is incident upon the fact that in man flesh and spirit were combined. It is the power of the spirit showing its supremacy over matter in disobedience even as in obedience. It is the evil of the mind fastened upon the members that becomes the struggle, for sin seeks to reign in and over the flesh through and by perverted spirit.

Hence in Revelation we have a record (first) of the order of the spiritual and material, and (secondly) the true order of the spiritual being,—the laws which govern, and the character which should result. We need not dwell upon the fact that this is the thought of Revelation, (first) that sin dwells in the spiritual part of man even unto death, and (secondly) that the whole force of Revelation is to make these facts clear, and to bring out

the truly spiritual nature of man, these facts having become obscured by the fact that sin was death to the spiritual man, and the living spirit could no more be determined from the dead spirit than the live body could be determined merely from a dead body. It is a living spirit in the realm of opposition to God with whom we have to deal as it is a living God whom we have to aid us.

This gives adequate meaning to sin, which is a pre-requisite to an adequate meaning of redemption, the plan whereby God would surely save him. It is not merely moral disorder, but it is positive and intentional rebellion against God's laws established at the beginning for the government of the spiritual being. This conflict comes down to man from the highest source of spiritual intelligence in the realm of Satanic opposition to God. Because man is a spiritual being and because he rebelled against God's law for that being he has allied himself with all the powers of darkness in the regions of hell for the overthrow of the divine government of the Almighty.

The results prove that whatever degradation man may reach he reaches because the laws of his spiritual nature have not been obeyed. This brings wreck to his whole complex life. The material or physical falls below the level of its own existence when not held in place by the spirit. All immorality and loss or lack of character grows out of the failure of the spiritual man to hold his place of dominion in and over man, when man becomes a helpless prey to the mere sensuous nature.

Consequently the effort of Revelation from the beginning has been to reveal the true spiritual character of God, and the place the spiritual was intended to occupy in man, and to bring man up to this high standard. Man was a stranger to himself until Revelation made known his real nature to him. The spiritual death that reigned within him made him the subject of a new creation whereby the spiritual nature was to be given life, and restored to its place of authority in man.

The monstrous task of revealing the spiritual was further enlarged and made difficult in having to be revealed to creatures in whom spiritual life was destroyed by disobedience, and apparently the only hope of such a revelation lay in the quickening of man's spiritual susceptibilities. Hence the method of reve-

lation must be what we might call a mixed method. The spiritual was conveyed to man through material forms. The physical world was called into requisition, to bear in its crude form the finer senses of the spiritual.

There is nothing more interesting to the true student than the wonderful use which God himself has made of the physical, both in nature and in man, in order to put into simplest form the idea of his real spirituality, which is the high aim of Revelation. Over and above the wreckage of disobedience man is still taught that the spiritual is his highest life, and that no other end is worthy the employment and struggle of his god-like faculties.

This is the meaning of the Old Testament economy. Here, in beautiful figure, type and symbol, like the colored sticks and many shaped blocks used in the *Kinter-Garten*, God taught His ruined creature and child the fact and nature of the spiritual. So effective was this method that many of the Old Testament worthies were enabled to look forward to the fulfilment of it all, and behold the King in all his majestic and redeeming beauty.

Carrying out this idea, we follow on down to the miraculous incarnation in which in the second Adam the true relation of the natural and the spiritual was more fully revealed. Everything Jesus said, and all he did seemed clearly intended to bring order, in the estimate man held of himself and of his God. The kingdom of heaven and its righteousness were given eminent first place, and man was taught that in a proper adjustment of the spiritual with reference to the temporal, he would find the highest enjoyment of both. After showing how absorbed the Gentiles were with the temporalities of life Jesus said, "But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." Temporal matters are here used as the good measure running over that is added to the man who puts these two natures in their proper relation.

Miracles are performed, not alone to heal the body, which Christianity has ever honored and ennobled, and which finds its chief glory in becoming the temple of the Holy Ghost, but to prove Christ's own supernatural power, and the high order of the spirit in man. Nothing could more completely destroy the

divine meaning of the miracles, and of all Revelation itself, than to interpret them as being an end in themselves. It was not, therefore, merely that man might *see*, or *hear*, or *walk*, or even *rise from the dead* to live a few more days of toil and suffering in this physical world, that Jesus opened the eyes of the blind, unstopped the ears of the deaf, gave power to the limbs of the paralytic, or raised the dead body of his friend to life. But in all this He aimed to teach the fact of the supernatural, and its power over the natural, and thereby develop man's spirit-consciousness. Jesus opened the blind eyes, not merely to give the unfortunate one a vision of the face and form of loved ones, and of the beautiful nature-world in which he lived, however great and to be desired this blessing,—but that he might thereby open man's spiritual vision, giving sight to the blinded eye of faith, that he might see in Christ the revelation of the Father, and his personal Redeemer, and that he might see in himself a child of the King, a possible heir to all the riches of heaven and immortality. He gave hearing not alone that the world of harmonies might be opened to his darkened soul, but that he might hear the words of life, and finally give ear to the symphonies of heaven. He gave the power to walk not simply that man might enjoy the use of his body and no longer be a burden to his friends, but that he might strongly bear the cross, and finally walk the streets of the New Jerusalem. He gave life, not to add another chapter to the checkered experience of this world-existence, nor to give temporary joy to the bereaved ones, but that he might more fully grasp the meaning of life and live forever.

In view of these suggestions, which must commend themselves to the candid student of the Bible, it would seem a minimizing of the divine power to have exerted it in the interests of the merely temporal gains which naturally followed. If this were the end, then we might say on the one hand that it was an extravagant use of the supernatural. The end did not justify the means. Or, on the other hand, we might say that it was a partial and limited use of divine power, because more of the world's afflicted were not healed, and because this power was not perpetuated as an established usage in the Church.

It is not without grave significance that the performing of miracles was confined in the scriptural sense to the apostles. It

was a part of the great confirmative evidence which the kingdom of Christ gave *that it was not of this world*. And no greater violation of the whole consensus of revelation could possibly be made than to regard the miraculous, as used in the correction of physical deformity, or the healing of physical infirmity, as an end in itself. This would overthrow the whole spiritual order so plainly laid down in Scripture from the beginning.

We must, therefore, come to discriminate between the spiritual as seriously taught in the Scriptures, and as such, giving man his true place in this world, and as well his true destiny in the world to come, and the spirituelle ideas of modern idealistic pantheists. No one can surely fail to see the gross inconsistency in that system of thought, if we may call it a system, which on the one hand confines the spiritual so exclusively to the mere healing of the body, and which goes so far as to claim that in a proper exercise of it this body may become immortal, and the accompanying claim that matter and body are not real and that nothing but mind is real. Christian science cannot square itself with any true philosophy of either the body or the spirit as taught in the Word of God.

The work of revelation continued in the wonderful miracle of Pentecost, which we have been led somewhat to anticipate. A new meaning, to man, was here given the spiritual. It was here that the dispensation of the Holy Ghost was fully inaugurated in the extension of the Christ-kingdom of which it was such a complete fulfilment. All the vital declarations of Jesus were made good. Pentecost bound by unassailable evidence the mission of Christ with the new dispensation. Prophecy, through John the Baptist, is no more absolutely bound with Christ in its fulfilment, than is Christ himself, through the miracle of Pentecost bound to and in the new spirit-dispensation. The chain of evidence is not only not unbroken, but increases in strength with each advancing step.

Notice the great difficulty Christ had all along with His disciples, and which increased to the end, and which culminated in that inimitable "farewell address." How He must fondle and caress His disciples, that He may prepare them for that great catalepsis which was to seize upon their faith. How mother-

like in His endearment to them when He says, "I will not leave you comfortless." "I go, but I will come again." "I am going away for only a little time, up into the higher and better region of heaven, that better land and country, as a pioneer, to look up and prepare mansions both for you and myself, and then I will come again, —after I have prepared the road and cast up a royal highway through the tomb, and thrown a golden crossing over the turbulent stream of death,—I will then come back and lead you over the way, so that where I am there you may be also."

Hear the spirit-blind disciples as they cry,—*"We do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way."* "Lord, just show us the Father now, give us a sensuous vision of this land now, and we will be satisfied. Don't make such heavy demands upon our faith, and don't give us such a hard lesson in spiritual things." Then he reveals the fulness of His real nature, "I am the way, the truth and the life." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."

We need and can have no more striking contrast between the natural and the spiritual, nor can we have an exhibition of the difficulty man had in comprehending the spiritual, than is given us in the actions of the disciples under the cloud of crucifixion and bereavement, and then upon the day of Pentecost. What changed men they were. What increased faith and power.

We ask ourselves the question, What was the mental and spiritual change which came over these disciples? We realize something of the miraculous display of Pentecost. But what was the peculiar work wrought in their natures?—their conceptions?—their understanding?—their power or manner of apprehending divine truth? Just before, our Lord spake to them in simplest parable and picture lesson, and they did not seem to understand. When the multitudes themselves had gone to their homes rejoicing in the truth as they received it in the simple manner and means of Christ's teaching, the disciples draw Him aside and ask Him to explain to them the meaning of the parable. But now they stand up before the multitudes proclaiming the power and wisdom of God. They are not only bold and fearless, but they speak out of a full knowledge of the mystery of godliness. They have a clear vision of the Son of God, and

His mission, and now preach Christ and Him crucified, as the only hope of a world's redemption. They now stand upon high ground. They deal with spiritual things as with the most tangible facts. They have graduated out of the school of parables, and are in the high school of the Holy Ghost. They can now hold spiritual truth in mental contemplation. They do not need the crude outlines of parable and figure. They now have enlarged spiritual capacity, and a fuller use of spiritual faculties, and can now see with the eye of faith, and paint pictures and draw figures with the unseen powers of *hope*, which have become the more real. They have enthroned Christ within, and are filled with the Holy Ghost, and can for the first time in their history walk in spiritual and heavenly places through the liberty given them by Christ Jesus.

We do not desire to force a meaning here, nor to go beyond the true equilibrium, if we may use the term, which always must be maintained between the spiritual and sensuous. Man is still physical and spiritual, and will ever so remain while in the body. And this fact demands that the physical shall still hold its proper place in all that pertains to his being. But we must say that the disciples have now come to a degree of spiritual independence where they may contemplate spiritual truth in something of its purity, and in some regard for its separate and higher mission and being: and are in a degree, equal to their spiritual progress, not only above the physical and sensuous but are largely independent of them.

The "stony ground" and "good ground" now appear in the light of a higher reality. The "wheat" and "tares" can now be distinguished in motive and action. The "salt" and "leaven" are now apparent in the actual life, while the "pearl of greatest price" has become an exultant possession passing in value all earthly riches. They do not now need these mental and spiritual crutches for they have found the true way of which the Lord is Himself the light.

We need only to remark that the whole religious life of the apostles bore out this same idea. Their freedom in the spiritual life and world was something most conspicuous. They were not only the marvel of those who heard them in every tongue, but a new life was manifest throughout. The new life accom-

panies the new language. They needed not now the temple, with its gorgeous paraphernalia to give them a sense of the majesty and glory of God, something which the Jewish service in all the splendor of a Solomon could approach. They possessed in their own soul's experience an ever-present and far more meaningful revelation of the power and glory of God. He had condescended from His throne of glory in the heavens and had taken a seat upon the humble throne of their heart's affections, and had filled their souls with a light before which the glory of the Shechinah was pale and obscure. It was an intelligent and conscious "supping" and communion with the indwelling Christ.

It was this gracious baptism that gave them the right use of their spiritual faculties. They now followed a new order. They went from house to house, breaking bread, testifying with marvellous accord to the doctrine of the apostles, praying and enjoying an unadulterated fellowship. They did not forsake the temple, but they go to it with a new life and a new power, and a new meaning of their apostolic mission. They are stopped at the "gate Beautiful" by the cries of a lame beggar whom they heal, and on account of which they were unable to reach the temple, but were gathered in Solomon's porch,—this court of the Gentiles,—where with fullest freedom from the perversions of Judaism, they proclaimed a new gospel unto men.

We need not elaborate this point. It shows the power of the spiritual, how it rose above, as it ought, all dependence upon the material and sensuous.

We are living in an age in which is seen many conflicting tendencies. It is the most materialistic and sensuous age the world has known. While the sensuous is somewhat delivered from sensuality, it is nevertheless most powerful. The spectacular carries the multitude and wins the day.

But it is also an age of strange manifestations in the realm of the spiritual. The occult sciences are being resurrected and find eager adherents and most fanatical advocates. So that while with Luther we would, on the one hand, "slap these spirits on the snout," we would on the other hand, also with Luther, proclaim the true idea of the spiritual. The truly spiritual is confined to laws of action and modes of manifestation, by which the vari-

ous spirits may be tried as is the case in the physical. It is no evidence of spirituality when it is attempted to deal unnaturally with the material, and to deny its place and office in the great plan both of creation and redemption. Nor is it an evidence of true spirit-life when all appeals to the sensuous nature are condemned and branded as unscriptural. There is here a happy medium of truth. The extremes of an excessive emphasis upon the spiritual are as marked and conspicuous for the harm they have done the true spiritual idea, as the undue emphasis upon the sensuous in spiritual things has harmed the sensuous. The occult sciences bear testimony to the former statement, and an effete Judaism, and spirit-destroying Romanism proved the latter.

We must still remember that we are under the dispensation of the Holy Ghost, and that we have not yet learned and become wise above what is revealed and written. Nor have we come to such perfection in the spiritual life that we can ignore the appeals of the parables and the miracles and the symbols of truth.

But we must further remember that we are in process of spiritual training and while we have not risen to the degree of apostolic perfection, and while it may be neither possible nor necessary for the carrying on of the world's evangelization that we should come to this third—heaven degree of spiritual development, yet we have cast aside the old wine—skins of the past, and are seeking a higher realization of the spiritual life. We should be growing away from too much dependence upon outer appeals. However much these may help us in the weakness of our spiritual condition, and the growing alertness of the sensuous nature, we must still maintain that the true idea will be found only when we persistently look and labor for the coming of that hour when neither “in the mountains of Samaria nor yet at Jerusalem” will we need to assemble for the worship of God, but when those who would truly worship the Father will worship Him in “spirit and truth.”

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

CONCORDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Commentar ueber den Brief Pauli an die Roemer, von Dr. G. Stoeckhardt, Professor am Concordia-Seminar zu St. Louis. 8 mo Pp. v. 649. Cloth with leather back.

The handsome make-up of this volume is justified by the character and contents. Dr. Stoeckhardt has brought to his task ample learning and critical skill. The method pursued in the treatment is that of a running, connected comment, in which the text is interwoven with the discussion, after the manner of Godet. Our author prefers this on the one hand to the glossary method which discusses texts, and on the other to the method which presents the exegetical content in a general summary, and discusses grammatical, historical, archaeological matters in notes, thus separating language and subject, form and content.

The doctrinal standpoint is conservative and orthodox. There is no yielding at any point to radical, critical views. The author is also soundly Lutheran and quotes freely from the Symbols of his Church. The Commentary is scholarly and intended for ministers who know the Greek text.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

Dies und Das Aus dem Leben eines ostindischen Missionars, von C. M. Zorn, Lutherischer Pastor zu Cleveland, Ohio. Large 8 mo. Cloth, illustrated. Pp. 292.

Pastor Zorn has given his readers a vivid picture of India and his experience there during five years as a missionary. He outlines his journey from Leipsic to Madras by way of Alexandria and the Suez Canal, recording various interesting incidents.

His field of labor lay among the Tamuls, south of Madras, whose manners and language are described. The illustrations are numerous and good, giving the reader an excellent idea of the natives, of their houses, cities, cattle and customs.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

Pamphlets from the Concordia Publishing House:

Catalogue of Publications, Pp. 350. A well arranged cata-

logue of well chosen books and supplies for Churches, Sunday Schools and Day Schools.

Amerikanischer Kalender fuer deutsche Lutheraner auf das Jahr 1908.

AMERICAN LUTHERAN PUBLICATION BOARD, PITTSBURG, PA.

The Lord's Prayer. By William Dallman. Cloth, 8 mo. Pp. 271.

The eleven chapters composing this treatise are evidently so many discourses preached by the author to congregations which he has served as pastor. The treatment is popular, but fairly thorough. The language is well-chosen and the illustrations are pertinent to the subject. The book is edifying and would be prized by many a layman were it placed in his hands. Ministers, too, will find it helpful by way of suggestion.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY, CHICAGO, NEW YORK, TORONTO.

The Doctrine of the Ministry. Outline Notes based on Luthardt and Krauth. By Reverend Franklin Weidner, D.D., LL.D. Pp. 147.

"Based on Luthardt and Krauth" has grown a little monotonous in the books prepared by Dr. Weidner. Yet as Luthardt and Krauth are good authors on some subjects of theology, it may be that Dr. Weidner's books are all the better because he has used their contributions as the basis of his own. But we would like to see something from Dr. Weidner's pen based entirely on his own study and investigation. Only original research and independence of thinking can awaken thought and inspire confidence, and can advance science.

The book before us is a digest of what men and churches have taught in regard to the ministry. It cannot be regarded as a discussion of the subject of the ministry. Hence it really adds little or nothing to the sum of our knowledge of the subject, though it may be referred to as a useful compend of teaching. But we cannot commend the author's method. He divides and subdivides after the manner of Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics, until one feels that he has only a skeleton in hand. We confess that we do not have a taste for such theologising.

With the teaching of the book we find no great fault. However, we do not understand why the author should write: "Ordination is not a true sacrament." The word "true" should be

omitted, since ordination is not a sacrament at all, but only an institution of men. But the author is quite right when he says that "all ministers are equal," that "the validity of the Sacraments does not depend upon the ministers," that "the ministry is not a priesthood."

To those who wish to consult a digest on the doctrine of the ministry we commend this book.

J. W. RICHARD.

THE JOHN C. WINSLOW COMPANY.

The Samaritans; the Earliest Jewish Sect; Their History. Theology and Literature. By James Alan Montgomery, Ph.D., Professor in Old Testament Literature and Language. Philadelphia Divinity School. Pp. XIV and 358. Price \$2.00 net.

The nucleus of this work was a Thesis prepared by the author for the Doctorate in the University of Pennsylvania. Having received the appointment to deliver the Lectures on the Bohlen Foundation for 1906, the author expanded his Thesis to the dimensions of the volume before us. We regard this work as a distinct contribution to the sum of human knowledge. The information contained in it, information rich and of great value, was scattered through the great libraries in rare volumes, mostly out of print, and therefore inaccessible to scholars in general. The volume represents an incalculable amount of painstaking and long continued investigation of the literature of the past bearing on this subject. As a result we have a full presentation and discussion of the facts relating to this singular semi-Jewish sect. Under the various headings the author presents these people in their Origin, their History under the Hellenic and Roman empires, and under Islamism, together with their Theology, Languages and Literature. We commend this work most heartily to the general reader and student. It should have a place in every well-arranged library.

T. C. BILLHEIMER.

EATON & MAINS, NEW YORK.

A Plain Man's Working View of Biblical Inspiration. By Albert J. Lyman, D.D., Brooklyn, N. Y. Cloth, 12 mo. Pp. 47. Price 50c. net

This very beautifully printed and bound booklet contains a clear and convincing plea for the inspiration of the Bible, based on four propositions:

First. There is such a thing as intellectual or literary inspiration—in a word, genius; and the Bible exhibits a very high degree of this.

Second. There is such a thing as moral or ethical inspiration, and the Bible exhibits a supreme degree of this.

Third. The Bible exhibits here and there marks of a special and spiritual inspiration, that is to say, gleams of insight so profound and wonderful, into the depths of religious truth and the spiritual life of man as to be apparently beyond any natural power of production possessed by the plain men who, on any theory of the Bible, originated these writings in a rude land and age.

Fourth. There are so many of these flashes or headland lights in the Bible and they are so distributed that they become interpretative and corrective of all the remainder of the Bible.

These propositions are defended with great force and cumulative power, producing a very strong presumption in favor of the contention.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

Life's Eventide. By Robert P. Downes, LL.D., author "Pillars of Our Faith," etc., etc. 8 mo., Cloth. Pp. XI 207. Price \$1.00 net.

"The object of this book is to provide some solace and inspiration to those in declining years." In order to discover whether the proposed end had been attained, the reviewer submitted the volume to the perusal of a venerable and intelligent lady of more than four-score years. She returned the book with beaming face and said "It is one of the most delightful books which I have ever read." It stood the test. We trust that it will have a wide circulation. Our readers will render a real service to their aged friends by making it accessible to them.

The topics treated are pertinent to the theme. Beginning with general reflections on old age, the train of thought follows the daily life and leads on and up to the endless life of immortal youth. There are many plain and practical suggestions as well as profound truths. The treatment is simple and shows fine culture and tender sympathy.

The make-up of the book is excellent in regard to paper, binding and especially type, which is good for old eyes.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

The Ripening Experience of Life and other Essays. By William V. Kelley. Cloth, 8 mo. Pp. VII 444. Price \$1.50 net.

This is a volume of most stimulating essays. The title is de-

rived from the first essay and "seems not unfit to cover this volume since the views and connections contained in the book have not been hastily acquired nor rashly propounded." The number of essays is thirty-two, covering a wide range of topics, arranged under three heads: 1. Avowals, 2. Answers, and 3. Consolations.

These essays are rich in positive "avowals." "Little Pippa: A study in Ignomies" and "Automatic Evangelism" are a forceful presentation of the power of personality. Among the "Answers," "The Bible as a Strain of Music," expresses the absurdity of the claims of "Ethical Culture" which looks upon the sacred Book in soft, sentimental way. For keen dissection of the pretensions of unbelieving scientists we commend "The Scientist's Compassionate Smile," "The Cosmic Chill," and "Truthfulness of Men of Science."

The essays are marked by fine moral and spiritual perfection, expressed in chaste diction, and indicate broad literary culture. They teem with illustrations culled from every department of literature. A splendid optimistic spirit, born of the old faith, runs through them. While appealing to all classes, they will act as a tonic to the disheartened minister, and will furnish him with suggestive themes.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

Thoughts on the Lord's Prayer. By Francis B. Palmer. 74 pp. Price 50c. net.

In the preface the author announces that the purpose of his "booklet" is "to aid in deepening devotion in the use of the prayer and to quicken the consciousness of the really great wants of men by calling attention to a few of the suggestions that lie near the surface and yet may escape the notice of a casual reader."

This purpose is very well carried out. The prayer is divided into four parts, respectively, "Address," "Salutation or Propitiatory Offerings," "Petition Proper" and the "Doxology," and each of these parts receive separate treatment. Just one-half of the space is devoted to the second part. The discussions are fresh, suggestive and devotional.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

Poems with Power to Strengthen the Soul. Compiled and edited by James Mudge. 8 mo. Pp. XII 295. Cloth, Gilt top. Price \$1.50 net.

Mr. Mudge quotes in the introduction to this collection of poems a line from George Herbert,

"A verse may find him who a sermon flies."

Certainly it would be difficult to find a collection of verse more inspiring, or better suited to the needs of a clergyman, who often seeks in vain for an appropriate stanza or poem to emphasize or supplement his own words. There is a thoroughly good index, both of titles, first lines and subjects. The collection includes not only many familiar selections, such as *The Present Crisis*, *The Chambered Nautilus* and many fine hymns, but many equally noble but less well known poems, such as Clough's "Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth," and Edward Rowland Sill's *The Reformer*. There are also some translations from the German.

E. S.

Whedon's Commentary...Commentary on the Old Testament.

Vol. IX, The Minor Prophets. By Frederick Carl Eiselen, Professor in Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill Pp. 741. Price \$2.00 net.

This work, like most Commentaries now appearing, is written from the standpoint of the Higher Criticism. The author claims to be conservative, and this claim is borne out in a general way. There are, however, notable exceptions, one of which we will cite as an illustration. It is found in the introduction to Amos. After giving some fourteen references by the prophet to the Pentateuch the author has this to say: "Not a single statement of Amos proves or even implies the existence of the Pentateuch in its present form. One may go even farther and say that there is nothing in the Book of Amos to place it beyond doubt that any part of the Pentateuch was known to the prophet in written form." This is a mere assertion and of course has no value. One feels tempted to ask how many quotations must be made from a book in order to prove the existence of that book. And why will not the professor allow the Pentateuch to have existed in its present form when Amos writes? For the simple reason that the critical theory places the date of the Pentateuch in its present form in the fifth century B. C., while Amos prophesied three hundred years earlier, therefore Amos did not quote from the Pentateuch.

Aside from these blemishes, however, the Commentary has real value. Especially is this true of the introductions to the several

books. Here we have the life of the prophet, a picture of the times in which he wrote, an orderly outline of the contents of the book, and the integrity of the book, all of which is brief, yet complete and informing. Of course the author does not accept the historicity of the Book of Jonah, nevertheless, he gives a fair and full statement of the arguments for and against this view. In his comments on the text our author is at his best. He has an unerring insight into the divine Word. He is familiar with the latest archaeological discoveries, and uses them freely in clearing away difficulties. We are especially pleased, for example, with his explanation of the doubtful passage in Amos VII, 26. He has the spirit of the true expositor. He gets at the meaning of things, and his interpretations are throughout exceedingly rich and helpful.

T. C. BILLHEIMER.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

The Natural History of the Ten Commandments. By Ernest Thompson Seton. 12 mo. Pp. 78.

This is an interesting and unique booklet from the pen of a great naturalist, who has delighted young and old by his interpretation of the life and the habits of animals. He has set for himself the remarkable task of proving a theory that "The Ten Commandments are not arbitrary laws given to man, but are fundamental laws of all highly developed animals." He reverses Drummond's process, who found a natural law in the spiritual world, by seeking for a spiritual law in the natural world.

Beginning with the Second Table of the Decalogue, Mr. Seton shows in succession how the violation of the Commandments brings punishment. The little chickens which disobey the mother-hen may be lost or perish. The maternal instinct protects the young of all animals. If the young do not heed, they suffer. He illustrates the Commandment, Thou shalt not kill, by showing that animals of the same species rarely destroy each other. He offers facts that indicate that sexual purity and monogamy among animals is the normal state which produces the highest types and results. In reference to stealing the author affirms that animals, as a rule, do not steal from their companions, and that they also abhor anything like false witness among themselves. False reports are not tolerated in the animal world. Covetousness, also, is not tolerated and meets due punishment.

These points are ingeniously fortified with illustrations, not all of which are convincing. The principle which underlies all these actions of animals is that of self-protection, the knowledge of which is instinctive but originally derived from experi-

ence. In short, animal morality is purely utilitarian. This is the theory of Hedonism in its primary form.

Our author is, as a matter of course, an evolutionist, who believes in "natural selection," and the "ceaseless upward struggle." What Darwin has found true in the material world, he believes also holds in the moral world. When, however, he comes to apply the First Table of the Law to animals he is somewhat staggered. At length, however, he finds a clue in the actions of some animals, which flee from their brute enemies to the protection of man. He says, "Maybe in this instinct of the brute and extremity, we have revealed the foundation of something which ultimately had its highest development in man." The brute is supposed instinctively to recognize in man a superior power, just as man recognizes a Supreme Being to whom he flees in trouble.

We would not deny Mr. Seton's facts, but his theories are fanciful when applied to the realm of spirit.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

The Virgin Birth of Christ. Being lectures delivered under the auspices of the Bible Teachers' Training School, N. Y., 1907. By James Orr, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, Scotland. 8 mo., Cloth. Pp. XIV 301. Price \$1.50 net.

These lectures by Dr. Orr created a deep impression when delivered last spring. Those interested in the subject are grateful for their reproduction in the present permanent form. Though comparatively brief, they are a classic. The line of argument is simple and the conclusions convincing. The gist of the volume may be presented as follows:

1. The denials of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. These came chiefly from scholars of the anti-Trinitarian, Naturalistic and Rationalistic Schools, and are based upon what they call (a) The inherent improbability, (b) The spuriousness of the text in Matthew and Luke, and (c) The silence of other N. T. writers. The answer to the first objection appeals to the fact of God's immanence, and to the inherent probability of the virgin birth as furnishing the only adequate explanation of the origin of the supernatural life and character of our Lord. The answer to the second is an appeal to fact. There is absolutely no ground for calling into question the integrity of the texts in Matthew and Luke. They rest upon the same authority as the rest of the gospels. The third objection is also groundless, for it can be shown that these writers either had no occasion to allude to the virgin birth, or actually did so.

2. The Authenticity of the Virgin Birth. This is established by arguments, cumulative in character. (a) The plain, undeniable affirmation of two (or one-half) of the Gospels. There is no proof of interpolation. The accounts are so direct, that no additional statements on the part of other writers seem necessary. (b) Other N. T. writers take the Virgin Birth for granted. Mark begins his story with the baptism of Jesus. John evidently knew the facts and alludes to them in such passages as, "The Word became flesh." Paul must have heard the account of the Virgin Birth from Luke, his traveling companion, and evidently has it in mind in Romans I, 3, 4; VIII 7; Phil. II 7; Gal. IV 4.

3. Its Early Acceptance is proved by its denial by a few small heretical sects, by its unchallenged currency in the Church, by quotations from the Early Fathers and the Apostles' Creed.

4. Its Importance rests upon the fact that (a) it confirms Christ's supernatural character as seen in his works and his resurrection. (b) It explains his entrance into the world as nothing else can. (c) It is a proof of his sinlessness.

An Appendix constitutes a valuable feature, giving confirmatory opinions of nearly a score of eminent scholars.

J. A. SINGMASTER.

Days Off and Other Digressions. By Henry Van Dyke. 8 mo., Cloth, illustrated. Pp. 322. Price \$1.50.

In *Days Off* Doctor Van Dyke has gathered together several essays, one or two less formal compositions, and several very good stories. The compilation is thoroughly delightful, especially the dissertation on sea gulls, the story of Silverhorns, the fine old moose who dared to give battle to a locomotive. Country folk and country lovers will see with delight the careful records of country walks and fishing trips, and the palms of their urban cousins will itch for rod and paddle. The book is heartily to be recommended. It is beautifully illustrated, and handsomely bound. The paper and the printing are good. The make-up and the contents of *Days Off* fit it for the parlor table or the study. It will be welcomed as a gift book.

E. S.

Under the Crust. By Thomas Nelson Page. 8 mo., Cloth, gilt, illustrated. Pp. 307. Price \$1.50.

Under the Crust is a collection of six short stories which have appeared from time to time in magazines, and *The Hostage*, a one-act play. Of the stories, *A Brother to Diogenes* and *Leander's Light* are the best. Mr. Page is the most successful in picturing simple, rugged folk, such as old Simmy, who refuses to

be tempted or coerced into giving up the old house where he was born. *The Hostage* is a disappointment, being old in subject matter, and accomplishing its effects by theatric rather than dramatic means. The book, as a whole, is entertaining, is handsomely gotten out and will be a suitable gift book.

E. S.

Social and Religious Ideals. By Artemas Jean Haynes, M.A.

A kodak is a very interesting diversion for the owner of it. It enables him to take snapshots of the things that strike his fancy. These pictures he develops; he shows them to his friends, who tolerantly permit themselves to be bored by the incessant thrusting before their eyes of picture after picture, which, interesting enough to the owner, have absolutely no attraction for the patient beholder. This book is a collection of snapshots. Some of them represent aspects of morals and religion, and are very well done indeed. But, as a photograph by an amateur is not art, so these extracts are not literature. One suspects that they have been picked out of the author's sermons, or addresses. They are very short, scrappy, disconnected. That they should be seriously regarded as contributions to the literature of sociology or religion, is not possible. Few men can write first rate short essays. These seem to be mere fledgling flights, not to be compared with the fine work of writers like Hamilton Mabie, whose books are always welcome. One other figure will serve to illustrate the sort of book before us. Walnut lumber is valuable; but one would not give much for walnut chips. This book is a collection of walnut chips.

D. W. WOODS, JR.

The Youth's Companion Calendar for 1908.

The publishers of the *Youth's Companion* will, as always at this season, present to every subscriber whose subscription (\$1.75) is paid for 1908, a beautiful calendar for the new year. Four paintings by artists of distinction are reproduced in the four panels of the Calendar by a process of color-printing which has been recently brought to remarkable excellence. The first of the panels is an inspiring sea scene, full of the beauty of the wide ocean and sky, and the joyous rush of the home-bound ship. The second is a fine cattle piece. The third picture is an old mill at Zaandam—typically Dutch in treatment. The fourth panel depicts a "Girl with Roses"—a charming face, exquisite in color and expression. All the pictures are worthy of preservation long after 1908 has passed into the good old times.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, NEW YORK.

The Modern Reader's Bible, the Books of the Bible with three Books of the Apocrypha, presented in modern literary form, edited, with Introductions and Notes By Richard G. Moulton, M.A. (Camb.) Ph.D. (Penn) Professor of Literary Theory and Interpretation in the University of Chicago. Cloth Smo. Pp. XIV 1733. Price \$2.00 net.

This volume is an achievement in book-making. Here are nearly eighteen hundred readable pages in a book easily held in the hand. The paper is necessarily thin but is opaque. The type is clear. The price is very moderate. This justly celebrated work is thus brought within the reach of those who may not have thought themselves able to secure the twenty-one volumes in which it has been before the public for the last twelve years. There is some gain in having the whole Bible in a single volume.

The contents of *The Modern Reader's Bible* consist of a preface, in which is explained the purpose of the work, the Books of the Bible as found in the ordinary versions, three Books of the Old Testament Apocrypha, Literary Introduction and Notes to Particular Books, and an Index. The Introduction and Notes cover about 350 closely printed pages. While the author has the example of various publishers in including several of the apocryphal books, nevertheless it seems to us that they should not be associated with the inspired Word of God. They are not found in any authentic Hebrew Bible, and really have no place in the sacred record.

The order of the books is chronological rather than topical, and has much in its favor though it impresses the reader with its unfamiliarity.

The Notes and Introductions are written from a purely literary standpoint. "From this work are excluded, not only theological questions and religious dogma, but also questions of historic criticism" (p. 1367). This method of treatment will make it all the more welcome to many a reader, while to others it will be the evidence of serious limitation. The author justly thinks that the contents of a book are of greater account than the question of its authorship.

"The text of the *Modern Reader's Bible* is one constructed specially for this work, for which the editor is solely responsible. It is based upon the English Revised Version, with choice between the readings of the text and margin, and such slight changes of wording as are involved in the adaptation to modern literary structure" (p. XI). While we have not observed any serious departure from the authorized or Revised Version, the

method of the author is certainly subject to serious question. While we are no stickler for mere words, it seems to us that variation from a text, founded upon the best known sources, can hardly be justified.

The arrangement of the matter and the distinction in type are striking features in the work and differentiate it from the ordinary Bible. The Revised Version does, in small measure, set the example in using paragraphs instead of verses, and also in printing the poetical parts as poetry is ordinarily printed. The author rightly claims that, for instance, in the historical books, there is much matter which in ordinary histories would appear in the form of notes or in an appendix. By indicating this supplemental matter in some way, the author has aimed to bring the main narrative into prominence.

Whatever the author's intentions, his arrangement of the matter can not be without dogmatic tendencies. Moreover, it must be evident that the task attempted is a stupendous one. We doubt if it is at all possible to know exactly the original plan, and we fear also that the judgment of one man, however brilliant and scholarly, is too fallible to be accepted in so serious a matter as the re-arrangement of our Sacred Books.

We do not, by the above strictures, mean in any degree to belittle the splendid work done by Professor Moulton, for we are bound to say that we have read the *Reader's Bible* with deep interest and new delight. Some of the Old Testament poetical books have become almost new to us in their new setting and appeal to us as they have never done before. What greater praise than this can Professor Moulton ask?

J. A. SINGMASTER.

New Theology Sermons. By R. J. Campbell, M.A.

There is a delightful charm in these sermons, suggesting the enthusiasm of youth which freshens whatever is in danger of becoming stale, as religion is in danger of becoming. When Mr. Campbell burst upon the London mind, which is too often typified by the London fog, some people were ready to say, "A great prophet is risen up among us;" second thoughts hardly justify such a statement. But these sermons have those readable qualities of perfect clearness and glowing enthusiasm which will win readers. The utmost sincerity shines in every line. There is not the slightest taint of sensationalism, nor is there any self-conceit evident, even when Mr. Campbell says, as he says frequently, "Now, listen to what I say." One does listen, and is repaid by what he hears, or reads. Startling things the orthodox reader will find here, but American readers are no longer held in leash by orthodoxy. Indeed, one is surprised that Mr. Campbell's doctrines should be called new. They have the fla-

vor of Horace Bushnell's thoughts. These sermons strike a note often found in one so ancient as Hugh Latimer, none the less they have the sure marks of originality, and of course the ministers of the London City Temple could be nothing less than fearless.

A detailed study of these sermons will not be presented in this review. Let it suffice that a few of the doctrines are noted. A favorite thought with him is the manhood of Jesus, as manifesting the divine type of manhood for all the children of God. "Whatever else he may be, God is eternally man," and so, later, "The true life for any man to live is the life that manifests the divine manhood." And again, "We are here to manifest, against the dark background of limitation, the nature of the divine man." "The truest life is the life that Jesus lived." Well, is that not just what all Christians have always believed and aspired to do? Mr. Campbell, however, succeeds in making us feel the reality of this familiar idea, treating it not as a doctrine of theology but as a personal experience for every man. He likes to contrast "theological tradition" and "spiritual common sense."

Where he runs athwart the traditional teaching of the Churches is at the point where he treats of sin. Anyone who is suspected of tampering with the doctrine of sin, opens himself to the charge of minimizing the entire Christian faith. It has seemed necessary to emphasize the fact, the tremendous significance of sin, in order to exalt the death of Christ. The Reformers and their followers have dwelt much on sin as the cause of man's fall and the condition from which he has been redeemed by Christ. "Sin and salvation," a great German theologian has said, are the two elements to be fronted in the gospel. The enormity of sin, its terrible effects in character, its fatality in determining the destiny of man,—who has not heard of these? *Indeed, who does not know the truth about sin in his own soul?* Now, Mr. Campbell does not overlook this. He only lays his emphasis on salvation. He speaks of sin as "the soul in prison," as a self-will, as summed up in selfishness the opposite of love. He is at pains to assure us that sin is horrible, and redemption from it the object of Christ's death. He dwells on the spark of divinity in man, appeals to the latent divine manhood. In short he does not denounce men as sinners, he appeals to them as the sons of God. And there you have, (I believe I have fairly stated it), his doctrine of sin. It grows out of his doctrine of man.

Then, of course, comes his doctrine of the atonement. Here it is, "To speak of Jesus as having paid some mysterious penalty for us in the unseen is not only untrue, but even morally mischievous, for it draws attention away from the essential truth, which is that all human life is of the same equality as His, a manifestation of God." And so the atonement is not a sacri-

fice made to God, as our substitute to satisfy divine justice, it is a sacrifice made by God to show His love for us. For "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." "The one thing in the Christian gospel which people feel to be the most precious—is the truth that Jesus bore their sins upon the cross. And they are perfectly right, it is the marrow of the gospel." In all of this he is perfectly clear and can summon abundance of scripture texts to support his theory, as can be done for any one of the seven or eight theories of the atonement. What Mr. Campbell makes you feel is not so much the truth of his theory, as the strength of Christ's love, His intimate sympathy with sinners, and His power to save from sin.

The idea is further carried out in his teaching about the resurrection. Whether he accepts the actual resurrection of Christ's body and the ascension of His physical frame, Mr. Campbell does not make sufficiently clear. At least I did not note a clear statement of it. He tells us what the disciples believed about it and holds before us the spiritual resurrection, as St. Paul does in his later epistles. "The resurrection is continually repeated in the experience of the sons of God." "It was the rising of Christ in a few simple Galilean fishermen that made the best in modern civilization possible, and it is the rising of that same Christ in brave and faithful men and women now which is filling the world with a great hope for the dawning of a better day." All this is very true. But if Mr. Campbell has no basis of fact, such as the actual resurrection of Christ, upon which to build hope for a personal immortality his preaching will not grip and hold the minds of men very long.

One realizes that there is a very large proportion of mysticism in these sermons. One sentence shows the naziness to be met with occasionally. "The being of God is a circle with its center everywhere and its circumference nowhere. Everywhere is here. Everywhere is now." I suppose that's about as near to a definition of Infinity and Eternity as a finite man can get.

When one has finished reading this book he has the sensation of having been out walking on a cool, breezy day. Nature is just what she always is, only some days are more charming than others. One finds little that is really new in this new theology; it is just a bit fresher, a trifle less solid, than the old theology. And any man will be amply repaid by reading this book. It will stimulate him, give him many clearer ideas of old truths, put him in living touch with vital humanity, and do him lots of good in many ways.

D. W. WOODS, JR.

(Mr. Campbell's *Theology* will be reviewed in our next issue. Eds.)

The Church and the Changing Order. By Shailer Matthews, Professor of Historical and Comparative Religion, in Chicago University. Pp. 255.

This book consists of eight splendidly written chapters. The first is on "The Crisis of the Church," and the last is on "The Sword of Christ." The intervening chapters discuss the Church in her relation to "Scholarship," "The Risen Christ," "Brotherhood," "Social Discontent," "The Social Movement," and "Materialism."

The agencies co-operating to make tomorrow very different from today are, "scholarship," "business," "socialism," "popularized philosophy," "amusements," and "national aggrandizement." The crisis of the Church is found in the necessity of "defining its attitude toward these formative forces." He claims that "the Church is not in touch with the age as it ought to be," and thinks that it is the fault of the Church, that the age has grown away from it.

In his chapter on scholarship he gives Kant and Darwin credit for having peopled the world with "new intellectual citizens." He argues that "dogma, as an expression of the facts of religions known in the life of Jesus and in human experience," is so affected by the "philosophical world-view," "scientific conceptions," and "religious philosophy" that when these latter change, the former must change with them, or adapt itself to them.

The discussion of such an important question by such an eminent scholar and writer necessarily brings out a great many valuable and interesting facts. But when the discussion is carried on from the standpoint of higher criticism, and with an aim to be truly evangelical, it leads to more or less confusion. The aim of the book seems to be to show what advantage the higher critic has in meeting the wants of the age with which it is supposed to "be in touch," over the pronounced orthodox Christian. Indeed the latter seems not to be able to solve the problem at all. The unbelieving critic will find much in the book to his notion. He would join the author heartily in his reflections upon "sixteenth theology" "Jonah and the great fish," &c., and in the low estimate in which he holds the miracle. He says that "Jesus is the real miracle," meaning that he is about all the miracle. Jesus says "the same works that I do bear witness of me." He says, "demoniacal possessions" and belief in the "heavenly Jerusalem and the lake of fire are not the gospel, but the ideas that conditioned the first preaching of the gospel." He tries to construct a gospel out of the barest facts of the gospel, that is both "liberal and scientific," and yet, "evangelical." He thinks that our religious teachers are in a sort of "philosophical, psy-

chological, anthropological, epistemological panic." This can hardly be true of the "sixteenth century theologians" whom he aims to bring in touch with the age, but seems rather to be a warning to his brother higher critics, who having come in touch with the age have run completely off the track. We cannot see how he can calm this theological mob by preaching Darwinism, and the gospel of Schmiedel, Van Manen and Schmidt, and other higher critics. He says "that the belief on part of the apostles in a risen Christ was merely the product of hypnotic suggestion, —auto—suggestion, and feminine hysteria." And yet he tries to hold on to the *risen Christ* in the most orthodox fashion!"

He pleads for the simplification of theology, thinking it a "waste of time, when living in a generation polluted by a mania for gambling, with saloons and brothels at its door, &c., &c., for the Church to pause to manœuvre its theology, and to discuss the calculus of religion," whatever that is, "thus failing to meet the demands of the age." But does the Church do this? Instead of giving us a true picture of the Church, he gives us an ugly caricature. He says that "the Church ought not make the historicity of the great fish and Jonah a test of fitness for co-operation in aggressive evangelism." But does the Church do this? We think not. Jonah's fish was made to swallow, not to be swallowed. Every critic, little and big, infidel or higher critic, must have his fling at poor old Jonah's submarine vessel. Nothing on earth is so overworked, and yet neither the critic, nor Jonah and his fish, seem to get tired of it. Well, as long as Jonah can stand it I guess we will have to. Our author does not give the Church of today a "square deal." It is this same Church which he so arraigns at the bar of his judgment, that is foremost in the great work of moral reform and law—enforcement which is sweeping over the country like a mighty tidal wave.

He claims that preaching is something more than "an appeal to the fear of hell." Well, who doesn't believe this? But is the Church guilty as charged? We think not. She doesn't preach as much hell as she ought. A heaven to gain without a hell to shun, may be good theology for the higher critics, but it doesn't tally with the Book, and the commission it gives to its ambassadors. It strikes us that the Church he is assailing, is the Church that has become weakened by preaching the mutilated and emasculated gospel of the "higher critic." With the miracle and inspiration both jettisoned, the preaching has gone wide of the true gospel mark.

But passing all this by, we cannot agree with the author in his notion that the Church must all the time be adapting herself to the ever changing world order. We cannot treat the Bible on "the Dutch auction plan" lowering its claims to the level and

bidding of rationalistic critics. We are becoming afraid of these theological and critical experts. They bring to our memory the dictum of Matthew Arnold, concerning those who "make learning and study the business of their lives," as they are apt "from want of some discipline or other, to lose all balance of judgment, all common sense." While it is true that Christianity is being judged, and tested by a broader intelligence, and broader views on many noted moral questions, and has its own peculiar problems to solve, we cannot believe that she is having a more severe test in the twentieth century than she had in the first. And instead of trying to find some scientific method of adaptation, our notion is that all these difficulties will readily yield to apostolic methods and measures. Greek idealism and Roman paganism were met and boldly encountered by the great apostle, and *overcome*, not by method of adaptation, but by boldly crying out "I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the *power of God*." What we need is not some means of adaptation to the world-order, but some way to keep this world-order *out* of the Church. The point of contact, and the only one possible between the world and the Church, between the age and the Church, is the contact of *conflict*, and not of agreement. We do not believe that any man who candidly accepts Moses, Christ and Paul, can possibly accept Darwin. They do not agree, and no line of argument, however adroitly drawn, can make them agree. There can be no greater mistake than to persist in trying to make them align, either in matters of science or of religion. And if this *could* be done we would find ourselves *farther* from meeting the problems of the age than before.

Besides the ethical teachers who are determined to avoid the doctrines of reward and punishment, are not the product of the sixteenth century, but of the twentieth. There never was an age more out of touch with the gospel message than the first century, the apostolic age, when it spread over nearly the entire civilized world. The difference between that age and our own is, so far as this discussion is concerned, that it had *passed* its golden era, and was looking for the Messiah, while we are *in the midst* of our golden era and are *not looking for the Christ*. There is too much of Darwinism and not enough of Christ in the Church, and that is a chief trouble. The world can never be saved, and immorality be cleansed by preaching a theory of creation. No age ever more needed the gospel preached in its apostolic purity and simplicity, and with pentecostal fire, than our own, and when that is done, *the devils of the twentieth century will flee as did the devils of the first*.

J. M. CROMER.

Jesus Christ and the Civilization of To-day. By Joseph Alexander Leighton, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Hobart College. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1907. Pp. X, 248. Price \$1.50.

The aim of this book is to offer an interpretation of the fundamental principles of Jesus in their bearing on the problem of social life and individual destiny as these present themselves to the men of to-day. It justly objects to the ethics of Antiquity and to that of the Middle Ages. It pleads for the ethics that has the Gospel as its basis. The book is practical and readable. The author is at home in his subject and cannot fail to hold the attention of the reader. In theology his standpoint resembles very much that of the positive modern school in Germany. Its appeal to Scripture is sane and strong, his attitude toward evolution and biology sound. The criticism that he passes on Fr. Nietzsche is alone worth the price of the book. The literature-references, though only moderately large, are up-to-date. It is known that Prof. Peabody, in his *austausch* lectures, delivered in Germany, was severely criticised for his onesided use of the literature current on his subject: he ignored the scientific literature of the conservatives. This criticism cannot be directed against Prof. Leighton, who bids fair to become a rival of the Harvard scholar. There are a few very important works, however, that our author seems to have neglected to consult—the works of Kahler and Zahn, bearing on the term The Son of Man (see Kahler's art. Christology in PRE. and Zahn's Commentary on St. Matthew), and, though I am not so sure of this, one booklet of Ph. Bachmann, "*Die Sittenlehre Jesu.*"

JOHN O. EVJEN.

MANN & MANN, ST. AUGUSTINE, FLA.

Story of the Huguenots. A sixteenth century narrative wherein the French, Spaniards and Indians were actors. By F. A. Mann

This little book is classified among the Florida Historical Tales. It is a simple story of the century in which Florida made its appearance in written history. The author's brief introduction is followed by three pages moonshine rhetoric on our southernmost state, descriptive matter that would do credit to a land-seeker's guide, got out by the land department of the best of our railroads. The real corpus of the book is divided into two parts. The first part, called "The History of It," tells about the troubles the French Huguenots had with the Spaniards. It relates the founding of La Caroline, the war with the

Indians, the suffering of the French Protestants at the hands of the cruel Spaniard and fanatic Catholic Melendez. Praise is bestowed upon Ribault and D'Erlach. The second part, called "The Romance of It," describes the romantic adventures of D'Erlach and his men along the coast of St. Augustine.

The purpose of the book is to eulogize the Huguenots as "the first martyrs to civil and religious liberty on the American continent; arriving as they did nearly a century before the landing of the Puritans at Plymouth." We cannot say that the eulogy is a success. We can, however, say that the scientific value of the book, as viewed by a student of history, is nothing.

JOHN O. EVJEN.

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J. A. SINGMASTER.

